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TRANSACTIONS IN CORPORATE
CONTROL*
Noyes Leech t
One seeking to acquire control of an existing corporation's op-
erations is not confined to buying all of its assets or merging it into
another corporation. He may simply buy a sufficient number of voting
shares to give him the "control" he desires.1 The purchase of a ma-
jority of voting shares brings power to elect at least a majority of the
* A Table of Contents for this article is appended at pp. 840-41.
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1. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69
(1933). The "control" of a corporation resides in that person or group of persons
which in fact determines the corporation's operational and financial policies with
minimum practical risk of effective reversal of policy decisions. In that sense, the
subordinate corporate official who has broad discretionary authority in the particular
area of corporate activity committed to him does not control that part of the cor-
poration, so long as the ambit of his authority is in practice circumscribed by others
and his decisions subject to effective review. Nor do scattered and unorganized
holders of a majority of the corporation's shares control the corporation, however
potential their control may be. For the most part, control rests in that person or
concerted group of persons who hold majority shares or occupy a position in the
corporate machinery which facilitates their garnering majority shares. Such a per-
son or group can select at least a majority of the board of directors, the technical
repository of the decision-making function in the corporation. As demonstrated in
the work cited above, there are numerous devices by which control (i.e., the practical
ability to select the board of directors) may be exercised. This article is concerned
with the control which is exercised through ownership of a majority of the cor-
poration's shares or of a large minority block of such shares. Of course, the mere
process of collection of a large minority block of shares does not guarantee that
control may be wrested from a management which has been able to administer the
proxy machinery to acquire voting majorities. But once such a block has assumed
management through a proxy fight or otherwise, its hold on the board of directors is
practically insured so long as a scattered majority acquiesces in its retention. Prac-
tical control thus may rest in a large minority block of shares not only because of
the difficulty of organizing opposition to the block (and to the shareholder adherents
it has acquired by inertia) but also because attempts to organize that opposition are
still not commonplace.
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directors and thereby to determine the day to day policies of the busi-
ness. Even a large block of minority shares may give the buyer as
much freedom, for if there is no similar concentration of shares out-
standing and the majority shareholders are sufficiently scattered to
make organized opposition unlikely, the buyer may find that he can
use the proxy machinery to install directors of his own selection.
The buyer may acquire the shares necessary to give him control
in a variety of ways, including open market purchases and invitations
of tenders from outstanding shareholders. If he is looking for a short-
cut, he may deal directly with the corporate management or with some-
one who already owns a block of majority or minority shares large
enough for his purposes. In such cases, participation by the manage-
ment or the controlling shareholders in the buyer's acquisition of con-
trol creates problems of significance and difficulty in corporation law.2
It is the purpose of this article to examine transactions involving the
acquisition of controlling corporate shares in the light of possible
causes of action against members of management and controlling share-
holders who facilitate such acquisitions.
Two major factual situations are to be considered. Part One
covers cases such as the following: D is a member of the management
of Corporation C, or the holder of a controlling block of C's shares, or
both. Buyer wishes to acquire control of C by purchasing shares. D
may sell his own shares, if he has any. At the same time he may
either buy other outstanding shares for resale to Buyer or advise,
or in some other fashion assist, other holders of outstanding shares
to sell to Buyer. Possibly, D may do nothing more than sell his own
shares, while Buyer makes his own arrangements with the other share-
holders for acquisition of their shares. The outstanding shareholders
(other than D) whose shares are thus purchased in connection with
Buyer's acquisition of control may for convenience be referred to col-
lectively in this article as "selling shareholders." The problem to be
considered is whether or not the selling shareholders have any cause
of action against D and, if so, under what refinements of the circum-
stances mentioned above.
Part Two covers primarily those cases in which D, the holder of
a controlling block of shares (either majority or minority), sells his
own shares to Buyer; the latter does not necessarily purchase the shares
of other shareholders. Those whose shares are not included in the
sale and who thus continue to be shareholders after the transfer of the
2. See Notes, Duties of Controlling Shareholders in Transferring Their Shares,
54 HARV. L. Rav. 648 (1941), Sale of Corporate Control, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 869
(1952), Restrictions on the Transfer of Controlling Stock, 40 VA. L. Rav. 195 (1954);
see also note 227 infra.
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controlling shares may for convenience be referred to collectively in
this article as "remaining shareholders." The problem to be considered
is whether or not D, the seller of controlling shares, is liable either to
the corporation or to the remaining shareholders and, if so, under what
circumstances.
A third factual situation may arise, involving a combination of
the two foregoing cases. D, the holder of controlling shares, sells his
controlling block; some, but not all, of the other holders of outstanding
shares sell their shares to Buyer. Thus there is posed the problem of
the integration of the possible remedies of three interested groups:
the selling shareholders, the remaining shareholders and the corpora-
tion. That problem also is examined in Part Two of this article.
The formal transaction giving unity to all of the cases considered
is a transfer of shares. Beyond the merely formal, however, each such
share transaction results in the vesting of control in the buyer. This
two-fold characteristic has created difficulty in the analysis of cases in
this area. In the main, corporate shares have been considered by their
holders, as well as by many courts, as constituting merely one species
of personal property which the owner is free to dispose of as his in-
clinations may dictate. However, recognition in recent years that
corporate control is a fact capable of isolation and identification has
caused courts to view its transfer by way of share transactions as a
matter essentially different from an ordinary purchase or sale of shares.
Courts have begun to focus attention on the responsibilities of those
who hold control and transfer it, or who have it within their power
to aid the buyer to acquire control from scattered shareholders. Those
peculiarly in that position are controlling shareholders and managers.3
As a result of judicial attention to this problem, controlling share-
holders have discovered that they may be subject to liabilities which
they thought did not rest on them. In addition, the relative im-
munity which management has had with respect to share transactions
has been disappearing.
Judicial examination of control transactions as such, rather than
merely as share transfers, has come about slowly. Courts have dealt
with the problems of control transfers in the light of common-law doc-
trines seldom designed to encompass transactions involving the peculiar
3. Unless otherwise specified, the word "manager" is used to mean one who is a
director or an officer of the corporation, or both. The officers included in the term
are those who occupy the major executive positions, usually the president, vice-
presidents, secretary, treasurer and anyone who, while not technically holding an office
with such a name, performs the functions usually performed by such an officer. Thus
in those cases in which it appeared that one of the parties was a "general manager"
and that his functions were those usually associated with the office of president or of
vice-president, that person has been referred to as a "manager."
19561
728 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
fact of corporate control. As a result the bases of decision are fre-
quently unclear. Some assistance in the solution of the problems in
this area has come by way of the federal securities statutes.4 There-
fore, it is the plan of this article to consider first the judicial handling
of particular problems under state law and to follow with a considera-
tion of the impact of the federal statutes upon the same fact situations.
Since, as has been suggested, the problems in this area were
initially viewed merely as share transfers, it is not surprising to note
that it has been a painfully slow process for the courts to impose new
responsibilities on a distinct type of shareholder, the controlling share-
holder. On the other hand, more ease in holding directors and officers
to strict standards of conduct, even in share transactions in general,
might have been expected: they were, after all, charged with a high
degree of responsibility for the welfare of the enterprise from the
outset. Even with respect to directors and officers, however, imposi-
tion of such high standards in control transactions has not been auto-
matic.
Initially it is necessary to consider a fundamental assumption which
underlies many of the cases with which this article is concerned. That
assumption is that it is not desirable to foreclose those who occupy
managerial positions from acquiring shares in the corporations in their
charge. Conceivably the law could have developed in a contrary di-
rection. As it became obvious that there was increasingly less identity
between the managers and the owners of corporate property, it might
have been concluded that complete segregation of management and
ownership would be more desirable than managerial ownership of only
a partial interest in that property. The argument could have run as
follows: directors and officers should represent the whole body of
shareholders. An owner of shares may at times find his interests
opposed to those of fellow shareholders, particularly when he is buying
and selling shares. A manager who owns shares may find his per-
sonal interests no less opposed to those of other shareholders and may,
indeed, seek to use corporate machinery to advance those personal
interests. Therefore, to guarantee concentration of endeavor on behalf
of all shareholders, the possibility of personal temptation in any case
should be removed by a rule forbidding managerial share ownership
in all cases.'
4. The statutes of primary interest are the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74
(1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1952) (hereinafter referred to as the Securities
Act), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 896 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1952) (hereinafter referred to as the Exchange Act).
5. See BERLE & MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 225
n.6 (1933).
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In the development of modern corporate policy, that argument
has been rejected, if indeed it was ever seriously considered. At least
equally plausible is the argument that managers who do not own some
interest as shareholders will be more inclined to use the corporation
for their own benefit than will those who, as shareholders, are affected
by whatever the corporation does. Statutes which require directors
to own "qualifying" shares retain the vestige of an assumption that
ownership of even a small part of an enterprise is a mild inducement
to better management. The practice of granting options to managers
to purchase shares at favorable prices has been justified in part on
the ground that management's acquisition of a stake in the enterprise
gives it an incentive to operate it consistently with investor interests.'
Not the least significant reason for the continuance of the basic as-
sumption is the desire to inhibit freedoms only to the extent that their
exercise is positively injurious to some common objective of society.
In management's ownership per se of corporate shares, there has been
no discernible risk of injury to any such objective.
Ownership of shares has implied some freedom to trade in them.
As will appear later in this article, the courts are not agreed on the
appropriate extent of that freedom so far as manager-shareholders are
concerned. They are agreed, however, that the fact that a person is
a corporate manager will not serve alone as the basis for imposing
a sanction on him for trading in his corporation's shares unless a
regulatory statute dictates otherwise.7 The freedom permitted to a
manager to trade in shares appears to go so far as to permit him to
buy shares for the purpose of accumulating a sufficient number to ac-
quire control of the corporation,' a freedom similar to that accorded
to the complete outsider.9 No shareholder whose shares have been
bought by a manager seeking to acquire control has successfully com-
plained solely on the ground that the one who purchased was a man-
ager.10
6. See Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HARV. L. Rav. 1403, 1404 (1953).
7. E.g., § 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p
(1952). Even under § 16(b), a beneficial owner, officer or director subject to its
provisions will be required to account for his profit only if the profit is realized by
trading activities within a period of less than six months. See also SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (proceeding under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79 (1952)).
8. Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147 (1947);
Howell v. McCloskey, 375 Pa. 100, 99 A.2d 610 (1953). In Guaranty Laundry Co. v.
Pulliam, 198 Okla. 667, 181 P.2d 1007 (1947), the court rejected one argument which,
if recognized, would constitute a substantial restriction upon a manager's purchasing
any shares, controlling or otherwise; the contention rejected was that an officer may
not purchase shares without first affording an opportunity to other officers and share-
holders to share in the purchase.
9. Hubbard v. Schlump, 106 Conn. 216, 137 Atl. 644 (1927).
10. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). A manager may be called
to account to the corporation for the purchase of the corporation's shares on his own
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When such a purchase of shares is examined in the light of the
circumstances under which it was made and the purpose for which
controlling shares were acquired, entirely different considerations come
into play. What risks are faced by a manager, or even a controlling
shareholder, who purchases shares to carry out a plan to vest control
in a third party? If the third party's purchase of control is cast in
some form other than a purchase and resale of shares by the manager,
or by the controlling shareholder, are those risks altered? The first
part of this article is concerned with such questions.
PART ONE. ACTIONS BY SELLING SHAREHOLDERS
I. ACTIONS UNDER STATE LAW
A. Actions Against Managers or Controlling Shareholders Who
Purchase for Resale or Advise Sale to Buyer of Control
Assume that Buyer wishes to acquire undiluted control of Cor-
poration C by purchasing all of its outstanding shares, consisting of
50,000 shares of common voting stock." He is willing to pay $200,000
for all of the shares, an average of $4 a share for all those outstanding.
He discusses the matter with a member of the corporate management
or with someone (not necessarily an officer or director) who already
owns a majority or controlling minority block of shares. If it may be
assumed that sales of Corporation C's shares have recently been made
at or around $3 a share, the manager or controlling shareholder may
do several things, the following two of which may now be considered:
Case A. Selling Shareholders Do Not Know That Buyer
Is Acquiring Control. D (the manager or controlling share-
holder) contracts with Buyer to deliver all of the outstanding shares
at Buyer's price ($200,000) or keeps the negotiations with Buyer
open. Then D buys any outstanding shares which he does not
presently own, paying approximately $3 a share for them. The
selling shareholders do not know of D's prospective profitable
resale to Buyer. D eventually delivers all of the Corporation's
behalf when he has used corporate funds to make the purchase: Ashman v. Miller,
101 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1939) ; Ashley v. Keith Oil Corp., 73 F. Supp. 37, 47 (D. Mass.
1947) (defendant had also disabled corporation from purchasing the shares which he
bought on his own behalf) ; or at a time when the corporation has directed him to
purchase its shares on its behalf: Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 46, 5 N.Y.S.2d
721, 730 (1st Dep't 1938) (dictum).
11. In deciding how he may best acquire C's business, Buyer may consider a
merger or a purchase of all the assets. He may reject those methods in favor of a
purchase of shares because of the applicable corporation statute; if that statute permits
shareholders dissenting from a merger or sale of assets to withdraw from the cor-
poration upon receiving the appraised value of their shares, there is the possibility that
a large number of shareholders may dissent and thereby drain the corporation.
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shares to Buyer for $200,000, averaging $4 a share, all of which
D retains.'
Case B. Selling Shareholders Do Not Know Price at Which
Buyer Is Acquiring Control. D either contracts with Buyer to
use his best efforts to see that all of C's shares will be delivered
to Buyer or keeps the negotiations open. Then D tells other
shareholders about Buyer's desire to acquire all of the shares and
advises them to sell or acts as their intermediary for delivery of
their shares to Buyer. D does not tell them how much Buyer is
willing to pay to acquire control. All of the shares are eventually
delivered to Buyer, who expends a total of $200,000 or an average
of $4 per share. But selling shareholders other than D have re-
ceived only $3 a share while D has received all of the rest, either
as a "bonus" or as a higher "price" per share for his own shares.
Has the manager or controlling shareholder incurred liability to
the selling shareholders in either of the above two cases? 1"
The foregoing transactions raise problems concerning the struc-
ture of the corporation as an institution and the interrelationship of its
component parts. No mere purchase and sale of shares is involved;
the entire enterprise 14 as a going concern is purchased by someone will-
ing to pay a highly favorable price. A business opportunity of a
12. D might persuade Buyer that effective control could be obtained without pur-
chasing the presently outstanding shares. If D should seek to acquire a sufficient
number of shares to satisfy Buyer's needs, by procuring the creation of new shares
by the corporation and their issuance to D for resale, a whole new set of problems
would arise. Aside from the frustration of D's plans, which might result from a
request for shareholder approval of an increase in authorized capital, existing share-
holders might have a common-law, statutory or charter pre-emptive right which would
be violated by an issuance of shares solely to D.
13. Whether a contract for the sale of controlling shares will be enforceable
between buyer and seller presents its own problems. See note 181 infra.
14. Cases A and B involve Buyer's efforts to acquire 100% of the corporation's
outstanding shares. If Buyer makes an offer to purchase D's shares, as well as
some but not all of the remaining outstanding shares, he may acquire effective con-
trol of the enterprise without 100% ownership. The writer believes that a selling
shareholder whose shares enter into a block of shares which Buyer eventually acquires
should be accorded the same rights as are given to selling shareholders when Buyer
acquires all of the corporation's shares. It is the writer's thesis that the sale of the
control of an enterprise is a unique transaction which cannot be equated merely with
a sale of shares and that the opportunity to participate proportionately in the pro-
ceeds of that transaction should be made available to all those whose shares make up
the controlling block which Buyer acquires. Nor should the rights of such selling
shareholders be diminished by a showing that D's shares alone were sufficient to
give Buyer control; if Buyer desired to make that control more complete and less sub-
ject to interference by acquiring shares in addition to D's, the selling shareholders
contributing to that more complete control should have the benefits of their contribu-
tion. The remedies of remaining shareholders whose shares Buyer did not purchase
are considered in Part Two at pp. 774-835 infra. Whether selling shareholders should
have a remedy in every case in which a manager or controlling shareholder pur-
chases for resale to someone not acquiring control poses different problems and is not
the subject of examination in this article.
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unique nature is available; the benefit of that opportunity is enjoyed
by only one segment of the whole corporate family. It might reason-
ably be asked whether, as a matter of wise administration of the cor-
poration as the major form of business organization, managers and
controlling shareholders should be permitted to appropriate such op-
portunities. Selling shareholders might have taken the position that
there is a community of interest in the enterprise as a whole, shared
by all of the shareholders, which overrides the division of the cor-
poration into separate units and that such a community of interest
requires recognition when the control of the enterprise is sold and
their shares have entered into that sale. They might have urged the
development of rules of law specifically directed toward molding the
corporation as an institution and designed to effect as nearly as pos-
sible a proportionate distribution, among all shareholders whose shares
enter into a control transaction, of the total consideration paid by one
who is purchasing control. The writer believes that such rules are
being developed and that they should be adopted and applied by the
courts.
Selling shareholders have rarely taken that position squarely be-
fore the courts. Whether the courts are consciously deciding cases
with an appreciation of that position is not frequently revealed in their
opinions. The obstacle to judicial examination of the questions which
it raises has been that a share transaction may more easily be viewed
as a mere purchase and sale of a species of property than as a matter
of corporate engineering. As such, a more customary set of rules
seems to be applicable, rules relating to an entirely different institution:
counsel for selling shareholders most frequently complain of D's con-
duct in Cases A and B on the ground that he committed a "fraud" on
their clients in connection with a purchase or sale of property and even
then rarely urge specific examination of the incidents of that property
in the light of the corporate institution of which it is an element. And
although the corporate issues necessarily underlie such cases and may
at times enter into the courts' determinations, they are for the most
part obscured, and possibly obliterated, by the inquiry into whether
the selling shareholder has been "misled" by D's behavior. Selling
shareholders may bring the question into issue in an action at law for
fraud and deceit, or a suit in equity for rescission or for a money decree
to redress a "fraud" or to require a "fiduciary" to account. The case
in which they are most likely to succeed arises when they allege that
D acquired their shares for resale or induced them to sell to Buyer by
means of misrepresentation. It may be asked whether the results of
such cases shed any light on the underlying corporate issues.
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1. Misrepresentation
The "elements" of a cause of action at common law for fraud
and deceit form the major external guide posts for judicial decision
in cases involving the misleading of sellers of corporate securities. The
usual questions asked are: (1) Did the defendant make a false state-
ment? (2) Was it a statement of fact? (3) Was the fact material?
(4) Did the defendant know or have reason to know it was false?
(5) Did the defendant intend to induce the selling shareholder to act in
reliance on the statement? (6) Did the selling shareholder reasonably
rely on the defendant's statement? (7) Did the selling shareholder
suffer loss? "5 If the issue is raised in an equity court, the court may
be less concerned with the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the
statement,' but in the cases examined in this article there is hardly a
question on that score.
Emphasis is placed for the most part on the satisfaction of the
"elements" of the cause of action for fraud. Judicial attention thus
is diverted from the issue whether a manager or controlling shareholder
should be entitled to retain the benefit of his transaction when he has
purchased for resale or has acted as intermediary for Buyer's acquisi-
tion of shares. The circumstances under which D acted are of major
importance. And those circumstances may vary widely, as has been
demonstrated in the many cases involving share trading not neces-
sarily engaged in as part of a scheme to transfer control. D may tell
a lie about any number of matters in order to induce other shareholders
to part with their shares. He may tell them that business is bad,
earnings have fallen, assets have depreciated badly or are obsolete,
or the corporation will not soon be able to pay a dividend. 17 Or he
may assert that the shares he is buying are "worth" no more than the
amount he is offering for them. 8 Detailed analysis of those cases will
not be made here, since the intended focus is on purchases involving a
third party's acquisition of control, and the making of such false state-
15. See PRossER, ToRTS 523 (2d ed. 1955); cf. 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 525
(1938).
16. 3 PolMRoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 885 (5th ed. 1941); PROSSER, TORTS
525 (2d ed. 1955).
17. Purchasers of shares were held liable in Lightner v. W. H. Hill Co., 258
Mich. 50, 242 N.W. 218 (1932); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W. 955
(1925); Trebelhorn v. Bartlett, 154 Neb. 113, 47 N.W.2d 374 (1951); Saville v.
Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N.Y. Supp. 768 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 567,
188 N.E. 67 (1933); Von Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N.Y. Supp.
629 (2d Dep't 1908), aff'd, 196 N.Y. 510, 89 N.E. 1114 (1909); Schafuss v. Betts,
94 Misc. 463, 157 N.Y. Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ; cf. Jaynes v. Jaynes, 98 Cal. App. 2d
447, 220 P.2d 598 (1950).
18. Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 224 (1945); Humphrey v. Baron,
223 Iowa 735, 273 N.W. 856 (1937); cf. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d
412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945).
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ments is not a peculiar incident of those transactions. But it may be
suggested that the shifting and uncertain content of the "elements"
of the fraud action make liability less than inevitable even in cases in-
volving an outright lie. 9 For example, it has been asserted that a
statement by a buyer respecting the "value" of purchased shares is
not a statement of "fact"; that a statement about the internal financial
condition of the corporation may not reasonably be "relied" upon by
one who is a shareholder and can look at the books himself; that an
admittedly false statement may not be "material." 20
Such results are not invariable; in some courts liability under such
circumstances has been found." But the diversity of result makes
it difficult to generalize about "underlying" policy determinations which
the courts may be making and emphasizes the necessity for close ex-
amination of those determinations. Consider the court which holds
that a selling shareholder has failed to prove one of the "elements"
of his cause of action and that he cannot recover from a manager or
controlling shareholder as a result.' It might be asserted that such
a court is really making a judgment about the corporate institution:
i.e., it is desirable to afford immunity to corporate managers and con-
trolling shareholders in connection with their share trading (and it is
appropriate for a court to use any reasonable and intellectually honest
means to produce that immunity). Other observers might assert in
contradiction that in such a case no judgment about the corporate in-
stitution is being made at all; the court is merely convinced that selling
shareholders' claims are like those of any other seller of personal prop-
erty, that such shareholders have a cause of action if they have been
misled and that the facts of the case do not demonstrate that that has
occurred. More probably, both ideas play a part in any particular
case, and it is difficult to say whether a judge has been influenced more
by one of them than by the other.
Recognizing, then, that the bases for decision even in cases in-
volving alleged misrepresentation are ambivalent and that it is diffi-
cult to describe a particular case as clearly representing a pronounce-
19. The problems encountered in applying common-law fraud doctrines to secu-
rities transactions are discussed in Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act,
43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
20. Blakeslee v. Wallace, 45 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1930) ; Hooker v. Midland Steel
Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N.E. 445 (1905); Klerlein v. Werner, 307 Pa. 16, 160 Atl. 719
(1932); Haverland v. Lane, 89 Wash. 557, 154 Pac. 1118 (1916); Hacker v. Kyle,
211 Wis. 584, 248 N.W. 134 (1933).
21. Shareholders were not precluded from recovering even though they could
have examined the corporation's books. Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 383,
159 P.2d 980, 986 (1945); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 509, 202 N.W. 955,
956 (1925) ; Bollstrom v. Duplex Power Car Co., 208 Mich. 15, 175 N.W. 492 (1919).
22. See cases cited in note 20 supra.
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ment on "corporate policy" or on the law of "misleading conduct," the
control transfer cases may be examined with the interplay of those
ideas in mind.
Consider hypothetical Case A, in which the manager or con-
trolling shareholder purchases for a resale which will give Buyer con-
trol. The cases in which the manager or controlling shareholder has
used false representations to induce a sale to him in anticipation of
resale are rare. When the cases have arisen, liability has been found
when the manager or controlling shareholder has lied about values,
earnings and other internal matters.23 Such lies had the purpose and
effect of misleading the shareholder into selling at a price lower than
was justified by the value of assets or the earning power of the cor-
poration. Therefore the fact that the insider had a resale contract
was not clearly relevant and did not enter into determining whether
the false representation was of a "material" fact. On the other hand,
the relevance (and the "materiality") of such a resale contract may
be demonstrated by the case of the selling shareholder who recovers
from a manager who has told a lie solely for the purpose of concealing
the manager's profitable opportunity to resell.24  Although it may be
argued that the court is merely affirming the right of an individual
shareholder to make up his own mind about selling to someone who will
make a personal profit from his shares, the result suggests judicial
recognition of the proposition that a shareholder has a protectable in-
terest in the sale of the enterprise as a whole even though it is cast
in the form of a sale of shares.
In hypothetical Case B, a factual variant of the straight purchase
and resale case, fraud doctrines have again been applied by the courts.
23. McMynn v. Peterson, 186 Wis. 442, 201 N.W. 272 (1924). (Action was
brought for rescission by a selling shareholder. Defendant was an officer, director
and majority shareholder. He entered into a tentative agreement with the buyer to
sell all the corporation's outstanding shares at book value of over $27 per share.
Keeping the pending sale secret, defendant's associates acquired plaintiff's shares for
$15 per share and completed the sale to the buyer. A false financial statement had
been exhibited to plaintiff, and other false representations about the state of the
corporation's business had been made. Plaintiff was awarded the difference between
the price paid him for his shares and the price defendant received for them from
the buyer.) See also Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952).
24. In Schroeder v. Carroll, 192 Wis. 460, 212 N.W. 299 (1927), a selling share-
holder, owning 37Y2 shares out of 1055 shares outstanding, asked the defendant (who
was secretary and manager of the corporation, as well as the owner of 255 shares)
if there was "anything in sight where the stockholders will receive a benefit in any
way, shape or manner. . . ." Id. at 461, 212 N.W. at 300. The defendant replied:
"There is absolutely nothing," (id. at 462, 212 N.W. at 300) although he knew
that there was pending a sale of all of the corporation's shares at a proposed price
of $145 per share. The selling shareholder sold his shares to the defendant for $93
per share, and the latter resold them at $143 a share. The court upheld a jury
verdict awarding the selling shareholder damages measured by the difference between
$93 and $143, the jury having found the latter figure to be the "value" of plaintiff's
shares. Cf. Voellmeck v. Harding, 166 Wash. 93, 6 P.2d 373 (1931).
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In such a case the manager or controlling shareholder may sell his own
shares and at the same time either (1) advise the other shareholders
to sell to the same third party or (2) act ostensibly on their behalf to
bring about a sale to the third party. The selling shareholders know
that Buyer is acquiring control; they do not know how much he is pay-
ing for the whole enterprise. As a result of the transaction, the man-
ager or controlling shareholder may receive a higher price for his
shares than other shareholders receive, or he may receive the same
"price" as other shareholders receive plus a "bonus." In either event,
the cash return to the manager or controlling shareholder, per share
of stock owned by him prior to the transaction, is higher than the cash
return per share to the other 'selling shareholders. If the selling share-
holders part with their shares on the basis of a false representation,
legal doctrine is available to support a recovery from the manager or
controlling shareholder who makes the representation. 5 This is so
even though the selling shareholder sells directly to the third party pur-
chaser of control rather than to a manager or controlling shareholder
who in turn resells.
Again, as in the discussion of hypothetical Case A, the question
arises whether the courts are grounding liability on some conception
of corporate policy or relying seriously on the traditional doctrines of
misleading behavior. In the cases presently under" consideration, al-
though the making of false representations has almost invariably re-
sulted in liability, the courts have imported other doctrines to achieve the
result. One court, holding a manager liable to selling shareholders
for lying to them about the price at which a third party was buying
all the shares, stated that it made no difference whether the defend-
ant's obligation to tell the truth arose from doctrines of "confidential re-
lations," ".agency" or "fraud." 28 In one classic case,2 7 the court em-
25. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 D. & E. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789) ; cf. Saville
v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N.Y. Supp. 768 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y.
567, 188 N.E. 67 (1933); White v. Texas, 59 Utah 180, 202 Pac. 826 (1921); 3
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 533, comment c (1938).
26. Stanton v. Hample, 272 Fed. 424, 432 (9th Cir. 1921); see also Stanton v.
Hamilton, 272 Fed. 432 (9th Cir. 1921); Upton v. Southern Produce Co., 147 Va.
937, 133 S.E. 576 (1926).
27. Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179 N.E. 310 (1932), modification aff'd,
262 N.Y. 700, 188 N.E. 127 (1933). The plaintiffs, holders of a minority of the cor-
poration's shares, alleged that defendant Fulmer "dominated" the corporation and the
negotiations leading up to the sale of shares. Fulmer owned or controlled a majority
of the corporation's shares. He informed plaintiffs that an offer had been made for
$300 a share, paid that amount to plaintiffs and delivered their shares to the buyer
for the same price. (Although in the court's language defendant "purchased" plain-
tiffs' shares, it appears that the transaction was a "purchase" only in form, since de-
fendant had "purchased" the shares from plaintiffs with a clear understanding that
the shares were to be delivered to the buyer for the same amount paid to plaintiffs
by defendant.) Shortly after the defendant's delivery of plaintiffs' shares to the
buyer, defendant delivered the remaining (majority) shares to the buyer for $1,098
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phasized the "fiduciary position" of the defendant (an officer, direc-
tor and majority shareholder) 28 in holding him liable to account to
selling shareholders to whom he had lied about the price of an offer for
all of the corporation's shares.29 Other courts have approached such
a case on a theory of agency,8" a theory not difficult to support fac-
tually since the selling shareholder knows that the manager or con-
trolling shareholder is interposed between himself and the third party.
One may only cautiously glean, from the cases emphasizing false
representation, on the facts of Case B, that the courts are trying to
solve the problem from some standpoint of corporate policy. The
choice of doctrines more subtle than those usually associated with the
common-law action for fraud and deceit may merely have resulted
from an attempt on the part of counsel or court to lend more plaus-
ibility to an argument that the selling shareholder has been misled.
The classical elements of the fraud action include a factor of "reli-
ance"; 1 a court may find that a manager or controlling shareholder
was an "agent" or "fiduciary" for a selling shareholder only because
such a finding seems to justify the selling shareholder's reliance on lies
made to him. Or a selling shareholder may merely be trying to bring
his case into equity to obtain a more effective remedy than he would
have under common-law rules of damages. 2 An allegation of "fraud"
a share. Defendant was required to account to plaintiffs, in proportion to their hold-
ings, for the total amount received from the buyer for all the shares. Cf. Falk v.
Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N.E. 243 (1922) (in equity for rescission and accounting;
demurrer overruled) ; Falk v. Hoffman, 241 N.Y. 569, 150 N.E. 558 (1925) (affirming
dismissal of complaint at trial).
28. The supreme court at special term found as a fact that Fulmer was the
president, treasurer and general manager of the corporation. Decision of Trial Judge,
Transcript of Record for Case on Appeal, p. 40.
29. Although the court's mention of the fact that the defendant had kept secret
the difference in the arrangements for the sale of the two blocks of shares points in
the direction of liability based upon nondisclosure, the case does not represent a strong
precedent on that issue. There was evidence of defendant's false representation. It
is coincidental that every false representation carries with it some element of non-
disclosure. Cf. McMynn v. Peterson, 186 Wis. 442, 201 N.W. 272 (1924), in which
the manager (1) falsely stated the book value of shares he was purchasing and (2)
failed to disclose a profitable proposed resale. It might be questioned whether the
nondisclosure of the resale increased the likelihood of defendant's liability in the
McMynn case, in view of the independent false statement by which he procured the
shares at a reduced price.
30. Reed v. Pitkin, 231 Mich. 621, 204 N.W. 750 (1925); Barber v. Martin, 67
Neb. 445, 93 N.W. 722 (1903). See also Mulvane v. O'Brien, 58 Kan. 463, 49 Pac.
607 (1897). (Defendant procured shares of selling shareholders with understanding
he would find a purchaser; defendant made false representations about the buyer's
inspection of plant to conceal the buyer's interest from shareholders; accounting
ordered on theory of agency.) Cf. Wann v. Scullin, 210 Mo. 429, 109 S.W. 688
(1908).
31. PRossER, ToRTs 523, 550 (2d ed. 1955); 3 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 525, 537
(1938).
32. Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N.E. 243 (1922). Under the common
law, a selling shareholder is entitled to recover the difference between the price he
has received for his shares and their "value." 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 549 (1938);
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alone might or might not persuade the equity court to take juris-
diction; " the allegation of an independent equitable ground might be
more successful. Such an independent ground may be found in one
of the many outgrowths of equity's jurisdiction over the express trust;
if the defendant can plausibly be described as a "fiduciary" and the
description documented by facts showing that the selling shareholder
reposed "trust" in him in the particular case, the equity court may open
its doors.34 If the courts are doing no more than putting a gloss on
traditional doctrines of misleading conduct, they have not given much
enlightenment on corporate policies which may underlie their de-
cisions.
It does appear that something more is being done, something which
sheds light on the proposition that shareholders have a community of
interest in control sales. The conflict in the cases suggests that what
is being done is important.? In some courts, the selling shareholder
has been awarded recovery from the manager or controlling share-
holder in the form of a judgment or decree effecting a proportionate
sharing of the total amount paid by the buyer to acquire the enter-
prise."8 Significantly, this result has been obtained although the man-
McCoRmIcm, DAMAGES 456 (1935); cf. Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 552-53, 124 N.E.
144, 146 (1919). There is a question whether the fact that the buyer is willing to
pay a higher price for the shares than they would otherwise bring if sold to one not
purchasing control is an element of "value" within the common-law rule. See cases
at law cited in note 42 infra. One way in which that question may be avoided is to
seek a remedy grounded in the theory that the defendant must disgorge his profits,
as in Falk v. Hoffman, mipra; see also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp.
176 (D. Del. 1955), where selling shareholders alleging common-law fraud as well
as a violation of rule X-10B-5 and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act were not confined
to a recovery measured by the "fair value" of their shares at the time of sale but
were awarded damages in which the disgorging of defendant's profits formed the
major element, apparently on an application of "restitutionary" principles.
33. "Misrepresentation was recognized very early as a basis for the jurisdiction
of courts of equity, at a time when the existing forms of action at law were inade-
quate to deal with the injustices which resulted. When the law courts later developed
remedies for such cases, the equity courts refused to surrender their jurisdiction,
saying that the nature of the 'fraud' made it peculiarly a matter for their inter-
ference." PRossaR, TORTS 524 (2d ed. 1955). There is, however, the possibility that
an equity court will surrender that jurisdiction on the basis of the adequacy of the
legal remedy, particularly when the plaintiff seeks monetary relief and does not seek
the peculiar aid which equity courts afford by way of injunction, discovery, account-
ing and the like. See 3 PomEROY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENcE § 914 (5th ed. 1941).
34. See 4 PoMERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1088, 1089 (5th ed. 1941).
35. Compare Stanton v. Hample, 272 Fed. 424 (9th Cir. 1921), Barber v. Martin,
67 Neb. 445, 93 N.W. 722 (1903), and Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179 N.E.
310 (1932), with Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902), and Klerlein
v. Werner, 307 Pa. 16, 160 Atl. 719 (1932) (purchase of shares in contemplation of
sale of assets). See also Terry v. Green, 185 App. Div. 517, 173 N.Y. Supp. 309
(1st Dep't 1918); McManus v. Durant, 168 App. Div. 643, 154 N.Y. Supp. 580
(1st Dep't 1915).
36. Stanton v. Hample, 272 Fed. 424 (9th Cir. 1921) (at law) ; Reed v. Pitlin,
231 Mich. 621, 204 N.W. 750 (1925) (in equity); Barber v. Martin, 67 Neb. 445, 93
N.W. 722 (1903) (at law); Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179 N.E. 310 (1932)
(in equity); Schroeder v. Carroll, 192 Wis. 460, 212 N.W. 299 (1927) (at law);
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ager or controlling shareholder has sought to justify his retention of
a larger share by pointing to his assumption of additional obligations
not required of the other selling shareholders, such as covenants not
to compete, guarantees of collection of accounts, assumption of con-
tingent liabilities and the like."1 Therefore, to some courts at least,
so strong is the policy in favor of proportionate sharing of the fruits
of a sale of the enterprise through a sale of shares that the benefits
flowing from the assumption of such obligations cannot be retained
unless the opportunity to join in their assumption is laid open to other
shareholders.38 In spite of such holdings, the presence of falsehood,
such an easily recognized ground of liability, simply tends to obscure
other issues.
But not all commercial transactions take place in an atmosphere of
prolix conversation involving a risk of false talk. Cases A and B may
as easily involve a manager or controlling shareholder who is inclined
to abstain from talking about his reasons for purchasing shares or ad-
vising other shareholders to sell. The cases demonstrate that defend-
cf. Voellmeck v. Harding, 166 Wash. 93, 6 P.2d 373 (1931) (at law). In the cited
cases defendants were either managers or, as in the Sautter case, controlling share-
holders who were also managers. The Sautter case is significant because of the fact
that the court did not ground the defendant's liability in his occupation of a managerial
position as distinguished from his control of majority shares.
37. In Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179 N.E. 310 (1932), the defendant's
additional obligations included certain indemnifications (from libel suits growing out
of any act committed by the corporation during the time it was under defendant's
control, against claims not appearing on its books and records and from specified addi-
tional tax assessments), a covenant to abstain for ten years from engaging in the
newspaper business in New York State, acceptance of the purchasers' bonds instead
of their note and a warranty as to the truth of financial statements. The court noted
that it could not say, as a matter of law, that the covenants had no value, but it gave
two reasons for denying recognition to that value: (1) the value attributable to the
covenants was too vague and shadowy, and the process of disentangling any such
value from the remainder of the consideration would be too complicated and artificial
to be practical; and (2) even if the value could be-determined, the defendant would
not be permitted to reduce his obligations to the plaintiffs by that amount because
he had misstated facts and had kept secret a personal benefit emanating from the
additional obligations. In Stanton v. Hample, 272 Fed. 424 (9th Cir. 1921), the
defendant was required to account although he claimed that he had received more
for his shares than the selling shareholders had received because of a covenant not
to compete for ten years, a guaranty of collection of accounts receivable and a promise
to assist the buyer for one year. In Barber v. Martin, 67 Neb. 445, 93 N.W. 722
(1903), the court rejected the defense that the excess price paid to defendant cov-
ered defendant's covenant not to compete.
38. Contra, Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902) (agreement
by directors to remain in employ of corporation) ; Terry v. Green, 185 App. Div.
517, 173 N.Y. Supp. 309 (1st Dep't 1918) (covenant not to compete); Klerlein v.
Werner, 307 Pa. 16, 160 AtI. 719 (1932) (indemnification of purchaser against claims
on corporation and covenant to withdraw from rug and carpet business for a period
of years; questioned transaction involved purchase of shares in contemplation of sale
of all assets). The courts which permit a defendant's retention of excessive price
appear either to have ignored the difficult problem of placing a value on such special
agreements and comparing that value with the excess amount received by the de-
fendant or else to have assumed that the burden of proof on that issue lay with the
complaining shareholder. See Klerlein v. Werner, supra at 22, 160 Atl. at 720,
and text at pp. 792-93 infra.
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ant's conduct, by ever changing degrees, may pass from the fulsome
lie through the half truth to the complete nondisclosure of facts which
might reasonably be thought material. Attention is directed in the
following subdivision toward the cases which do not involve primarily
the making of blatant falsehoods.
2. Nondisclosure
Hypothetical Cases A and B may be examined, therefore, from the
point of view of the manager or controlling shareholder who does not
disclose, in one case, a profitable resale contract or, in the other, the
price which the purchaser of control is paying for the total enterprise.
Consider Case A, the case of the manager or controlling shareholder
who sells his own shares and simultaneously purchases other shares
which he resells at a high price without disclosing his purpose in buying
the shares. The manager or controlling shareholder may try to avoid
liability to the selling shareholder by asserting that the shareholder has
suffered no loss. His argument may be that Buyer would not have
entered into the transaction if he had had to negotiate with a number
of shareholders and that the selling shareholder has thus not proved
he could have made the same profitable sale if Buyer's desires had been
disclosed to him.
Some courts have accepted this argument. 9 However, the fact
that the selling shareholder has not proved he has lost an assured
sale has not precluded recovery when false representations have been
shown.40 In addition, the courts have considered cases in which a
manager has purchased outstanding shares with a view to acquir-
ing complete ownership of a corporation prior to a sale of all of the
assets; selling shareholders have recovered their proportionate share
of the proceeds of a sale of the assets without being required to prove
that the purchaser of the assets would have gone through with the
transaction whether or not the corporation had one or many share-
holders.4 If the manager or controlling shareholder has purchased all
outstanding shares in anticipation of either a sale of all the shares or
a sale of all of the assets, it may be an open question in either case
whether the ultimate buyer would have entered into the transaction if
39. Ryder v. Bamberger, 172 Cal. 791, 158 Pac. 753 (1916); Haverland v. Lane,
89 Wash. 557, 154 Pac. 1118 (1916).
40. Schroeder v. Carroll, 192 Wis. 460, 212 N.W. 299 (1927).
41. Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N.E.2d 630 (1945); Gammon v.
Dain, 238 Mich. 30, 212 N.W. 957 (1927); Black v. Simpson, 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E.
1023 (1913) (on demurrer) ; cf. Westwood v. Continental Can Co., 80 F.2d 494 (5th
Cir. 1935); Wood v. MacLean Drug Co., 266 Ill. App. 5 (1932); Nichol v. Sensen-
brenner, 220 Wis. 165, 263 N.W. 650 (1935).
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he had had to deal with a number of shareholders rather than merely
one. But in a case involving a resale of shares, the selling shareholder
has suffered at least the loss of an opportunity to bargain. Buyer was
interested in buying complete control, and the plaintiff's shares were
apparently useful to him to that end. It is true that the value of that
lost opportunity to bargain may be difficult to measure, but that can
hardly be attributable to the selling shareholder. It is the manager
or controlling shareholder who has foreclosed that opportunity and
has made it impossible for the selling shareholder to prove its value.
It should therefore not be necessary for the selling shareholder to resort
to independent proof of the value of that opportunity. In the absence
of other evidence, the most objective standard is already at hand: the
total amount which Buyer paid for all the shares. To award the selling
shareholder a proportionate part of that amount would serve as a rough
approximation of the value of his opportunity. It can be only an
approximation, since it is impossible to prove that Buyer would have
paid the selling shareholder more or less than that proportionate part
if separate bargains had been necessary. Legal theory has not been
found lacking to permit recovery of that proportionate part despite
the impossibility of proving the extent of loss with measurable ac-
curacy.42
That the selling shareholder has suffered a disadvantage which
the courts can handle is clear. The next question is whether they are
willing to protect him from such disadvantages by imposing on man-
agers and controlling shareholders even that minimum obligation of
sharing their gains from transactions in his shares. The question
of the responsibility of the manager or controlling shareholder may be
phrased in terms of "duty," i.e., does he have a duty to disclose his
resale contract in Case A or his personal profit in Case B ? 43 In the
main, courts have had a generalized bias which protects nondisclosures
in ordinary commercial transactions. The hypothesis appears to be
42. In equity: Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N.E. 243 (1922) (equity will
charge defendants with "trust" of proceeds from resale of plaintiff's shares) ; Upton v.
Southern Produce Co., 147 Va. 937, 133 S.E. 576 (1926) (equity will grant recovery
of "secret profits" procured by fraud and misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary
duties).
At law: Staker v. Reese, 82 W. Va. 764, 97 S.E. 641 (1918) (plaintiff entitled
to recover difference between amount defendant paid plaintiff for shares and amount
defendant received for them from subsequent sale of assets; even if defendant entitled
to charge that plaintiff's damages are measured by "market value" of stock, best
evidence of market value is selling price) ; Schroeder v. Carroll, 192 Wis. 460, 212
N.W. 299 (1927) (with other evidence, amount received by defendant from resale is
evidence of "value" of plaintiff's shares). Cf. McCoPmIcK, DAMAGES 117-23 (1935).
Compare Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 465, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (1928).
43. See 3 RESTAMENT, ToRTs § 551 (1938); RZSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 472
(1932).
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that normally in a transaction of purchase and sale the parties deal
at arm's length and that, in the arm's length transaction, neither party
has a duty to disclose facts concerning the subject matter of the sale.44
It may be suggested that the vitality of the doctrine which accords im-
munity from such liability is a reflection of the general conviction that
there is less moral opprobrium attached to keeping silent than to telling
a lie. But it is only in part grounded in that conviction. Far more
significant, the doctrine appears to be retained because it fits into and
helps to maintain the existing pattern of behavior in a competitive
economy. Such an economy encourages habits of nondisclosure, par-
ticularly where market conditions are concerned. The corner grocer
is not required to announce to the housewife that his eggs are priced
two cents higher than those of the grocer one block down the street.
Nor is the purchaser of a dwelling house required to disclose that he
is already negotiating for its profitable resale to a third party, even
though the owner of the house has suffered a loss, in the sense that he
might be in a better position if the disclosure were made and he were
given an opportunity to bargain.45 On the whole it is thought to be
economically desirable to reward the diligent who have acquired a su-
perior market position. Should that rule of non-liability be extended
to the manager or controlling shareholder in Cases A and B who
profits from the market which he has for the shares of other share-
holders? Counsel for selling shareholders have suggested that the
rules should not apply; the reasons they have given have not produced
consistent results.
Counsel might have argued that the peculiar facts of corporate
life were sufficient grounds for imposing liability upon managers and
controlling shareholders gaining from control transactions, requiring
that a transfer of the entity as a whole, whether by way of a merger,
sale of all of the assets or sale of all of the shares, shall inure to
the benefit of all shareholders. Instead, they quite naturally looked
for a useful analogy in prior cases and found one in the "fiduciary re-
lationship." The effort was made to bring to bear rules developed
in cases involving principal and agent, guardian and ward, lawyer
44. BowER, AcTIONABLE NoN-DIsCLOSURE § 163-68 (1915). A modern applica-
tion of the hypothesis is Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42
N.E.2d 808 (1942). (Action by purchaser of dwelling house was based solely on
seller's failure to disclose the presence of termites. In awarding judgment for seller
the court stated: "The law has not yet, we believe, reached the point of imposing
upon the frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic as this." Id. at 678-79,
42 N.E.2d at 809.) But see Annot., 141 A.L.R. 967 (1942).
45. See Lucas v. Long, 125 Md. 420, 94 At. 12 (1915), and comments thereon
in MoRRsS, ToRTs 268 (1953) ; Keaton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15
TEXAs L. REv. 1, 21 (1936).
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and client, trustee and beneficiary, director and the corporate entity.
4
The vast bulk of litigation by selling shareholders has been directed
toward enforcing accountability by directors and officers. So far
as legal doctrine is concerned, judicial reaction to the pressing of the
analogy of the "fiduciary relationship" in that litigation has divided
three ways:
(1) In one line of cases, frequently said to represent the majority
rule, the courts have observed that: (a) a director or officer is a
"fiduciary" to the corporate entity only and not to the shareholders,
and (b) the ambit of the duty owed by a director or officer as fiduciary
extends to "corporate acts" only and not to share trading.
(2) In another line of cases, representing the so-called minority
rule, the courts have held that: (a) a director or officer is a "fiduciary"
to the corporation, to be sure, but also, through the corporation, a
fiduciary to the whole body of shareholders and thus to each of the
shareholders, and (b) the duty owed by such a fiduciary extends not
only to "corporate acts" but also to share trading.
48
(3) In the middle ground following the "special facts" or "special
circumstances" rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Strong v.
Repide,49 is a line of cases holding that an officer or director is a "fidu-
46. See 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 2.5 (1939), for a description of the "fiduciary relation-
ship."
47. Board of Commissioners v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873) ; Crowell v. Jackson,
53 N.J.L. 656, 23 Atl. 426 (Ct. Err. & App. 1891) ; Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb.
581 (N.Y. 1868); see also Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del.
1943) ; Waller v. Hodge, 214 Ky. 705, 713-14, 283 S.W. 1047, 1050 (1926) ; Gladstone
v. Murray Co., 314 Mass. 584, 587, 50 N.E.2d 958, 960 (1943); Seitz v. Frey, 152
Minn. 170, 174-75, 188 N.W. 266, 268 (1922); Gardner v. Baldi, 24 N.J. Super. 228,
234, 93 A.2d 644, 647 (Ch. 1952).
48. Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903) (in equity for rescission of
sale of shares to a manager; plaintiffs contended that defendant had failed to disclose
that a profitable sale of the corporation's assets was being negotiated when defendant
renewed an option to purchase plaintiffs' shares). See American Trust Co. v.
California Western States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 56-58, 98 P.2d 497, 504-05
(1940), for a discussion of the so-called majority and minority rules with respect to
the fiduciary duty of directors to shareholders of the corporation.
49. 213 U.S. 419 (1909). Defendant was a director, "administrator general" and
majority shareholder of a corporation whose only valuable assets were certain lands.
For some time defendant had been carrying on negotiations with the Philippine Gov-
ernment for the sale of those lands. At a time when there was a strong likelihood
that the corporation would conclude a very favorable sale of the lands, defendant
purchased plaintiff's shares for one-tenth of the amount they became worth when
the lands were subsequently sold. The purchase was made through an agent of de-
fendant, and neither the identity of the principal nor the state of the negotiations for
the sale of the lands was disclosed to the plaintiff. Plaintiff recovered, in the alterna-
tive, damages or her shares. The court stated: "If it were conceded, for the purpose
of the argument, that the ordinary relations between directors and shareholders in a
business corporation are not of such a fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a
director to disclose to a shareholder the general knowledge which he may possess
regarding the value of the shares of the company before he purchases any from a
shareholder, yet there are cases where, by reason of the special facts, such duty
exists." Id. at 431.
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ciary" to an individual shareholder only when the relationship is
created by particular events."0
These. disparate rules have entered into the judicial handling of
Cases A and B.Y Selling shareholders have taken the position that,
despite the arm's length presumption in the ordinary case of buyer
and seller, when a manager is buying for resale, as in Case A, he has
a duty to disclose that fact solely because of his office. The argument
is that the duty to disclose arises from the defendant's occupation of
a fiduciary position toward the selling shareholder. And in Case B,
even though he is not personally purchasing for resale, the same fiduci-
ary position requires disclosure of his personal profit or a personal
bonus.
If proponents of defendant's duty to disclose material facts to the
selling shareholder had defined that duty in its own terms, i.e., solely
as a "duty to disclose," judicial analysis might more clearly have been
50. "Special facts" cases are examined in Smith, Purchase of Shares of a Cor-
poration by a Director From a Shareholder, 19 MICE. L. REv. 698 (1921). See gen-
erally on the problem of managerial share trading: Berle, Publicity of Accounts and
Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 MicI. L. REv. 827 (1927) ; Walker, The Duty of
Disclosure by a Director Purchasing Stock From His Stockholders, 32 YALE L.J.
637 (1923) ; Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock, 27 YALE
L.J. 731 (1918) ; Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a Director From a
Shareholder, 8 MIcH. L. REv. 267 (1910); STxvENs, Co.PoRATIONS § 150 (2d ed.
1949) ;, BALLANTINE, CoRPoATION s § 80 (rev. ed. 1946). Cases are collected in
Annot., 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
51. Managers (who in some instances were also controlling shareholders), were
held liable, on facts analogous to Cases A and B, in Dunnett v. Arn, 71 F.2d 912
(10th Cir. 1934) ; Dutton v. Barnes, 162 Minn. 430, 203 N.W. 414 (1925) ; Jacquith
v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916). Recovery was denied in Ryder v.
Bamberger, 172 Cal. 791, 158 Pac. 753 (1916) ; Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho 464,
196 Pac. 208 (1921); Haverland v. Lane, 89 Wash. 557, 154 Pac. 1118 (1916). The
denial of recovery in Hayes v. Kelley, 112 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1940), and Blabon v.
Hay, 269 Mass. 401, 169 N.E. 268 (1929), may be attributable as much to the fact
that the resale occurred at a later time (and was not in contemplation at the time the
defendant purchased from the plaintiff) as to a basic assumption that managers do not
have a duty of disclosure.
As yet, the decided cases have not squarely presented the question of the liability,
on the facts of Cases A and B, of the nondisclosing controlling shareholder who does
not simultaneously occupy a managerial position. But nondisclosures other than those
involved in Cases A and B may be in issue. In such a context, it was stated that if
an officer or director does not stand in the "position of a fiduciary" to shareholders
from whom he purchases, then, a fortiori, a majority shareholder does not occupy
that position. Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd
per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945). However, in Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del.), as supplemented, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951), motion
for leave to file answer to common-law count denied, 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952),
the court held that an action for fraud and deceit under the common law had been
stated against a controlling shareholder, not occupying an office or directorship, who
had purchased shares without disclosure of the increased value of inventory under-
lying the purchased shares and without disclosure of the defendant's intent to capture
such increased value by merger, liquidation or dissolution. The Speed case is dis-
cussed at p. 770 infra in connection with § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See also
Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947), and note 126 infra. The
difficulties encountered by the courts in finding a "fiduciary duty" applicable to con-
trolling shareholders as such and the policies relevant to finding such a duty vis a vis
selling shareholders are discussed in the next subdivision of this article, beginning
at p. 750.
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directed toward determining whether there is a compelling factual
basis for such a duty. Categorization of the "duty to disclose" as a
"fiduciary duty" has created confusion. Such a description of the
duty carries with it the implication that it rests only on one who stands
in a "fiduciary relationship" with another. But neither the courts nor
the commentators have been able to demonstrate with any clarity
whether the "fiduciary relationship" is a concept of law consonant with
a duty to disclose or is a shorthand statement for a congeries of facts. 2
For example, the selling shareholder who argues that the defend-
ant in Cases A and B has a duty to disclose his resale contract or per-
sonal profit may phrase his argument in terms of defendant's fiduciary
relationship to him. It is unclear whether he is asserting that: (1)
as a matter of law, the court should assume to impose the duty of dis-
closure on the defendant because of desirable corporate policy, or (2)
as a matter wholly of fact, the arm's length presumption does not hold
in the particular case. If a court applies the so-called majority rule
to the selling shareholder's argument by saying that there is no fiduciary
relationship and thus no fiduciary duty, it may be making only a legal
pronouncement: it is not desirable to put the burden of disclosure on
the manager or controlling shareholder. In so saying, the court may
reject analogies to other so-called fiduciary relationships, such as that
which obtains between trustee and beneficiary or corporation director
and the corporate entity, even though in cases involving those other
relationships it is applying rules of law for the purpose of shaping and
preserving particular institutions serving peculiar functions in society
or the economy and is not simply giving effect to the factual expecta-
tions of individual people.' If the court's approach to the problem of
52. E.g., the fact that one party to the relationship reposed trust and confidence
in the other or reasonably expected that the "fiduciary" would look after his interests.
53. If the beneficiary of an express trust seeks an accounting from a trustee who
has personally profited by a sale of property to the trust, it is not a requisite of the
action that he show that he personally reposed any confidence whatever in the trus-
tee; if he had any confidence at all, it might as reasonably have arisen from an un-
formed idea that the courts would protect him. If it be argued that it is the settlor
of the trust who reposes such confidence, one may ask whether the settlor of a testa-
mentary trust has factual confidence in a substitute trustee appointed after his death.
The director of a corporation is said to be in a "fiduciary relationship" to the
"corporation." Again the question may be asked whether his obligations to account
for personal profits from transactions in "corporate" property rest on factual expecta-
tions based on confidence that he will not seek such profits. The "corporation" as such
clearly never had such factual expectations. If the people behind the corporate entity
are examined, perhaps the majority shareholders who put him into office had such
confidence. Possibly the minority shareholders who voted for some other candidate
had no trust in him whatever. But it is totally irrelevant in an action by the "cor-
poration" representing such diverse viewpoints of the director's honesty that even all
of the shareholders at the time of his election had serious doubts about the extent
to which he could be trusted; the director's liability has never been reduced in pro-
portion to the number of shareholders shown to have had no confidence in him. Cf.
Rohrlich & Rohrlich, Psychological Foundatimts for the Fiduciary Concept in Cor-
poration Law, 38 CoLum. L. REv. 432, 448 (1938).
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fiduciary relationships is thus legally, rather than factually, oriented,
it may be possible to dissuade it from an uncritical analysis which lumps
together all cases of nondisclosure by corporate managers and control-
ling shareholders under a common legal rubric of "no fiduciary duty."
It may be possible, that is, to argue that there is need for development
of peculiar rules for the corporate institution where control transactions
are involved, just as it has been necessary to develop peculiar rules
for the institutions of "trusts" and "agency."
On the other hand, the court applying the majority rule may
merely be saying that the duty to disclose is grounded in defendant's
misleading conduct, that it arises only when, as a factual matter, the
selling shareholder reasonably expects that the whole truth is being
made known to him. 4 If the court thus equates the fiduciary rela-
tionship with selling shareholder's reasonable factual expectations, it
may be much too late to argue that the manager or controlling share-
holder in Cases A and B occupies that relationship to the selling share-
holder. Perhaps when the rule of "no fiduciary duty" was first laid
down in the last century, it was true that shareholders were not par-
ticularly confident that corporate management or controlling share-
holders would tell them the truth. But whether such shareholders did
in fact expect disclosure is no longer of any moment. What is im-
portant is that a rule so long established, whether it is a rule of
law or a generalized factual finding, becomes self validating as it be-
comes more known and pervasive. Today, in a jurisdiction where
the majority rule has been applied with some consistency to relieve a
nondisclosing corporate manager from liability, the selling shareholder
will deal at arm's length with his managers because the courts have
told him he must. There may be no "fiduciary duty" simply because
the factual basis for it does not exist.
54. Cf. REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTs § 472 (1932). Although the Restatement holds
open the possibility that there is no privilege of disclosure by a party who ". . . is
denied immunity for non-disclosure by any special rules of law" (subsection d of
§ 472), it asserts also that the privilege is denied to one who ". . . occupies such a
relation to the other party as to justify the latter in expecting that his interests will
be cared for...." (subsection c of § 472). Subsection c appears to have a factual,
rather than legal, orientation. In comment c to § 472, in discussion of "justifiable
expectation," reference is made to the "fiduciary position" as one of the relations
referred to in the section.
3 RESTATEmrNT, TORTS § 551 (1938), on the other hand, is less clearly factually
oriented. A duty of disclosure is imposed with respect to ". . . such matters as the
other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust
and confidence between them . . - ." (Subsection 2(a)). Although the relation of
"trust and confidence" appears to require a factual basis (whatever the courts may
say as to the matters one is entitled to know from a person in that factual relation)
the Restatement eschews any discussion of the duties which "the directors of a com-
pany owe to its shareholders" (comment e to § 551), thereby leaving open the pos-
sibility of development of rules of law not dependent on factual trust and confidence.
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The basis for the minority rule that there is a fiduciary relation-
ship, and a corresponding fiduciary duty, may also have had either a
factual grounding or a legal one. If the courts began with some no-
tion that they properly should give shape to the corporate institution
by adopting a rule of required behavior, selling shareholders may now
as a fact expect managers to tell them the truth, especially if they are
familiar with the law. In any event, their factual expectations are
irrelevant, since the rules developed by the courts have made them so.
The "special facts" cases involving share transactions other than
those in Cases A and B vacillate without clarity between factual and
legal bases for a duty of disclosure. In some, liability depends not so
much on nondisclosure as on the making of false representations.
55
Cases in which a manager is held liable for failing to disclose his iden-
tity when purchasing shares suggest that the basis for the duty may be
the fact that a selling shareholder may reasonably distrust, rather than
trust, the managers of his corporation: had he known that a manager
was purchasing his shares he would have become suspicious that some
impending benefit was being privately appropriated5 6 However, other
"special facts" cases do not emphasize factual trust or distrust but ap-
pear to impose a duty of disclosure as a rule of law required by cir-
cumstances, such as an undisclosed contemplated sale of all of the
corporation's assets, under which the selling shareholder cannot ade-
quately protect himself.17  The result is reached primarily on the basis
of desirable corporate policy.5
With respect specifically to Cases A and B, when nondisclosures
have been alleged, recovery has been denied to selling shareholders by
some courts and granted by others. When denied, the result has been
put in part upon the rule of "no fiduciary duty," perhaps as a matter
55. Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P2d 224 (1945); Lightner v. W. H. Hill
Co., 258 Mich. 50, 242 N.W. 218 (1932); cf. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d
412, 159 P2d 958 (1945).
56. Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945); cf. Broffe v.
Horton, 172 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1949).
57. Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N.E.2d 630 (1945); Gammon v.
Dan, 238 Mich. 30, 212 N.W. 957 (1927); cf. Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504,
202 N.W. 955 (1925).
58. In some of the cases in which managers or controlling shareholders have been
held liable to selling shareholders in connection with share trading, the courts purport
to see factual grounds for a finding that the plaintiff had reposed trust and confidence
in the defendant and that his factual expectations were reasonable. However, those
cases generally involve false representations as well as nondisclosure. Since the
character of particular representations and their commercial reasonableness in the
context in which they were made have a significant effect on the question of the rea-
sonableness of the factual expectations of the persons to whom they were made, those
cases do not furnish a reliable guide to cases in which no such representations appear.
Cf. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945); Jaynes v.
Jaynes, 98 Cal. App. 2d 447, 220 P.2d 598 (1950) ; Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159
P.2d 224 (1946).
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of law, perhaps consciously on the ground that there was no misleading
on the facts."9 When granted, liability has not clearly been grounded
on the disappointment of the shareholders' factual expectations.'
The court which awarded recovery to selling shareholders in a situa-
tion similar to Case B and justified its conclusion on the theory that
the defendant had been engaged in a "joint undertaking or enterprise"
with the selling shareholders and "heading a syndicate" to sell all the
shares " did not point to plaintiffs' factual expectations that their in-
terests were being cared for. 2 Equally consistent with that court's
reasoning is the thought that, in such a situation, the law will impose
an obligation on the manager or controlling shareholder to share with
other shareholders the benefits of a sale of the enterprise. As a fur-
ther example, the court in the leading case of Dunnett v. Arn ' re-
sorted to elaborate legal doctrine to justify recovery from managers
who sent a letter to shareholders informing them of an outside offer
for their shares at a named price. Although the managers informed
the selling shareholders that the managers' own shares had been sold,
no revelation was made of the high price they had received. Selling
shareholders recovered a proportionate part of the excessive price re-
ceived by the managers. Not content with justifying the result solely
on the basis of the defendants' misleading conduct, the court showed
sensitivity to the proposition that all selling shareholders should share
equally in a transfer of the enterprise even though it is effected by a
sale of shares. The court observed that the transaction was "in sub-
stance" a sale of assets, that a sale of assets is a "corporate transaction"
and that an officer and director occupies a fiduciary relation to share-
holders with respect to corporate transactions (whatever the rule of
fiduciary duty might be with respect to share trading). Such reason-
ing does not appear to base liability on factual trust and confidence
reposed by the selling shareholders. It does not appear unreasonable
to see in this opinion tentative probings in the direction of a rule of
corporation law enforcing equality of treatment of all shareholders
when a third party is acquiring firm control of the enterprise."' Al-
59. See Ryder v. Bamberger, 172 Cal. 791, 158 Pac. 753 (1916); Stout v.
Cunningham, 33 Idaho 464, 196 Pac. 208 (1921); Haverland v. Lane, 89 Wash. 557,
154 Pac. 1118 (1916).
60. See, e.g., Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916).
61. Dutton v. Barnes, 162 Minn. 430, 203 N.W. 414 (1925).
62. "Men engaged broadly in business affairs generally would say that such a
transaction should not succeed; and the view that it cannot is properly crystallized
into a principle of law." Id. at 432-33, 203 N.W. at 415.
63. 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934), 20 CoRN-.iL L.Q. 101.
64. Those plaintiffs who had received the managers' letter, but did not prove re-
liance on the half-true statements in the letter, did not recover in this case or in a-com-
panion case growing out of the same transaction. Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68 (10th
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though the decided cases have involved either those who were solely
managers or controlling shareholders who were also managers, the
fact that some courts appear to be reaching for rules of conduct
grounded on corporate policy rather than on individual expectations
suggests that eventually, on the facts of Cases A and B, no distinction
must necessarily be made between the liability of the manager or the
manager-controlling shareholder on one hand and the controlling
shareholder, as such, on the other.
If it be suggested that a rule of law which moves away from more
conventional doctrines of fraud ignores the arm's length presumption
of commercial trading, it is freely admitted that that is being proposed.
The law has moved in that direction in other areas when social and
economic needs have dictated it. Doctrines of nuisance, negligence and
implied warranty have gradually been applied in increasing instances
to break down the notion that arm's length trading is an immutable
rule. 5 The rules of responsibility applied to agents and trustees, or
even to corporate directors with respect to transactions more conven-
tionally recognized as "corporate," are not wholly explainable on a
factual failure of the arm's length presumption. 6 The law has molded
those institutions to socially desirable ends. The obligation of the in-
sured to disclose to the insurer the material facts known to the insured
does not survive for any reason of trust and confidence between the
parties, but surely because the business of insuring would operate at a
higher cost to all insureds if the rule were not soy2'
Courts will not readily free themselves from analyzing the prob-
lems involved in sales of corporate control in terms of "fraud" and
misleading conduct, however, so long as the manager or controlling
shareholder enters so evidently into the transaction as he has in the
Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706 (1937). Those results do not militate against the
proposition that the Arn case moves in the direction of the establishment of a
rule of corporation law requiring proportionate treatment of all shareholders whose
shares enter into a control sale. If a selling shareholder knows that the managers
or controlling shareholders are receiving a higher price from the buyer than he has
received, he may reasonably be said to have waived his right to proportionate treat-
ment. To that extent, there can be no argument with the court's denial of recovery
to certain shareholders in the Arn and Roby cases. The writer believes, however,
that the court should have imposed a burden on the defendants of proving that such
a waiver had been made, i.e., of proving that they had disclosed the price which the
defendants had received for their shares.
65. See PRossER, TORTS 535, 541, 546 (2d ed. 1955).
66. "XVhen the principal employs an agent, the law presumes that he does so in
order to secure to himself the benefits of the agent's skill, experience or discretion,
and to reap the fruits of the performance of the undertaking. The law presumes
that he expects-and it gives him the right to expect-that the agent so employed
will endeavor to further the principal's interests, and will use his powers for the
principal's benefit." MEcHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 500 (4th ed. 1952) ; see note
53 supra.
67. See VANcE, INsURANcE 365-68 (3d ed. 1951).
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cases discussed heretofore. Judicial inclination to examine the ques-
tion from the standpoint of the corporate institution is diverted by the
availability of the more familiar concepts, which, as seen, may lead as
easily away from managerial responsibility as toward it. When the
manager or controlling shareholder has become conscious of the risks
attendant upon his entering into the transaction as an active party and
has bargained separately with the buyer for his own shares (leaving
the buyer to his own devices in approaching, bargaining with and pur-
chasing shares from other shareholders), the more traditional for-
mulations are not available. The policy reasons for adopting a rule
of corporate law, supplementing the older remedies, may therefore be
considered in a context where those remedies do not fit handily. The
following section of this article considers those cases which present
the policy problem clearly.
B. Actions Against Managers or Controlling Shareholders Who Do
Not Deal Directly With Selling Shareholders
Two cases raise the principal issues to be considered in this sec-
tion:
Case C. Buyer Initially Negotiates for Purchase of All of the
Shares. Buyer wishes to acquire undiluted control of Corporation
C by buying all of its outstanding voting shares, 50,000 in num-
ber, for which he is willing to pay their book value ($180,000)
plus $50,000. He approaches D, who is the owner of a majority
or controlling block of shares, and discloses his proposition. D
may or may not also be an officer or director. D is anxious to
sell his shares at a favorable price in excess of book value.
Although D realizes that he might make additional profits by buy-
ing the shares of other shareholders or by advising them to sell
to Buyer as in Cases A and B, he is unwilling to incur the risks
involved in such a transaction. He does not, however, insist upon
Buyer's offering the same price for all outstanding shares, but
accepts something substantially in excess of book value for his
own shares and leaves Buyer to his own devices in bargaining
with the other shareholders for a sale of their shares at book value
or slightly above. Neither D nor Buyer discloses that Buyer has
purchased D's controlling shares; Buyer purchases all other out-
standing shares at a lower price per share than D has received.
Case D. Buyer Negotiates for Purchase Only of the Con-
trolling Shares. Instead of revealing to D his interest in acquiring
all of the shares, Buyer purchases D's majority or controlling
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block of shares at a price substantially in excess of book value per
share. More or less contemporaneously, Buyer purchases all the
remaining shares in separate transactions and at a lower price
per share than D has received.
In Case C, the manager or controlling shareholder has not com-
municated with the selling shareholders directly or otherwise estab-
lished contacts with them with respect to this particular transaction.
Selling shareholders might, nevertheless, claim from D a proportionate
part of the amount he has received per share in excess of the amount
they have received. Accustomed to couching such a claim in terms of
"fraud," they might make the following argument. Buyer wished to
acquire all of the shares at the price favorable to all shareholders and
known to D. D permitted the selling shareholders to sell in ignorance
of the fact that Buyer was willing to pay such a price for the enterprise
as a whole. Had they known of Buyer's plan, they would not have
sold or would not have sold at the price they did. By D's failure to
disclose, they were misled. Doctrinally, D's participation in the trans-
action might be denominated by them an "implied misrepresentation"
effected through Buyer's communication to them of his offering price,
with D's acquiescence and with D's knowledge that such offering price
did not reveal D's and Buyer's real objectives. Such an argument no
doubt goes to the frontier of the concept of "misleading conduct."
Realistically the issue is squarely whether the law should recognize that
community of interest among all shareholders which requires that a
sale of the corporate enterprise, even through a sale of shares, should
inure to the benefit of all shareholders whose shares are necessary for
its consummation and not merely to those who have its control in hand.
Tryon v. Smith, involving much the same facts as Case C, repre-
sents one court's approach to the problem; the underlying corporate
issue seems not to have been examined adequately. A bank president
sold seventy per cent of the bank's shares to Transamerica Corporation
at a price per share in excess of the price other shareholders received. 9
The court rejected selling shareholders' claim that the president had
68. 191 Ore. 172, 229 P2d 251 (1951).
69. The defendant stated to Transamerica that he would have "... nothing to
do with any of the stock except the controlling interest of the stock in which I am
interested, including my own and that of my family." He informed the buyer that it
would have to deal directly with the minority group, although he also indicated that
he thought the minority shareholders should receive at least $220 per share. Book
value was $200 per share; actual sales ranging from $160 to $170 per share had been
made before the time of the transaction, "to the knowledge of some of the minority
shareholders." Transamerica paid $220 per share to minority holders, while the
president and his family reecived $460 per share for their shares. Id. at 174-77, 229
P.2d at 252-53; cf. McCord v. Martin, 47 Cal. App. 717, 191 Pac. 89 (1920).
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breached his duty as a director and as president by failing to advise
them that there was such a discrepancy in price. ° Selling shareholders
had claimed also that he had received additional amounts because
Transamerica had obtained their shares at the lower figure. The court
observed that there had been no fraud, duress, domination or interfer-
ence in the sale of plaintiffs' shares and no fiduciary duty resting on
majority shareholders to inform the minority shareholders of the price
or terms of sale or of Transamerica's original offer. If the court was
rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs had been misled, it can only
be supposed that it felt bound by traditional concepts of fraudulent mis-
representation. Its reference to "no fiduciary duty" indicates that it
was at the same time refusing to examine broader policy considera-
tions. As in Cases A and B when they are stripped of their ovet-
tones of "misleading conduct," the question is whether the owner of
a controlling block of shares should be permitted to benefit, to the ex-
clusion of non-controlling shareholders, from the sale of his controlling
block when he knows that Buyer is purchasing the entire enterprise
through the mechanism of a sale of shares. A subsidiary question is
whether the law should treat the owner of a controlling block who is
also a director or officer differently from the owner who does not
technically occupy an official position.
A comparison between a purchase of all of the corporation's assets
and of all of its outstanding shares may help to pose the issue. 71 When
purchasing all of the assets, a third party is presumably not interested
in how the price he will pay for them will be distributed among the
70. Transamerica told "at least some" of the minority shareholders that the de-
fendant and his associates were to receive more for their shares than Transamerica
offered to pay to minority shareholders. The court stated that the evidence in the
record sustained only the allegations that Transamerica offered to pay to the defendant,
for all of the shares, the book value of the shares plus $500,000. 191 Ore. at 177,
229 P.2d at 253. It does not conclusively appear whether or not the plaintiffs knew
how much defendant received for his shares. But the opinion is written in terms
which indicate that, even if plaintiffs did not know this fact, the court would never-
theless deny recovery.
71. The comparison is intended to suggest that, just as a shareholder's pro-
portionate interest in assets is protected at the time of their sale, so also should his
proportionate interest in the enterprise as a whole be protected when a sale of control
involves a sale of his own shares. Therefore, it is not suggested that recognition
of that proportionate interest should be confined to the case in which a sale of shares
is followed by the buyer's liquidation of the corporation and his acquisition of "title"
to the assets. Of course in that latter case analogy to a sale of assets may be par-
ticularly close; compare the treatment which has been accorded to specific instances
of that narrow situation in the area of tax law. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 827 (1951); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 334(b) (2) and (3). See also the
manner in which the courts have accorded to shareholders, upon a sale of assets,
remedies similar to those specifically provided in connection with mergers. Marks v.
Autocar Co., Civil No. 16075 (E.D. Pa. 1954), reported in 131 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER
423 (Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 14, 1954); Bloch v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 75
Pa. D. & C. 24 (Delaware County C.P. 1950).
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shareholders. All shareholders have a proportionate interest in the
price received for the assets, and no shareholder may with impunity
divert to himself the proceeds of such a sale. Directors are under an
obligation to bargain with the prospective purchaser for the best price
obtainable for the assets, and although their judgment is subject to
review by a majority of the shareholders, a "side payment" by the
purchaser to the directors may hardly be retained by the latter.72 In a
situation involving a sale of all of the assets, even the minority share-
holder is not always ivithout some bargaining power since under some
statutes he may dissent from the sale and withdraw from the corpora-
tion upon receipt of the value of his shares determined according to a
statutory formula." The purchaser may have to pay a higher price
for the assets than he originally anticipated in order to overcome the
possibility of dissent by holders of a large number of shares and the
consequent withdrawal of assets to pay dissenting shareholders.
If the Tryon case is to be followed, such protection is not accorded
to the selling shareholder. The major fact which is eventually dis-
closed in a sale of assets is the price which the purchaser is willing
to pay for them. In a situation involving the purchase of all outstand-
ing shares under the circumstances detailed in Case C, that fact is never
disclosed to the selling shareholders in general, but only to the control
group. Of course, the individual small shareholder always has the op-
portunity to decline to sell his shares to Buyer and thus attempt to
evoke a higher offer for his shares. He is, however, never able to
judge accurately the point to which he may safely raise his demands,
since he lacks knowledge of the significant fact that Buyer has ex-
pressed a willingness to pay a specified amount for all the shares. A
rule which would permit the control group to retain the excess in price
which they have received may lead to Buyer's obtaining all of the cor-
poration's shares for a smaller expenditure than he would have to make
if all shareholders had more accurate knowledge of the extent of his
desires. Shareholders have lost an opportunity which should have
been available to all of them in view of the fact that Buyer had ex-
pressed a willingness to pay a specified price to acquire a complete enter-
prise. Their loss is directly traceable to the fact that the controlling
shareholders were willing to stand by and permit this loss to occur
because they had obtained a satisfactory price for their shares. If the
controlling shareholders are also directors or officers of the corporation,
72. Proctor v. Farrar, 213 S.W. 469 (Mo. 1919); Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 475
(1885); cf. Bird Coal & Iron Co. v. Humes, 157 Pa. 278, 27 AtI. 750 (1893).
73. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, §§ 157.72, 157.73 (Smith-Hurd 1954); N.Y.
STOCK Cop. LAw §§ 20-21; Oms. REv. STAT. §§ 57.511, 57.516 (1953).
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it would not appear that their obligation to disclose the price which a
third party is willing to pay for the enterprise should be any less in
connection with a sale of all of the shares than in connection with a sale
of all of the assets.
Thus far in the discussion of Case C, it has been emphasized that
the obligation to disclose Buyer's price should rest upon a selling share-
holder who is also an officer or director. In the Tryon case it was
implied that freedom from liability to account to the selling share-
holders resulted because the defendant was acting as a shareholder
when he sold control. 4 Assume for the moment that one who is solely
a shareholder has no liability in such circumstances. That does not
mean that one who is a manager-shareholder is likewise free from lia-
bility. The assumption of the Tryon case is that it makes a difference
whether Buyer deals with D in his "capacity" as shareholder rather
than as manager. Although the ultimate form of the transaction gives
D the appearance of having dealt with Buyer only as a shareholder,
the fact may be that Buyer did not originally approach D as share-
holder, but as a manager. If D was approached to exercise powers
attendant upon his managerial position, it is difficult to see how he
could, consonant with responsibilities attendant upon that position,
convert the proposed transaction into a private one. By what stand-
ards is it to be determined that one who is in fact the controlling center
of a corporation was approached as a shareholder rather than as a
manager? When Buyer proposes to D that all the shares be pur-
chased, he may have several practical objectives in mind; at least two
are the purchase of D's shares and the communication of Buyer's pro-
posal to the rest of the shareholders. The latter involves obtaining
access to the shareholder list and the use of D's influence to interest
the shareholders. It may be a matter of indifference to Buyer whether
that influence is to be exerted by D as the controlling shareholder or
as the technical occupant of an office which opens a direct line to the
shareholders. Therefore, even though D has not carried the transac-
tion through to the shareholders by using the facilities of his man-
agerial position, he may initially have been given the opportunity to
do so, at least in part because he occupied that position. The deter-
mination of the "capacity" in which D was approached by Buyer is
subject to more speculation than to proof; even as to proof, because
of its speculative nature it is subject to manipulation which may not
necessarily be dishonest. The result of attempting to draw a distinc-
74. "No case has been cited holding that a fiduciary relationship exists between
majority and minority stockholders under facts comparable to the facts in this case."
191 Ore. at 181, 229 P.2d at 254.
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tion between D's capacities would be, in practice, a rule either of unen-
forceable disclosure or of privileged nondisclosure."
In Porter v. Healy,7" the fact that defendants were shareholders
as well as managers did not free them from liability in connection with
their sale of controlling shares. In that case the controlling share-
holders cast the transaction in such a form as to make it unmistakeable
that they had appropriated funds which would have been paid to minor-
ity selling shareholders if the true facts had been disclosed. Ostensibly
the same price was paid by the buyer for all shares, but a bonus was paid
to sellers of controlling shares and divided arbitrarily among them.
Members of the controlling group had been officers and directors of
the corporation; they were held accountable to selling shareholders for
a proportionate share of the bonus. The court found a doctrinal basis
for the result in the defendants' violation of managerial duties; the de-
fendants had resigned their offices in connection with the sale, and the
court was able to say that the defendants had sold their influence and
positions as directors. By discounting facts which might have been
used to support a theory of recovery based on misleading conduct '7
75. In the field of so-called corporate opportunities it may be easier, than in the
situation discussed in the text, to determine the capacity in which one holding a
managerial position was approached with a proposed transaction. Thus, an out-
sider's offer to sell a patent may more clearly have been extended to a manager in his
individual capacity than an offer to purchase all of the outstanding shares of the man-
ager's corporation; as noted in the text, the latter requires the involvement of other
shareholders through the manager-shareholder's position in the corporate structure,
the former does not necessarily involve the manager's corporation. But in the field
of corporate opportunities, even though it may be proved by some acceptable standard
that an outsider has approached a manager in the latter's individual capacity, that
fact does not conclusively establish that the manager may appropriate an offered
transaction for himself. In Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Del. 1956), that was
only one of the facts which precluded a corporate accounting from the defendant
(the corporation's president, director and indirect substantial shareholder), who had
purchased a patent which his corporation might have purchased. The court's inability
to find the requisite corporate "interest or expectancy" in the patent offer was a sig-
nificant factor in the result. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Chancery, which had held that such an interest existed. Greene v. Allen, 114 A.2d 916
(Del. Ch. 1955), 104 U. PA. L. REv. 424. The chancellor had stated that his con-
clusion was not altered by the fact that the offer had come to the defendant manager
in his individual capacity. "The character of the opportunity does not rest upon so
narrow a base. Rather, it depends upon broader considerations of fiduciary duty.
The 'formal' acceptance of an opportunity as an individual matter cannot convert a
corporate opportunity into an individual one." Id. at 919. The writer believes that
this proposition is a proper statement of the law and that the reversal of the judg-
ment did not effect a repudiation of the chancellor's reasoning in that respect. The
classic statement in Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 271, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct.
1939), of the circumstances under which an officer or director is entitled to treat an
opportunity as his own indicates that the fact that an offer has come to the manager
in his individual capacity is only one of several prerequisites to his freedom to con-
tinue to deal in that capacity.
76. 244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914).
77. In fact, a letter had been sent to minority shareholders by the buying group,
over the names of the defendants. The defendants had agreed to send such a letter
but had not done so, and only one of the directors knew that it had been sent. The
letter stated that the majority shareholders had sold their shares at the same price
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and by granting relief directly to shareholders rather than requiring
that such redress be given to the corporation, the court rejected ortho-
dox theories for a result recognizing the shareholders' common interest
in the enterprise. In contrast with the Tryon case, the fact that the
defendants occupied a shareholder position did not divert the court.
The Porter case does leave open the question whether, in a case in
which the officers and directors do not resign, they will nevertheless
be subject to liability for selling their controlling shares in the situation
posed by Case C. It will be suggested hereafter in greater detail that
the fact of resignation from office serves primarily to provide a con-
venient doctrinal basis for a court's action,78 but that it is not a sine
qua non of the fundamental fact that corporate control was sold and
that those who sold it benefited to the known exclusion of other share-
holders whose shares were useful to that end.
A more difficult problem is whether one who is not technically a
holder of an office or directorship should be held accountable for a
bonus or excess price received for his shares on the facts of Case C.
The convenient rationalization that he has sold an office is not avail-
able. The lack of that rationalization should not be an insuperable
impediment. The courts have increasingly looked into the activities of
controlling shareholders as such and have imposed restraints, account-
ability and other sanctions upon them for conduct inimical to the inter-
ests of non-controlling shareholders, adapting older doctrines to reach
the desired result.79  There are, however, particular objections which
controlling shareholders have interposed as justification which require
examination, particularly the argument that nondisclosure of their par-
ticipation in the control sale in Case C is of no significance since a con-
trolling block of shares has more "value" than a minority block. The
implication is, of course, that the excess value is appropriately retained
by the seller of the controlling block.
There is first a question whether there is more or less "value" to
a control block than has been paid in a particular case, a question not
raised in Tryon because the "no-fiduciary duty" rule foreclosed inves-
tigation. But more significantly, the statement that controlling shares
have more value than others begs the question. At most it is a state-
ment of economic fact: the effect of supply and demand. But that fact
offered to minority shareholders. Conceivably, in view of defendants' agreement to
cooperate with the buyers in this fashion, the court might have disposed of the case
favorably to the plaintiffs by finding that the defendants had authorized this false
representation. But the court stated that it did not give "controlling weight" to
this letter. Id. at 432, 91 Atl. at 430; cf. Dunnett v. Arn, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir.
1934).
78. See p. 807 infra.
79. See pp. 805-06 infra and note 221 infra.
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is not always a legal justification for retention of the amount received
as a result of its operation. A person is in a "valuable" position so
long as someone is anxious to bribe him. Closer to the present issue,
majority shareholders are in a "valuable" position when they are voting
to sell all the assets. In the latter case, a side payment to the majority
shareholders by the purchaser of the assets to induce the vote is not
justifiably retained by them." On the present issue, it is quite pos-
sible that if the controlling shareholders were to reveal to all share-
holders that Buyer was willing to purchase all shares at a price in
excess of their current market or book value, he would receive con-
siderably less for his shares than if he kept the information secret.
If he should insist upon a higher price, the presence of higher demands
by other selling shareholders might effectively tend to equalize the
amount each shareholder would receive, making the "value" of con-
trolling shares fall. A value subject to such fluctuation suggests that
part of the "value" of controlling shares is attributable to the other
selling shareholders' ignorance and serves as a bribe to induce the con-
trolling shareholder not to disclose the facts to them.
A rule requiring accountability from controlling shareholders in
Case C, as well as from managers and controlling shareholders in Cases
A and B, finds its justification in the requirement of fair conduct on
the part of those who are in the best position to receive and communi-
cate to other shareholders not so situated the opportunity to sell the
enterprise as a whole at a favorable price. All of the shareholders
either have invested capital at risk or have continued to hold invest-
ments at risk in the enterprise. The peculiar value of that enterprise
to a buyer cannot be allocated disproportionately in any rational way
among the various management and shareholder groups making up
the institution. Strict responsibility to disclose such opportunities
would admittedly be but one factor in the heightening of that protec-
tion for the small investor which is so vital to the continuance of the
smaller corporate enterprise, but it is a factor well worth encouraging.
justification for a rule of no responsibility has rarely been articulated
in the particular contexts studied here. Those justifications which
have been made, or which can be imagined, do not have sufficient
weight to alter a rule of fair conduct. (1) That the controlling share-
holder is merely obtaining the "value" of his shares is at best an unan-
alyzed proposition and, as observed, begs the question. (2) That it
is too much of a burden on managers, when trading in shares, to
80. See Donalson v. Investors Realty Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 20, 25, 139 Atl. 766,
768 (Ch. 1927); cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); Lebold v.
Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1942) ; see also -Stott v. Stott, 258 Mich.
547, 242 N.W. 747 (1932) ; Dieckrnann v. Robyn, 162 Mo. App. 67 (1911).
19561
758 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
reveal "all they know" is a truism which proves too much and does
not meet the specific narrow issues in these cases. 1 (3) That share-
holders will lose the incentive to accumulate controlling shares assumes
that it is desirable to encourage that activity, an assumption which is
not self-evident. It ignores other practical incentives, such as the
controlling shareholder's freedom while he holds such shares. In addi-
tion, the assumption ignores the fact that increased accountability in
the cases under question would tend to afford incentives to many small
shareholders to invest with assurance of fair treatment. (4) That
managers should be entitled to supplement their compensation by
share trading in general and by control sales in particular is at best
an explanation for judicial non-action in the share trading cases.82 Ex-
amined in the light of day it could hardly serve as legal justification
for such laxity. That executive compensation should be a matter of
full disclosure and the object of public debate seems too clear for ex-
tended discussion.
Case D, on the other hand, poses slightly different problems.
There, as noted, the controlling shareholder is approached for a sale
purely of control, and Buyer's desire for all of the shares, or his ex-
pected investment in all of the shares, is not made known to the control-
ling shareholder. D in such a case can positively assist other share-
holders only if he discloses that he is selling control and at what price,
or if he refuses to sell unless Buyer makes an even-handed offer to all
shareholders. In such a case, requiring D's assistance to other share-
holders cannot rest on a need to prevent his diversion of existing op-
portunities from other shareholders. Nor can it rest on an extension
of the theory of misleading conduct unless D knows that Buyer is pur-
chasing other shares at a lower price. Adoption of a rule of accounta-
bility must necessarily rest on other reasons for depriving D of per-
sonal benefit from a sale of control. Discussion of such other reasons
is deferred until a later part of this article, where the question of the
place of selling shareholders in the administration of the policies sug-
gested there will be examined.'
II. ACTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES STATUTES
The rights of the shareholder whose shares have been sold in
connection with a plan by a third party to acquire control of a corpora-
81. Compare Walker, supra note 50, at 639, with Berle, supra note 50, at 837.
82. Loose ethical practices in share trading may have been the outgrowth of the
corporate practice in earlier times of not paying substantially for directoral or even
managerial services. See LATTY, INTRODUcTION TO BUSINESS ASSociAriONS 420
(1951); HURF, SOCIAL ASPEcTS OF ENTERPRISE IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 107
(1950); DOUGLAS, DEmOCRACY AND FINANCE 47 (1940); BmLE & MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 225 n.6 (1932).
83. See note 273 infra.
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tion have been considered heretofore in this article in a common-law
context. The federal securities statutes have, of course, had significant
impact upon many aspects of the securities trading process.8 4 Insofar
as they relate to share trading by managers and controlling share-
holders, the statutes were drafted in the framework of the basic as-
sumption that managers and, a fortiori, controlling shareholders should
not be absolutely prohibited from participation in such trading. How-
ever, the statutes permit examination of particular aspects of the trad-
ing process. As observed in the foregoing discussion of selling share-
holders' remedies under state law, the courts have, in the main, viewed
the problems raised by transactions in corporate control from the
standpoint of share trading rather than of corporate policy. The fed-
eral statutes do not change that fundamental orientation; it is there-
fore necessary to determine whether they provide any particular
machinery for analysis of the rights of the several parties concerned
in a sale of controlling corporate interests.
Two sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have par-
ticular significance in connection with the problems raised by the four
hypothetical cases previously considered; they are section 16(b) 83 and
section 10(b)." In the context of those cases, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's rule X-10B-5,8" adopted in implementation of
section 10(b), is particularly important. Section 16(b) has received
widespread attention because of its general applicability to share trading
by corporate managers and substantial shareholders. In the context
84. The statutes of primary interest in this article are cited in note 4 supra.
85. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952).
86. "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(a) . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors." 48 STAT. 891 (1934),
15 U.S.C. §78 (1952).
87. "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security."
The rule was adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 FED.
REG. 3804 (1942); see also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3634, Dec.
22, 1944.
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of the problems considered in this article, its effect is limited. There-
fore section 16(b) will be examined to point out its limited impact
and to demonstrate the need for resort to the more penetrating rem-
edies afforded by section 10(b) and its implementing rule.
Section 16(b) does not provide direct relief to the selling share-
holder as such. However, the section has impact upon the factual
situation involved in hypothetical Case A. As will be observed, the
causes of action created by the section do not run to the selling share-
holder in that capacity;8 they do, however, operate in such a way as
to discourage the manager or controlling shareholder from entering
into the particular transaction involved in Case A which might give
rise to the selling shareholder's complaint. Section 16(b) ,furnishes
a cause of action to an issuer of securities to recover "short swing
profits" realized by a defined class of persons frequently referred to as
corporate "insiders"-officers, directors and beneficial owners of more
than ten per cent of certain classes of securities." The profits recov-
erable are those resulting from purchases and sales of equity securities
within a six months period. As applied to the facts of Case A, if D
(the manager or controlling shareholder) (1) is a member of the
class of corporate insiders affected by the statute,90 (2) purchases
shares of a selling shareholder and (3) sells shares to Buyer within a
six months period, his profits from the transaction will be recoverable
by the corporation.
In several respects the statute provides an easier remedy against D
than is furnished by the common law. (a) So long as D fits into the
statutory class of insiders subject to the statute, it is unnecessary for
the complainant to prove that D owed a "fiduciary duty" to anyone,
that he factually controlled the corporation or even that a transfer
of control was involved.9' (b) It is unnecessary for the complainant
88. Section 16(b) gives a cause of action to the issuer; in the event that the
issuer fails or refuses to institute the suit within sixty days after request, or fails to
prosecute a suit diligently, the owner of any equity security of the issuer may insti-
tute suit in the name or on behalf of the issuer. Thus it may be only coincidental
that a selling shareholder is the holder of some other security and therefore in a
position to prosecute a suit under the section with reference to transactions in his
shares.
89. See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act,
66 HARv. L. Rav. 385, 612 (1953).
90. Section 16(b) applies to "every person who is directly or indirectly the bene-
ficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of, any equity security (other
than an exempted security) which is registered on a national securities exchange,
or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security. . . ." 48 STAT. 896
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1952). As to "officers" who are covered by the
statute, see Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
91. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
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to prove that D made any representations or failed to disclose any facts
to the shareholder who sold to him.
It should not be thought, however, that section 16(b) has sup-
planted the need for the development of adequate state remedies for
selling shareholders. In the first place, it does not cover all classes of
corporations in which the facts of Case A might arise. Since the only
profits recoverable are those realized from transactions in the equity
securities of an issuer which has an equity security registered on a
national securities exchange, transactions in the control of "unlisted"
corporations are completely untouched by the section. It is more likely
that controlling shares will be capable of concentration in the hands
of a single person or cohesive group in the case of smaller corporations
than in the case of larger, listed corporations. It is therefore more
likely that transactions in controlling shares will occur in connection
with such unlisted companies and that the bulk of the cases will not be
affected by section 16(b)2 In the second place, even if the statute
does reach the particular transaction, it does not afford the selling
shareholder compensation for his loss of an opportunity to offer his
shares to Buyer at Buyer's favorable price. The profits recoverable
under the statute are paid into the corporation's treasury; the selling
shareholder, no longer a shareholder of the corporation, does not ben-
efit by that recovery. Only in the case in which D has purchased
92. Since registration of a security on an exchange is effected on a voluntary
basis, the impact of § 16" may be avoided by an issuer's choosing not to register any of
its equity securities on an exchange. In the past, the Commission has proposed
amendments to the Exchange Act which would have required registration of the
securities of certain issuers with $3,000,000 or more in assets and 300 or more secu-
rity holders. In addition to requiring the filing of reports with the Commission and
extending the provisions of § 14 of the Exchange Act (relating to proxy solicitation)
to such issuers, the Commission's proposals specifically brought such issuers under
§ 16. The proposals were first introduced in the House in 1946 and, as the so-called
"Frear Bill," in the Senate in 1949. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 2408, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
The Commission documented the need for its proposals in two reports: SEC, A
PROPOSAL To SAFEGUARD INVESTORS IN UNREGISTERED SECURITIES (1946), and SEC,
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON A PROPOSAL To SAFEGUARD INVESTORS IN
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES (1950). The proposals were not enacted.
Bills substantially embodying the provisions of the Frear Bill were introduced
in the 84th Congress: S. 2054 by Senator Fulbright on May 24, 1955, and H.R. 7845
by Representative Klein on August 2, 1955, applying to certain issuers with $5,000,000
or more in assets and 500 or more security holders. See Hearings Before a Sub-
conmnittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 2054, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1955). A revision of S. 2054, reported to the full committee by the sub-
committee and reflecting some of the recommendations made by the Commission at and
after the 1955 hearings, would make the provisions of the bill applicable to certain
issuers having total assets exceeding $2,000,000 and would require registration with
the Commission of (A) each class of equity securities held of record by more than
750 persons and (B) each debt security registered pursuant to the Securities Act
where the outstanding principal amount of the class exceeds $1,000,000. Although the
bill as reported would extend §§ 14 and 16 to issuers so registering, the Commission
has recently recommended that the bill be revised further to exclude the applicability
of § 16(b) pending further study. See SEC REPORT ON S. 2054 TO THE SENATE CoM-
MITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY (Committee Print 1956).
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merely a part of the selling shareholder's shares for resale, or in which
the selling shareholder has subsequently purchased new shares in the
corporation, does the corporate recovery benefit him by supplementing
the assets underlying the shares he then owns. Finally, section 16(b)
leaves almost completely untouched the cases represented by hypotheti-
cal Cases B, C and D, in each of which D has purchased no shares
from selling shareholders in contemplation of resale but has merely
sold his own shares and either acted as intermediary in the share-
holder's sale to Buyer or assiduously kept away from direct contact
with the other shareholders.'
Thus, despite the fact that section 16(b) works as a strong pro-
phylaxis to prevent the diversion of opportunities which should be
made available to shareholders, its application to only a limited portion
of the control transaction cases frequently makes it necessary for a
selling shareholder to resort to his state law action or to bring his
claim under some other part of the federal securities statutes.
It is in section 10(b) and rule X-10B-5 that the selling share-
holder can find his major potential source of relief from unfair treat-
ment in a control transaction. Aside from the question whether the
section and rule substantively comprehend the hypothetical cases under
consideration, there are questions of procedure and jurisdiction which
arise at the outset. Judicial determination of the reach of section 10 (b)
has been focused largely on those procedural and jurisdictional ques-
tions raised principally because the language of the section and rule
is not very specific. From the reported cases has come the con-
sistent ruling that a civil remedy is afforded to a selling shareholder
in the event of the violation of the rule, even though a civil remedy
is not expressly provided by the statute." In addition, several courts
have concluded that the application of the section is not limited to
transactions on a national securities exchange or on the over-the-
counter professional markets ;9" because of inadequate statutory guides,
93. The statute does reach one type of case which might grow out of Cases B,
C and D, for which the common law has no remedy. If any of the shares which
the insider sells to Buyer were purchased by him in the six months period, he must
disgorge any profit from their sale even though the shares were not purchased in
contemplation of their resale to Buyer.
94. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir., 1953) ; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp.,
103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa.
1950) ; Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) ; Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947) ; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
95. Fratt v. Robinson, supra note 94; Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres
Corp., supra note 94; Robinson v. Difford, supra note 94; Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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various theories have been advanced to support those conclusions.
With respect to actions by sellers of shares against purchasing man-
agers or controlling shareholders, the major limitation upon section
10(b) is its application only to transactions in which there has been
t . use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange.
,, " Judicial willingness to hold that the statute has been vio-
lated, even if the fraudulent act was accomplished only in connection
with the use of the mails, makes the limitation less narrow than might
appear from the language of the statute; several courts have held that
there need be no allegation or proof that a particular fraudulent mis-
representation was mailed or otherwise transmitted by interstate
means. s Positing the required minimum use of the jurisdictional
media of section 10(b), therefore, it appears that in the transactions
considered heretofore in this article, selling shareholders have recourse
not only to remedies available under state law, but also to those which
may be afforded by section 10(b) and rule X-10B-5.99
A selling shareholder may find recourse to section 10(b) and
rule X-10B-5 desirable for two reasons. In the first place, his sub-
stantive rights may be greater than those afforded by applicable state
law in a particular jurisdiction. That proposition will be examined
more fully hereafter. In the second place, a major procedural benefit
accrues to the selling shareholder suing under the Exchange Act: that
is the availability of extra-territorial service of process, a procedure
particularly attractive in the corporate field because of the interstate
96. See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953).
97. See Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 74 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(complaint dismissed for want of jurisdiction). On appeal, Slavin v. Germantown
Fire Ins. Co., 174 F2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949), defendants conceded that the mails had
been used in connection with the questioned transaction; judgment was reversed on the
ground that the district court had erroneously dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and
judgment was directed to be entered for defendants on the merits.
98. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952) ; see Latty, The Aggrieved
Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation under the S.E.C. Statutes,
18 LAW & CONTEmeP. PROB. 505, 513-15 (1953), for a comparison of the jurisdictional
limitations of § 10(b) with those of § 12(2) of the Securities Act.
99. But cf. Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954). Motions to
dismiss (treated by the court as motions to quash service of process) were granted on
behalf of defendants on whom extra-territorial service of process was made by plain-
tiffs proceeding in a district court on allegations of violations of rule X-10B-5. The
court developed a novel and substantial restriction on rule X-10B-5 by holding, in
effect, that the rule does not cover violations of common-law rights ". . . which
might have been fully adjudicated and enforced by appropriate action in a state court,
(or in a federal court on grounds of diversity of citizenship) before the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 was passed." Id. at 790. On appeal from the order quashing
service of process, the court of appeals granted defendants' motion to dismiss the
appeal on procedural grounds, but noted that it did not agree with the reasoning
of the district court as set forth in the passage quoted above. Beury v. Beury, 222
F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955). The opinion of the district court is commented upon in
103 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1098 (1955).
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character of many corporations and the geographical dispersion of
shareholders and managers."°
A. Actions Against Managers or Controlling Shareholders Who Pur-
chase for Resale or Advise Sale to Buyer of Control
1. Misrepresentation
Section 10(b) and rule X-10B-5 may be, examined first from the
point of view of their applicability to Cases A and B insofar as those
cases involve false representation by the purchasing manager or con-
trolling shareholder. Reported judicial consideration of the substan-
stantive content of rule X-10B-5 has been relatively infrequent. 10' No
reported judicial opinion has involved precisely the problem of the
shareholder seeking redress from the manager or controlling share-
holder who has purchased shares after falsely stating to the seller that
there were no outstanding contracts or negotiations for their resale.
The SEC has asserted that the rule has been violated by such activity
on the part of managers and controlling shareholders; it has sought
injunctive relief and obtained consent decrees directed toward
those transactions.
0 2
Insofar as the private rights of selling shareholders are concerned,
under the facts of Case A, the section and rule do not appear to be
intended as any limitation on the common-law concept of "fraud," 'o
100. 48 STAT. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 79aa (1952).
101. See Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 827-44, 1043-66 (1951);' Loss, SUPPLE-
MENT TO SECURTIES REGULATION 328 (1955), for a comprehensive study of the
administration of rule X-10B-5.
102. SEC v. Gentile, SEC Litigation Release No. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), involved
a suit by the Commission for an injunction against the president of a corporation
who owned or controlled 82% of its shares. A third party had agreed to buy all
of the defendant's shares at $6.13; under the agreement all shareholders of the cor-
poration had the right to join in the agreement and to receive the same price per
share. The defendant purchased minority shares at prices ranging from $1 to $4
per share without disclosure of the agreement or the price available to minority
holders. Defendant consented to an injunction restraining him from making any
untrue statement concerning (a) the current market price of the corporation's shares,
(b) plans for the resale of the shares by defendant, (c) the resale price of the shares,
and (d) the right of all shareholders to sell their shares at that price. Defendant
made restitution to minority shareholders from whom he had purchased shares.
103. In Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947), on a motion to dis-
miss the complaint, the court upheld a count alleging a common-law cause of action for
fraud and deceit and then concluded that a further count under rules X-10B-3 and
X-10B-5 also stated a cause of action ". . . for violations of the Statute and regula-
tions which are, if anything, broader than the common law." Id. at 478.
See remarks on the legislative history of rule X-10B-5 in Loss, SECUrITES
REGULATION 810 (1951); Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging
Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1121 n.13 (1950).
In SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3634, Dec. 22, 1944, the Commis-
sion stated, in response to inquiries as to the extent and application of rule X-10B-5,
"Generally speaking, this Rule embodies the broad anti-fraud provisions of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. . . ." In other contexts, courts have stated that
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whatever question there may be as to the extent to which the statute
reaches beyond the common law. A false statement designed to con-
ceal the existence of a resale contract and sufficient to support relief
under common law should be sufficient to render the purchasing man-
ager or controlling shareholder liable to the selling shareholder under
the statute and rule.'1
4
A distinct problem arises when rule X-10B-5 is sought to be
applied to Case B, in which the selling shareholder has sold to Buyer
and the manager or controlling shareholder has made a false state-
ment designed to induce the sale. That problem is whether the share-
holder has a cause of action against someone not a "party" to the sale.
Conceivably the rule might be interpreted to create liability when there
is a purchase for resale, but not to affect the transaction in which the
selling shareholder has sold directly to the third party, induced by the
false statement of the manager or controlling shareholder. The dif-
ference between the two situations appears to be formal at most; such
an interpretation of rule X-10B-5 would have little effect on the
transactions in question other than to invite the rule's evasion. As
noted previously, it was not a defense at common law that the one
who made a false representation had not entered into contractual
relations with the person to whom he lied." 5 On the face of rule X-
1OB-5, it would seem that the shareholder can obtain relief in Case B,
since the rule makes it unlawful for "any person" to do a proscribed
class of acts "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
The rule does not in terms apply only to one who has taken the ben-4
§ 17(a) of the Securities Act and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act are not limited to the
common-law concept of fraud. Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228
(D.C. Cir. 1949) (revocation of broker registration for violation of § 17(a) (1) of the
Securities Act and §§ 10(b) and 15(c) (1) of the Exchange Act) ; Charles Hughes
& Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) (revoca-
tion proceeding for violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act and § 15(c) (1) of the
Exchange Act).
104. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), a
manager purchased shares at a time when there was an outstanding agreement between
the corporation and a third party for the sale of all of the corporation's assets. Selling
shareholders, plaintiffs in the case, asked one of the purchasing defendants whether
he had made any agreement for the resale of their shares, to which the defendant
answered, "No." The court accepted plaintiffs' testimony to the effect that the ques-
tion also mentioned a sale of the assets as well, in which case defendant's answer
was an "untrue statement of a material fact" under rule X-10B-5. However, the court
noted that even if plaintiffs had asked only about a resale of shares, the defendant
had omitted to state a material fact necessary to make his answer not misleading.
Defendants were ordered to account to the plaintiffs. Id. at 801 & n.1.
Other cases in which selling shareholders prevailed on allegations of fraudulent
misrepresentations inducing the sale. of their shares are Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp.
954 (N.D. Ill. 1952) ; Fry v. Shumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947). These
cases suggest that the courts may also accord favorable treatment to the selling
shareholder who alleges that a defendant manager falsely represented that there were
no outstanding contracts or negotiations for the resale of plaintiff's shares.
105. See note 25 supra.
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eficial interest in shares involved in the sale. However, there has
been introduced into the construction of rule X-10B-5 a concept of
"privity" with which selling shareholders may have to contend.
That concept was articulated in Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio &
Television Corp.' Plaintiffs purchased shares of the corporation's
stock through an exchange. Subsequently it was, revealed publicly
that the corporation was in a precarious financial condition and had
been in that condition for more than six months prior to plaintiffs'
purchases. As a result, the price of the corporation's shares fell, and
plaintiffs sold at a loss. Plaintiffs sued certain directors and officers
of the corporation under rule X-10B-5 on the ground that the defend-
ants had known of the corporation's financial condition prior to plain-
tiffs' purchases and had not disclosed it, and that the defendants had
published a false financial statement knowing that persons such as
the plaintiffs would rely upon it. Apparently to bring the defendants
within the language of the rule proscribing activities "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security," the plaintiffs alleged that,
also prior to plaintiffs' market purchases and at times during which
the defendants knew of the corporation's condition, the defendants had
sold certain of their own shares on the exchange. The plaintiffs did not
allege either that they had purchased shares from the defendants or,
according to the district court's understanding of the complaint, 11 7 that
they had relied upon the false financial statement. The court dis-
missed the complaint, stating that "a semblance of privity between
the vendor and purchaser of the security in connection with which
the improper act, practice or course of business was invoked seems
to be requisite and it is entirely lacking here." 108 The court of ap-
peals affirmed, per curiam, °9 on the district court's opinion and its
own opinion in another case in which it had concluded that ".
Rule X-10B-5 extends protection only to the defrauded purchaser or
seller." 110
It has been suggested that the district court was importing into
rule X-10B-5 a doctrine of the common law limiting the ambit of the
defrauder's liability to those persons or classes of persons intended to
106. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.
1952).
107. In the court of appeals, however, Judge Frank, dissenting, was of the opinion
that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that, in the purchase of their shares, they
had been misled by false statements of material facts concerning the company's financial
condition. 198 F.2d at 884 n.2.
108. 99 F. Supp. at 706.
109. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
110. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952); see
text at pp. 832-35 infra for a discussion of the ruling in that case.
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be defrauded by his conduct."" There is some justification for that
construction of the case, in view of the district court's reference to the
possibility of plaintiffs' amendment of their pleading to allege reliance
upon the defendants' false financial statement."' Thus construed, the
opinion does not mean that the parties to the litigation must be in con-
tractual privity with each other, in the sense that one has sold shares
to the other, although the opinion may be properly criticized for taking
a narrower view of the reach of a defrauder's responsibility than is
warranted by more modern developments even at common law. How-
ever, consistently with that construction of the Farnsworth case, a
court could hold that, on the facts of Case B, a manager or controlling
shareholder has the required "semblance of privity" with a selling
shareholder: he has lied to the selling shareholder with the express
purpose of inducing the latter to sell his shares to a third party. • It
may be argued in opposition to that contention that in Farnsworth the
defendants must have known that their failure to disclose the corpora-
tion's financial condition would lead unsuspecting purchasers into be-
coming shareholders, making subsequent loss in the value of their
shares inevitable, and that, since the court has denied relief on those
facts, it should deny relief also in Case B. That argument is not con-
trolling. Whether or not one agrees that the liability limitation im-
posed in Farnsworth is proper, there is a difference between the two
cases which justifies a difference in result. It is a difference in de-
gree only, which depends upon the extent to which the share transac-
tions of the respective plaintiffs are essential ingredients in the accom-
plishment of the defendants' purposes. At least in Case B, the selling
shareholder's sale is a most essential ingredient; in Farnsworth, the
plaintiffs' place in defendants' scheme might be subject to more subtle
speculation. 113
111. 4 STAN. L. REv. 308 (1952), quoted by Judge Frank in his dissenting opinion
in the Farnsworth case, 198 F.2d at 884.
112. 99 F. Supp. at 706. However, the court expressly declined to rule on the
sufficiency of a complaint alleging reliance on the defendants' statement. In addi-
tion, it reverted to a concept of privity of contract by noting the possibility of later
sales by the defendants forming ". . . the basis of privity with these plaintiffs.
." Ibid. Of course, such privity of contract would correct the defects of plain-
tiffs' case, but the question is whether so much "privity" is necessary and whether
what might be called "privity of communication" would be sufficient to satisfy the
rule laid down in the Farnsworth case.
113. If plaintiffs situated as were those in the Farnsworth case were to argue
that the managers' failure to disclose the failing condition of the corporation fell
within the proscriptions of rule X-10B-5 with respect to plaintiffs' purchases, the
defendants would urge that there was no "privity" because the purchases by plaintiffs
were only remote and incidental to the sale of the managers' shares and their pur-
chase by others not complaining. Plaintiffs might suggest, however, that their
purchases were hardly remote and incidental, making the following argument: it
was essential for the managers to conceal the corporation's condition while their
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The court appears to have been led into the privity argument by
the way in which plaintiffs pleaded their case. Some confusion un-
doubtedly resulted from the allegation that it was in connection with
the defendants' sales that they performed their fraudulent practices.
So viewed, it is not strange that the court should question the relevance
of plaintiffs' purchases to such sales, hint at the possibility of remedies
available to those who bought the defendants' shares 114 and move in
the direction of suggesting that there was no connection (or privity)
between the defendants' sales and plaintiffs' purchases cognizable under
rule X-10B-5. On the other hand, if the plaintiffs had not emphasized
defendants' sales but had alleged that it was in connection with pur-
chases by the plaintiffs that the defendants had performed their fraudu-
lent practices of failing to disclose financial condition, the court might
have avoided use of the ambiguous privity concept and nevertheless
have reached the same result." 5
It has become evident that courts interpreting rule X-10B-5 hesi-
tate to open the door to litigation of corporate issues which are nor-
mally cognizable in state courts; 116 otherwise, failure to disclose acts
of mismanagement (such as a waste of assets) might be alleged as
the basis for an action under rule X-10B-5 by one who has purchased
shares after the event. Farnsworth may represent nothing more than
one court's effort to keep the rule from being used (when the fact of
a purchase or sale of shares is only incidental to a major issue of cor-
porate management) to examine into the questions of mismanagement
normally cognizable under state law in a suit by the corporation or a
derivative suit by shareholders. If so, the use of the "privity" concept
should be understood for what it is worth in that context: a shorthand
declaration of the existence of some rather indefinite limits to the reach
of the rule not applicable in a situation like Case B where the sale of
shares is really the heart of the controversy.
sales were being made, and it was no less essential to continue to conceal that con-
dition as long as possible to prevent those who had purchased from the managers
from seeking rescission of the managers' sales. That continued concealment could
be effected only by permitting normal exchange transactions to go through; any
effort by the managers to protect those making purchases on the exchange would
have involved disclosure of the corporation's condition and would have brought down
the managers' house of cards. Therefore, the plaintiffs' purchases were as necessary
an ingredient of the managers' "fraudulent" practices as the purchases and sales of
the managers' own shares.
114. 99 F. Supp. at 706.
115. The difficulties posed by the "privity" rule have been analyzed in Loss,
SUPPLEMENT TO SECURITIES REGULATION 371 (1955); Latty, .rpra. note 98, at 520.
116. Cf. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Beury
v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954).
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2. Nondisclosure
It was observed that, under state law, Cases A and B posed par-
ticularly difficult problems when the manager or controlling shareholder
did not make a false representation but merely bought shares or assisted
in their sale without informing the selling shareholder of his arrange-
ments with Buyer. The language of rule X-10B-5 does not cover
merely those transactions in which some communication, false or half
true, has passed from the purchaser to the selling shareholder. A pur-
chase of shares, unaccompanied by a disclosure of a contract or nego-
tiations for resale, is encompassed by the language of subsections (a)
or (c) of the rule, as a ". . . device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
or an "act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit. . . ." Whether the courts will recog-
nize that such a purchase does in fact fall within the rule is a further
question. A suggested measure of the scope of the rule, i.e., that
construction of the rule would seem to start with a bias in
favor of at least the 'special circumstances' doctrine of Strong v.
Repide," 117 suggests the possibility of liability in a direct purchase and
resale transaction such as Case A."
8
In considering issues not involving precisely the nondisclosure in
question in this article, courts have recognized that liability will attach
under the rule when nondisclosure of a material fact is the major basis
for complaint." 9 The fact that the defendant has not made a false
statement has not relieved him from liability. In judicial determina-
117. Loss, SEcUnITIs REGULATION 827 n.59 (1951).
118. Compare SEC v. Mueller, SEC Litigation Releases Nos. 264, 268 (D. Wis.
1945), in which an injunction was granted against violation of rule X-10B-5 by the
president of a corporation, owner of more than 50% of its common stock and allegedly
dominating and controlling the corporation. Defendant had offered to purchase com-
mon shares at $2 per share but had failed to disclose the book value (more than $40)
and net asset value (more than $16) of the shares, the net earnings of the company,
an increase in sales of the corporation's products, the over-the-counter market price
(between $7 and $10) of the shares and his prior refusal to sell his. own shares at
less than book value (at the time, $40 a share). The injunction restrained the
defendant from purchasing common shares in the future without full disclosure to all
shareholders of all pertinent facts bearing on the value of their shares. Note, how-
ever, that the defendant and the corporation had supplied the shareholders with some
information which was incomplete and, because of the nondisclosures, probably mis-
leading. Consider also the nondisclosures alleged in SEC v. Gentile, SEC Litigation
Release No. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
119. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). (See Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947), for the opinion on a motion
for summary judgment.) See also Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613
(E.D. Pa. 1947), on a request for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law,
subsequent to the court's opinion after trial in 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
The court stated by way of dictum that the selling shareholders' cause of action under
rule X-10B-5 would have been sustained even if there had been no representations
respecting pending negotiations for the sale of the corporation's shares or assets;
defendants would have violated the rule if they had merely purchased plaintiffs'
shares without disclosing certain inside information. 83 F. Supp. at 614.
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tion of the reach of the rule, factual trust and confidence have not been
emphasized as the foundation of liability so much as the fact that the
rule creates liability for nondisclosures by reason of its language and
policy.
120
The most revealing indications that rule X-10B-5 will compre-
hend a purchase of shares by a manager without disclosure of resale
contracts or negotiations, as in Case A, are found in Speed v. Trans-
america Corporation 121 and the Commission's report of its investiga-
tion of the purchase of shares of the Ward La France Truck Corpo-
ration.122  In Speed, suit was brought by certain former shareholders
of Axton-Fisher Tobacco Company against Transamerica Corpora-
tion, majority shareholder of the tobacco company, to recover damages
resulting from the majority shareholder's purchase of their shares.
The majority shareholder had failed to disclose that the tobacco com-
pany's inventory had greatly appreciated in value and that at the time
of purchase the buyer had formed an intent to capture that increased
value by a merger, dissolution or liquidation of the tobacco company.
The court found that the purchase of shares under those circumstances
violated rule X-10B-5, on the ground that under the rule it ". . . is
unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase
the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts
affecting the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder
by virtue of his inside position but not known to the selling minority
stockholders, which information would have affected the judgment of
the sellers." "z The case indicates that at least in some circumstances
nondisclosure 124 will serve as a basis for complaint by selling share-
120. "The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate
insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority
stockholders. . . . Some courts have called this a fiduciary duty while others state
it is a duty imposed by the 'special circumstances.' One of the primary purposes
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . .was to outlaw the use of inside infor-
mation by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own financial ad-
vantage to the detriment of uninformed public security holders." Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
121. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). On the question of damages, see Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955).
122. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
123. 99 F. Supp. at 829.
124. The court referred to the nondisclosure in the Speed case as creating an
"implied misrepresentation." This conception of the defendant's conduct was first
articulated to refute defendant's argument that only express misrepresentations and
half-truths fall within the proscriptions of rule X-10B-5. Id. at 829. The court's
description of the duty imposed by the rule (see note 120 supra) indicates that the
defendant's liability rested upon a policy basis. However, the notion dies hard that
the maximum obligation imposed on one in a commercial situation is to refrain
from "misleading conduct." On similar facts in Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53
F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945), the same
court dismissed a complaint alleging common-law fraud. Its dismissal was based
principally on the ground that the defendant had not occupied a "fiduciary relation-
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holders.'2 5 It is further made clear that the liability created by rule
X-10B-5 is not to be imposed only upon one who technically occupies
an office or directorship; it reaches as well to controlling shareholders. 26
That the rule was not intended to cover only those cases where
false representations have been made was indicated by the SEC in
the report of its investigation in the Ward La France case 127 shortly
after the promulgation of the rule. The president and treasurer of
Ward La France Truck Corporation held 80 per cent of the voting
power of the corporation. They made an agreement with a third
party to sell all of their shares for slightly in excess of $45 per share.
Immediately prior to their entering into the agreement they procured
the purchase of minority shares at prices ranging from $3.25 to $5.75
per share, the purchases being made on behalf of the corporation. 28
ship" to the plaintiffs. In the Speed case, the court held that a common-law
cause of action for fraud and deceit had been stated, as well as a cause of action
for violation of rule X-10B-5. 99 F. Supp. at 828, as supplemented by 100 F. Supp.
461, 463 (D. Del. 1951), motion for leave to file answer to common-law count denied,
103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952). At the same time, the court suggested that the
evidence disclosed that there was more to the case than the ". . . narrow and some-
what abstract legalistic propositions . . ." considered in the Geller case. Its basis
for sustaining the common-law count in the Speed case was stated: ". . . I think
the statements made were misleading because there was a pre-existing intent to cap-
ture the inventory appreciation." 99 F. Supp. at 828. In a further attempt to
characterize the "nature" of the liability imposed in the Speed case, the court made
the following observations in its opinion on damages: "A restitution theory of
recovery, based on breach of fiduciary duty, would seem inapplicable, for the liability
in these cases is based upon an implied misrepresentation of fact." Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176, 179 (D. Del. 1955). "The rights of . . . [the
plaintiffs] arise: 1. from defendant's breach of duty to disclose as controlling stock-
holder; and 2. from defendant's breach to disclose under rule X-10B-5 of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission." Id. at 186. A reading of the opinion demonstrates
that the court eschewed direct characterization of the defendant as a "fiduciary." The
courts will no doubt struggle to fit common-law liability for nondisclosure into some
traditional category, such as "misleading conduct" The presence of the common-law
issues in the Geller and Speed cases and the ambiguities of the "fiduciary" doctrine
undoubtedly contributed to the court's terminological difficulties. But in spite of those
difficulties, the court succeeded in doing what rule X-10B-5 has invited; it recognized
liability created for reasons of corporate policy and worked out rules of damages
appropriate to the factual situation at hand.
125. But cf. Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949)
(there still remain problems of what is to be disclosed, by whom and to whom).
126. Cf. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). This case
indicates that the common law has been moving in the direction of holding a majority
shareholder liable for violation of a "fiduciary duty" to minority shareholders. How-
ever, some of the force may have been taken out of the court's initially broad state-
ment of this obligation by its assertion, later in the opinion, that the basis for the
majority shareholder's responsibility was the violation of well-recognized duties by
the directors of the corporation and the fact that the majority shareholder had con-
trolled them in their activities.
127. See note 122 supra.
128. The Ward La France case is therefore not a controlling precedent on the facts
of Case A and is cited here to demonstrate the impact of rule X-10B-5 on non-
disclosures. Some common-law courts have already reached the point where a
director's purchase on behalf of the corporation may involve liability to the share-
holder. In Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Ill. App. 134, 108
N.E.2d 493 (1952), the court noted that when directors purchase shares on behalf
1956]
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The third party proposed that, after obtaining the controlling shares,
it would transfer all of the assets of -the corporation to itself, vote to
liquidate the corporation and then pay the minority shareholders $25
a share. No minority shareholder was informed that the truck cor-
poration was buying the shares, that negotiations were being conducted
for the sale of the controlling shares, that the corporation was to be
liquidated or that minority shareholders would receive $25 per share
on liquidation. In addition, no disclosure was made that the corpo-
ration's earnings had been increasing. The Commission conducted
an investigation into the purchases. Although the Commission took
no formal action, voluntary restitution was made to minority share-
holders. In the report of its investigation, the Commission concluded
that rule X-10B-5 had been violated, although it did not state spe-
cifically whether any particular nondisclosed fact, standing by itself,
would have constituted a violation. The transactions violated the rule
whether the managers were viewed as having received a bonus payment
or as having appropriated the corporation's assets without payment
to minority shareholders of their proportionate share of the business.
So far as Case B is concerned, once the determination is made
that rule X-10B-5 comprehends cases in which material facts have not
been disclosed, the considerations previously noted in the discussion
of Case B in a context of false representations are again germane. The
major problem is again one of "privity" in the sense in which the
term was employed in the Farnsworth case. The manager or control-
ling shareholder is intimately involved in the sale of the shareholder's
interests to the third party and, in effect, is offering a type of brokerage
service to them. Thus the limitations of the Farnsworth case again
appear not to prevent recovery by the selling shareholder even though
the defendant is not, in a technical sense, the buyer of the shares. Refer-
ence to the facts of the Ward La France case reveals that no such
restriction was envisaged by the Commission, for there the managers
were stated to have violated the rule even though the purchases of
shares were effected on behalf of the corporation and not directly by the
managers; and in at least one reported -case in the courts a complaint
alleging that brokers had participated in their customers' scheme to
acquire shares by misrepresentation and concealment was held to have
of the corporation "... they occupy the position of trustee to each individual
stockholder." Id. at 144, 108 N.E.2d at 498. Because the director in that case had
not purchased plaintiff's shares on his own behalf, the court stated: "Whether a
different legal situation exists where a director deals with a stockholder in his indi-
vidual capacity is not the question before the court here." Ibid. See SEC v. Stand-
ard Oil Co. of Kansas, SEC Litigation Release No. 388 (S.D. Tex. 1947) (consent
injunction) ; SEC v. Boyd Transfer and Storage Co., SEC Litigation Releases Nos.
295, 308 (D. Minn. 1945) (same).
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stated a cause of action not only under the Commission's rules relat-
ing to brokers but also under rule X-10B-5. 29
B. Actions Against Managers or Controlling Shareholders Who Do
Not Deal Directly With Selling Shareholders
The questions raised by Case C have not been litigated with ref-
erence to rule X-10B-5. Insofar as the common-law rule of "no-
fiduciary duty" has effectively blocked consideration of the real prob-
lems involved in the case of the manager or controlling shareholder
who sells his own shares at a high price after negotiations have been
opened for a sale of all the shares, the rule may be interpreted to lift
that block.'
It may be argued that, if the requirement of "privity" suggested
by the Farnsworth case is to have vitality, it would at least preclude
recovery in a case where there are not only no direct contractual rela-
tionships between the manager and the selling shareholder but also
no communications or other immediate points of contact between them.
But, even if Farnsworth is interpreted as posing the question of the
liability of the defendants with respect to the plaintiffs' purchases
(rather than the defendants' sales), it does not cover the facts of the
hypothetical case. In Case C (exemplified by Tryon v. Smith),'
the manager-controlling shareholder and Buyer communicated with
each other on relevant matters; a profitable purchase of all of the
shares was converted into a purchase profitable only to the defendant,
and Buyer negotiated with the minority shareholders on the basis of
a price established as a result of his dealings with the defendant. So
much participation by the manager-controlling shareholder in the ulti-
mate transaction between Buyer and the selling shareholder, with knowl-
edge of its inevitable effects on the selling shareholders, seems more
than sufficient to supply the "semblance of privity" required by Farns-
worth.
It was suggested that Case D may be decided under state law only
on bases of policies which have reference to something more than
misleading practices directed toward selling shareholders. 33 Discus-
129. Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
130. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
131. See note 68 supra.
132. However, the pleader may find that he has avoided the privity rule by
alleging a "conspiracy." In that event, recovery under rule X-10B-5 might be pre-
cluded if the court followed Citizens Casualty Co. v. Shields, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
190683 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (rule X-10B-5 refers to the effectuating of sales directly
and not to conspiracies).
133. See text at p. 758 supra.
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sion of the appropriate approach of courts applying state law to sales
of controlling interests, made under circumstances in which the other
shareholders are not an integral part, has been deferred until those
policies may be examined. The problems posed by an attempt to
apply rule X-10B-5 to Case D will be similarly deferred." 4
On the whole, section 10(b) and rule X-10B-5 offer an oppor-
tunity for those courts considering complaints of selling shareholders
in connection with sales of controlling corporate interests to reach
results more in consonance with obligations of fairness than the com-
mon law has permitted. Unlike other parts of the federal securities
statutes, more narrowly oriented and restricted in their application,"'
the rule has afforded an experimental ground for handling a variety
of devices used by corporate managers and controlling shareholders
to obtain benefits from which the body of shareholders is excluded. If
rule X-10B-5 remains in force and if it is not hedged about by judicial
restrictions reminiscent of the common law, many of the deficiencies of
the common-law cases dealing with the remedies of selling shareholders
in control transactions may eventually be corrected.
PART TWO. ACTIONS BY COMPLAINANTS OTHER
THAN SELLING SHAREHOLDERS
Thus far in this article inquiry into the purchase of controlling
corporate interests has been directed toward those instances in which
a selling shareholder has been the complainant. The transaction by
which the buyer acquires control may take a form which opens up a
real possibility of complaint by other members of the corporate in-
stitution. For example, the buyer may purchase only the shares owned
by a controlling shareholder, who may or may not be an officer or
director. In such a case, the other shareholders continue to own their
shares in the corporation after the buyer has acquired control. Even
if the buyer purchases not only the controlling shares owned by one
person (or by a group acting in concert), but also some additional
shares owned by other shareholders, there may still be shareholders
who continue to own shares after the completion of the buyer's trans-
action. Thus there is the possibility of a suit against the seller of the
controlling shares by those who may be referred to as the "remaining
shareholders"; in such a suit the problems raised are somewhat dif-
ferent from those posed in a selling shareholder's suit.
134. See note 273 infra.
135. Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 82, 84 (1933), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1 (1952) ; § 9 of the Exchange Act, 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
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Aside from the question of the remedies available to the remain-
ing shareholders in some instances, there is a problem of the possibility
of a cause of action by the corporation on its own behalf. That prob-
lem may arise in any case in which the buyer acquires control, whether
he does so by way of a purchase of all of the shares, of controlling shares
plus some of the other shares or only of controlling shares. The ques-
tion whether a "corporate" cause of action exists may arise in several
procedural contexts, three of which may be mentioned. The directors
may authorize the prosecution of such an action in the name of the
corporation. Shareholders may bring a derivative suit asserting a
corporate cause of action which the directors have failed or refused to
prosecute. In case of an insolvent corporation, a receiver or trustee
in bankruptcy may proceed as successor to the corporation.136 An
examination of the circumstances under which a corporate cause of
action may be asserted, as distinguished from a cause of action pros-
ecuted by selling shareholders or remaining shareholders, is the subject
of the immediately following section.
III. ACTIONS UNDER STATE LAW
A. Actions by or on Behalf of the Corporation
The factual contexts in which a corporation may attack a control
sale are varied. By way of introduction to a study of those factual
situations, it may be suggested that with respect to each of them there
is the broad question whether it is desirable to require the seller of a
controlling block of corporate shares to account to anyone except a
shareholder who has been induced to sell his own shares and has suf-
fered the loss of an opportunity to participate proportionately in the
contr6l sale.13 7 There have been major obstacles to judicial considera-
§ 78i (1952). See Latty, supra note 98, at 512-15. In his dissenting opinion in
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883, 884 (2d Cir. 1952),
Judge Frank noted that "when the Commission promulgated Rule X-10B-5, it did not
deem it 'necessary or appropriate' for the public interest that the restrictions else-
where imposed should be required in suits under that Rule." Id. at 887.
136. At least with respect to suits involving a sale of control under circum-
stances suggesting a possibility that the purchaser of control might cause harm to
the corporation by appropriating its assets, no significant substantive differences in
the liability of the seller of control have been observed that are attributable to the
fact that suit was brought, on the one hand, by the corporation or, on the other
hand, by a trustee in bankruptcy. Those cases will, therefore, be examined together.
It is a major problem, as yet not wholly satisfactorily resolved, whether, in the case
of a solvent corporation, payment of a judgment arising out of a derivative suit in-
volving sale of control should be made to the corporation or directly to the com-
plaining shareholders. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955),
and text at p. 821 infra.
137. It has been held that the corporation is not a proper party to prosecute an
injunction suit against directors based on an allegation of fraud on selling share-
holders. Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, Inc., 187 Md. 49, 48 A.2d 322 (1946). The
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tion of that narrow problem. One such obstacle has been the dearth
of available legal doctrines which permit analysis of the situation.
Another has been a readiness on the part of the courts to decide the
cases on the basis of the same negative doctrine which blocked the
selling shareholder in cases previously considered in this article,
i.e., that the absence of a fiduciary relationship between a shareholder
and other members of the corporate family forecloses examination of
even a controlling shareholder's transactions in his shares.
A preliminary look at several of the decided cases will illustrate
the play of that doctrine; it may suggest that the doctrine imposes
serious limitations upon examination of the desirability of a corporate
cause of action in specific factual situations. In Keely v. Black, 3'
the president of a corporation sold more than 95 per cent of the out-
standing shares of the corporation to a third party. He had bought
some of the shares from other shareholders in order to deliver control.
In a suit brought by the remaining shareholders, the court declined
to order an accounting to the corporation with respect to a "bonus"
which the president had received from the buyer. It appeared to the
court that the president had acted only as an individual, had received
the bonus for his own services in connection with his purchase of out-
standing shares and had not occupied any fiduciary relationship to
the complainants.3 9 The duality of defendant's position, as a manager
and as the holder of 95 per cent of the corporation's shares, did not
move the court to ask whether what the defendant had done in one
capacity (i.e., as shareholder) had some bearing on responsibilities
which he might owe in his other capacity as president of the corpora-
tion.40
court intimated that even the selling shareholders had no cause of action, stating:
"Everyone knows, as these shareholders must have known, that purchasers of stock
do not anticipate a loss, but a profit." Id. at 60, 48 A.2d at 327-28.
138. 91 N.J. Eq. 520, 111 Ati. 22 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920).
139. The court noted, however, that no shareholder from whom the shares had
been purchased for resale was complaining. Whether the court would have required
an accounting to such a shareholder is not too clear, since it has been observed previ-
ously in this article that even selling shareholders have not invariably been granted
relief in such a case. It was a factor influencing the court's decision that accounting
had been requested to be made to the corporation. Since the buyer now owned almost
all of the outstanding shares, the result of such an accounting would have been an
indirect return to the buyer of the major part of the bonus paid to the president.
The court stated that it could not ". . . conceive of a more unjust and inequitable
result than to force the Bell company to take back this money which it paid in good
faith and for the return of which it does not ask." Id. at 524, 111 AtI. at 23. But see
text at pp. 821-26 infra.
140. The possible impact of Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d
5 (Ch. 1949), upon the type of transaction observable in the Keely case deserves
note. In that case, an accounting was required of one who was not even a manager
(in the sense of an officer and director) but a "confidential secretary" of a director
of the corporation. Having learned that the corporation was proposing to purchase
some of its own shares, he bought shares on the market; after the corporation entered
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Other courts (or other plaintiffs) have been more assiduous in
their search for an available doctrine with which to begin examination
of the problem. In Commonwealth Title Insurance & Trust Co. v.
Seltzer,'4' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to be misled by
the notion that a transaction essentially single could be divided into a
shareholder part and a managerial part. When approached by a third
party who wanted to buy a corporation's sole asset (certain real prop-
erty), the corporation's president indicated to the prospective buyer
that the purchase could not be made. Thereafter, the president and
another director purchased a sufficient number of shares to obtain con-
trol of the corporation and then sold their shares to the third party
at a profit to themselves.' At a shareholders' meeting held after
the third party had obtained control of a majority of the shares, the
directors and officers were authorized to accept the third party's offer
to purchase the corporation's real property. Immediately thereafter,
the defendants and the other directors of the corporation authorized
the sale of the property at a price ". . . which was not found to be
inadequate. . . . ""I The cash received for the purchase of the
property was then distributed to the shareholders; the principal de-
fendants did not resign from the board of directors until after the board
had voted to accept the offer for the purchase of the corporation's prop-
erty. 44 On a bill in equity brought by minority shareholders, the
principal defendants were required to account for the profit 141 which
they had made on the sale of the corporation's shares. 46
the market and caused a rise in price, he sold his shares at a profit. The court denied
a motion to dismiss a complaint in a derivative suit to compel accounting for the
profit, even though the court thought that the allegation that the transaction had been
"to the detriment of Cities Service" was insufficient to show loss to the corporation.
It was not necessary to plead that a loss had been sustained; it was only necessary
for the complainants to demonstrate that there had been a breach of a "confidential
relation" by an employee. The court apparently required the accounting as a prophy-
lactic measure to foreclose the use of "inside" information which, in most cases, might
result in actual loss to the corporation.
141. 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910).
142. An agreement covering the purchase of shares was executed in May, 1902.
At the beginning of 1902, the defendant Seltzer owned no shares in his own right,
although he was co-trustee of an estate which owned a small block of shares. Mem-
bers of his family were shareholders. Relatives of the other principal defendant "were
heavily interested in" the corporation. Transcript of Record, p. 235.
143. 227 Pa. at 415, 76 Atl. at 78.
144. Transcript of Record, p. 242.
145. Since the defendants had not held shares of the corporation prior to the time
they had made purchases in connection with the transaction in question, the court was
not faced with the problem of determining the "value" of the shares in their hands
as an incident to further determining the amount of "profit" which the defendants
had made on the sale of the shares to the third party. Defendants were held liable
to account for the price they were paid for the shares by the third party after deduct-
ing (a) the payments they had made to shareholders to acquire the shares and (b)
their expenses in connection with the transaction. Id. at 258.
146. The case poses problems of (a) the theory of the "ownership" of the cause
of action and (b) the form of relief. Plaintiffs had requested an accounting either to
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Like the New Jersey court which decided the Keely case, the Penn-
sylvania court preserved the symmetry of the law by noting that a
shareholder, even though he is a managing officer of a corporation,
has the right to buy and sell the corporation's shares and to keep the
profits. But the court observed that in this case the defendants were
acting as directors in selling the corporation's assets; they had not
made certain that the corporation should receive all which the buyer
was willing to pay for those assets. In their capacity as managers they
had diverted into their own pockets as shareholders a portion of the
total consideration which, in reality if not in form, was paid for those
assets. For dereliction of their duty as directors, they were required
to account even though they had cast the transaction in the form of
a sale of stock and despite the fact that the corporation had received
at least a "fair" price for the assets.
Because the directors had cast their transaction in two parts, the
court was able to pin the label of "fiduciary duty" on what they had
done as directors. Had they merely sold their shares and resigned
from office, leaving the buyer free to dispose of the assets of the cor-
poration as he saw fit, perhaps even then the court might have held
them accountable for their failure, as directors, to effect the sale of
assets when it was first proposed.' 47 Beyond that the question arises
as to what the court would have done (1) if the buyer had initially
come to the defendants with a proposal to buy only a controlling block
of shares, the buyer intending to use the power thus acquired to con-
trol the disposition of the assets to itself, or (2) if the defendants had
themselves, or to the corporation, or to a receiver. Id. at 145-46. Thus, their bill
was not couched distinctly in terms of a derivative, rather than personal, suit. The
trial court found the defendants had committed a fraud on the shareholders, but also
found that the profits made by defendants "belonged" to the corporation. Id. at 251.
Although not plainly articulated, it appears that the trial court viewed the suit in
theory as the assertion of a "corporate" cause of action. The supreme court's dis-
cussion of the propriety of suit in the name of individual shareholders is indicative
of a similar conception of the theory of the suit as one in which shareholders were
bringing a corporate suit which they could not reasonably expect the present man-
agers to prosecute; the language of the opinion bears a strong resemblance to the
customary language in more modern opinions discussing the propriety of shareholders'
maintaining derivative suits. 227 Pa. at 418-19, 76 Atl. at 80.
In determining the form of relief, however, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's direction that accounting be made directly to the plaintiffs. Defendants were
required to pay only a portion of their profits, measured by the proportion which
plaintiffs' shares bore to the outstanding shares of the corporation. Transcript of
Record, p. 248. Since the defendants were not required to pay their entire profit to a
representative of the corporation (such as the present management or a receiver),
the form of relief did not strictly follow the theory that the defendants' profits
"belonged" to the corporation. One basis for explanation of this result may be that
. . . the corporation had practically gone into liquidation ... " 227 Pa. at 418,
76 Atl. at 80.
147. The lower court noted, however, that if the defendants had resigned from
the board before the sale of assets was authorized, the defendants might have retained
the profits made on their stock speculation. Transcript of Record, pp. 250-51.
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been merely holders of controlling shares, not formally directors but
otherwise effectively controlling the directors' management of the cor-
poration.14s In either event, a doctrine relating to the duty of directors
might have been an insufficient basis for the court to impose account-
ability on shareholders.
The search for appropriate and usable legal tools to solve such
problems has produced varied results in what might be called the "loot-
ing" cases. Those cases involve observable depletion of corporate as-
sets. They will therefore be examined before attention is directed
toward control sales in which injury to corporate interests is not so
obvious.
1. Against Controlling Shareholders When Sale Is Followed by
Looting or Looting Is Anticipated
Trafficking in control was one of the serious abuses detected by
the SEC in its intensive investigation into the practices of investment
companies 49  Remedial legislation .1o was not the only outcome of
such abusive operations; litigation growing out of control transfers
has left judicial precedents which may have impact upon transactions
involving the transfer of controlling interests in corporations which
do not possess the specialized attributes of the investment company.
Two major suits were brought against controlling shareholders who
had sold their shares, the buyers having used their newly-purchased
control to appropriate corporate assets for their own purposes. In
short, the buyers "looted" the corporations soon after obtaining access
to the corporate treasuries. In one of the cases, Insuranshares Corp.
v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 5' the suit was brought in the name of the
corporation; in the other, Gerdes v. Reynolds,.52 recovery was sought
by a reorganization trustee. In each case, liability was imposed upon
the selling group. However, both the theories of liability and the
measures of recovery were different.
148. Cf. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). In Sautter v.
Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179 N.E. 310 (1932), the court did not discuss whether defend-
ant's liability to a selling shareholder was grounded in his occupation of an office or
directorship, as distinguished from his ownership of controlling shares.
149. See SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 30 OF THE PUBLIc UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY AcT OF 1935
(1940).
150. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1
(1952).
151. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940); 42 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (ascer-
tainment of damages).
152. 28 N.Y.S2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (con-
firmation of report of referee to assess damages).
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Those differences in theories of liability and measures of recovery
are significant in this study not merely in reference to the other looting
cases to be considered. Of particular significance is the impact of the
cases in this section upon those control transfers which do not result in
observable depletion of corporate assets. Running through the looting
cases are two different forms of relief. The plaintiff may ask that
the transferor of controlling shares be required to pay damages to the
corporation measured by the value of the assets appropriated by the
purchasers of control.'5 3 On the other hand, the plaintiff may seek
to compel the control transferor to disgorge profits resulting from the
control sale; specifically, to give up that part of the price he has re-
ceived for his shares which exceeds whatever may reasonably be found
to be the "value" ' of the shares he has sold. In reviewing the looting
cases, therefore, it should be noted that the plaintiff may ask for both
recoveries, or only one. It should also be kept in mind that the profit
remedy and the reasons for its being granted or denied will be the
focus of attention in those cases, to be discussed in a later section,155
which involve control sales unaccompanied by looting.
The defendants in the Insuranshares case were shareholders, for-
mer officers and directors, and purchasers of controlling shares who
had appropriated corporate assets. Of principal interest with respect
153. If suit is brought by the corporation, or by innocent shareholders asserting
a derivative right, rather than by a trustee in bankruptcy, the purchasers of control
may conceivably benefit by a recovery from the sellers of control. This possibility
should not preclude corporate recovery of damages from the sellers of control.
(1) It is factually unlikely that buyers will institute a corporate suit against sellers.
If looting is serious enough, a trustee in bankruptcy will have stepped in. If the
buyers are still in control, they will hardly institute a suit which will necessarily
involve disclosure of their own misconduct. (2) It is not improbable that the looters
will have disposed of their share interests to new shareholders after they have used
the corporation for their own purposes. In effect that is what was done in the
Insnranshares case. See Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 42 F. Supp.
126, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1941). (3) If the buyers still hold their shares and a derivative
suit is instituted by innocent shareholders, the court will be faced with a situation
similar to that encountered in the ordinary derivative suit for corporate mismanage-
ment. In such a case, the fact that managers may be shareholders does not preclude
corporate recovery from them or even require that relief against them be molded
in such a way as to preclude the wrongdoers from sharing indirectly in the pro-
ceeds of the judgment. See note 261 infra. Whatever dissimilarity there is between
the ordinary derivative suit and the suit involving control transfers rests in the
possibility that the sellers of control may be made the sole defendants, thus bearing
the whole burden of a judgment for damages which will inure to the indirect benefit
of fellow wrongdoers. In that narrow situation, adaptation of the present rules of
indemnity and contribution might well be made to permit sellers to recover from
buyers all or some part of a judgment for damages paid to the corporation. (As to
the problems posed by those rules, see Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. Rrv. 130 (1932).) Of course, no right to shift the burden
of a judgment for sellers' profits as distinguished from one for corporate loss should
be recognized; that liability falls exclusively on the sellers, and along with the risk
of the buyers' insolvency should remain as a deterrent to sales of control under cir-
cumstances arousing suspicion as to buyers' intentions.
154. See note 246 infra.
155. See text at pp. 797-820 infra.
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to the problems under study in this article are the shareholders (banks
and individuals) who had sold approximately 27 per cent of the cor-
poration's outstanding shares. The court found that this block was
sufficient to constitute practical control of the corporation, although it
occupied mathematically only a minority position. Of the defendants
who had been served and were therefore before the court, three were
banks which had held shares in the corporation and one was an indi-
vidual who had been their "representative" on the board of directors.
The sellers were required to restore to the corporation the losses which
had been caused by the purchasers' appropriation of its assets.'56 Al-
though the controlling shareholders had received a price for their shares
in excess of the market value as well as the book value of the shares,
the corporation did not ask that they be compelled to disgorge their
profit, and no part of that excess appeared as an element of the corpo-
ration's recovery.
157
The selling shareholders' liability to account was grounded in two
propositions. First, the shareholders were found to owe a "duty" to
the corporation which they might not have owed if the transaction had
been a mere sale of stock, 158 a conclusion reached apparently from a
reading of the "whole record" ' and from a consideration of the price
at which the shares were sold. The former test does not suggest a very
significant standard by which to determine the existence of the duty
which the court imposed, except for its inferential emphasis on the fact
that the particular sale of shares involved in the case resulted in the
corporation's loss of assets. With respect to the latter test (the price
at which the shares were sold), the court concluded that the defend-
ants had sold "control," basing its decision on the grounds that the
sellers had received $3.60 per share at a time when the book value of
shares was $2.25 per share and the. over-the-counter market price only
$1.00 to $1.25 per share. Having thus determined that the controlling
shareholders owed a "duty" to the corporation, even though they were
not managers, the court then moved to its second ground of liability,
i.e., that, in a case in which control is sold, the seller of control will be
liable for negligence in connection with the sale; if the circumstances
156. A major loss was caused by the purchasers' sale of plaintiff's portfolio to
repay money borrowed by the purchasers to buy the shares of the selling group. In
effect, the purchasers had bought the corporation's shares with its own assets.
157. See 42 F. Supp. at 126 for discussion of the measure of damages.
158. Thus, in the search for an applicable concept to supply a "duty" in con-
nection with a sale of shares, the court adopted the technique of other courts which
have viewed the transaction as substantially or primarily something different from
the form in which it had been cast. Cf. Dunnett v. Am, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir.
1934); Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77
(1910).
159. 35 F. Supp, at 24.
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suggest inquiry 160 and if such inquiry is not made, the sellers must
account to the corporation for resulting losses.' 61
The theory of liability in the Insuranshares case was therefore
grounded in part on a factual determination that those who occupied
a position of power in the corporation had negligently caused loss to
the corporation through the medium of an ostensible sale of shares;
since the defendants did in fact occupy that position of power they
were not relieved from liability merely because they had not occupied
some other position of power such as that of an officer or a director.
In the second of the investment company cases, Gerdes v. Reynolds,
62
the theory of liability, while not wholly clear when viewed in the fac-
tual context, appears to have been more legally than factually oriented.
The Gerdes case also involved a sale of controlling shares of an invest-
ment company to a buying group which assumed control through
resignations of the old board of directors and substitution of new di-
rectors; 16' the buyers thereafter "looted" the treasury of the corpora-
160. The court listed five facts which should have led the sellers to an investi-
gation: (1) the corporation had previously been looted in a similar fashion; (2) some
of the defendants had been willing to permit another prospective buyer to use the
corporation's assets to pay for shares; (3) defendants knew that the buyer wanted
to turn some of the assets into cash before the sale; (4) the price for the shares was
excessive; and (5) defendants had been warned of risks attendant upon sale of
control to irresponsible people. Id. at 25-26.
161. "Without attempting any general definition, and stating the duty in minimum
terms as applicable to the facts of this case, it may be said that the owners of control
are under a duty not to transfer it to outsiders if the circumstances surrounding the
proposed transfer are such as to awaken suspicion and put a prudent man on his
guard-unless a reasonably adequate investigation discloses such facts as would
convince a reasonable person that no fraud is intended or likely to result. Thus,
whatever the extent of the primary duty may be, circumstances may be sufficient to
call into being the duty of active vigilence [sic] and inquiry. If, after such investi-
gation, the sellers are deceived by false representations, there might not be liability,
but if the circumstances put the seller on notice and if no adequate investigation is
made and harm follows, then liability also follows." Id. at 25.
As stated in this excerpt from the opinion, the court imposed an absolute duty
to investigate if circumstances should have aroused suspicions. Because the court
was convinced that an investigation, if made, would have resulted in discovery of
the fact that "looting" was proposed, its statement is probably adequate for the facts
of this case. The difficult case arises when there are suspicious circumstances, no
investigation by the sellers of control and an attempt by the sellers to prove at trial
that an investigation would not have revealed that the buyer might loot the cor-
poration. If the "negligence" doctrine of the In'uranshares case is to be taken seri-
ously, then, at least theoretically, the sellers would have a defense. It could hardly
be said that it was negligence to fail to do that which, if done, would not have pre-
vented the subsequent loss to the corporation. In practice, the burden of proving
that defense may be so great that sellers will make the investigation in most cases
or, if they do not, will find the defense not useful to them in any realistic sense.
162. 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
163. New directors were substituted by the following method. One member of
the old board resigned, after which the vacancy so created was filled by the re-
maining members through appointment of a nominee of the buyers. Then another
member of the old board resigned, and the vacancy so created was filled in the same
manner. Successive resignations and appointments resulted in the creation of a board
composed exclusively of the buyers' nominees. Id. at 632. The court recognized
that ". . . in the case of this particular corporation, as in many others, the remaining
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tion and used the proceeds in part to pay for the stock purchased. In
the Gerdes case there was no necessity to find the existence of "prac-
tical" control; legal control had been vested in the selling group, since
it owned a majority of the stock. A significant difference from the
Insuranshares case was the fact that the selling shareholders themselves
occupied offices and directorships in the company, making it unneces-
sary for the court to create a fiduciary doctrine applicable to controlling
shareholders as such. However, since the argument had to be met
that shareholders may freely sell their shares, it was necessary for the
court to hold that a group of directors and officers who sell their shares
may be subjected to liability qua directors, even though they may have
cast a transaction in the form of shareholder activity. The trustee
was granted both of the forms of relief mentioned above: the defend-
ants were required to account to the trustee for (1) the loss sustained
by the corporation as the "proximate" consequence of the sale of con-
trol and the turning over of the corporation's assets to the buyers,""
and (2) the difference between the "actual value" of the shares sold
by the control group and the price received."
The basis for the imposition of liability in the Gerdes case is some-
what unclear from the opinion. The court vacillated between two
theories, one based upon the defendants' negligence, the other upon the
fact that the defendants had received an excessive price for their shares
in connection with their resignation from office. Those ideas were de-
veloped in the following way. The plaintiff trustee had alleged that
the sale of the defendants' shares (accompanied by resignations of di-
rectors and officers) was an "illegal transaction" because it had been
accomplished in violation of a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation
and to holders of debentures, preferred stock and common stock. Al-
directors were specifically authorized to fill vacancies." Id. at 649; cf. Oil Shares, Inc.
v. Kahn, 94 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1938). Statutes permitting directors to fill vacancies
on the board, without notice to or approval by shareholders, facilitate the substitution
of a completely new board in the manner employed in the Gerdes case. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 808 (West 1955); DEfL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §223 (1953);
PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 15, § 2852-402(3) (Purdon Supp. 1954). Under §16(a) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 813, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (1952), the
procedure used in the Gerdes case would no longer be available to directors of invest-
ment companies subject to that statute.
164. 30 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
165. 28 N.Y.S.2d at 656-61. Although, in theory, the "profit" from the sale of
control was considered by the court to be the "property of the corporation," the de-
fendants were directed to pay a portion of this amount to the trustee of another
insolvent corporation from which funds had been diverted to make up a portion of
the price paid to acquire control of the investment company. In effect, therefore, the
court held that the defendants' clear profit payable to their corporation was less
than it would have been had defendants not been required to reimburse another party
for funds unlawfully received by them. See p. 826 infra for a discussion of the
measure of the liability of a manager or controlling shareholder, required to account
to his corporation for "profit" realized in a control sale, when there are selling share-
holders who claim a portion of his profit.
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ternatively, the trustee asserted that if the sale was not illegal per se,
then it was illegal because the defendants had negligently or in bad
faith failed to investigate the purchaser or give notice to the other
shareholders, -and that this was especially true since the excessive pur-
chase price paid to defendants put them on notice of some intended
wrongful act.' (The latter position sounds much like the one taken
by the court in the Insuranshares case.) In its opinion, the court
gave verbal recognition to the right of shareholders to sell their shares
and pass to the buyer the right to select directors, but noted that a
director's right to sell shares or to resign is qualified by a fiduciary
obligation which he owes as director. 16 7  The court stated that there
were two questions to be answered: (1) Were the circumstances such
as to charge the resigning directors with notice that unlawful plans and
designs of the purchasers were". . . reasonably to be perceived"? "~
(2) Was the price paid in reality a price for stock or at least in part for
the resignation of the officers and the election of the buyers' nominees?
The first of these questions, as well as the court's observations about
the nature of the assets ("practically negotiable securities")"6 9 and the
method of consummating the transaction, indicates that the court was
moving in the direction of imposing liability upon the managers of
the corporation because of their negligence (as did the court in the
Insuronshares case). However, the court's subsequent examination
of the price paid for the shares demonstrates that it was shifting toward
the proposition that the receipt of that price, in connection with resig-
nation from office was a more significant liability determinant. -Hav-
ing found that the shares had a "value" of, at most, 75 cents a share 170
166. 28 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
167. The court noted that if officers, directors or stockholders actually knew that
the purchasers of control intended to loot the corporation, liability ". . . would not
have to be predicated upon breach of a fiduciary relation, for the act would amount
to a wilful and malicious injury to property, tortious 'in its very nature." 28
N.Y.S2d- at 652. The court found no such knowledge and thus moved on to the
development of its theories of liability applicable to the facts of the case. See remarks
of Judge Swan, dissenting in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 179 (2d Cir.
1955), and suggesting a limited duty of sellers of control. The known irresponsibility
of purchasers of control- appears to have been a significant fact in Benson v. Braun,
141 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 286 App. Div. 1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d
Dep't 1955) (on motion to dismiss for insufficiency of complaint). See note 184 infra.
168. The court cited Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928).
169. 28 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
170. Taking the figures most favorable to the defendants, the court determined
that the "asset value" of the shares would amount to six cents a share. An expert
witness had testified that, taking all "speculative elements" into consideration, the
shares had a fair value of 25 cents a share ($263,750 for 1,055,000 shares) with
slightly in excess of three cents a share ($32,000) added for "control features" (the
latter amount consisting of one year's salaries and brokerage commissions which
the owner of the majority of the corporation's shares might obtain for himself).
Another witness valued the shares at 30 cents a share plus 10 cents a share added for
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and that they had been sold for $2 a share, the court concluded that
the excess amount had been paid for what it referred to variously as
.. .immediate en masse resignations and immediate election of
the purchasers' nominees as successors," "" the ". . . resignations
and election of successors," 172 and ". .. control . . . . 13 The
sellers were obliged to account to the corporation for the excess. Thus
,far, the court had imposed liability for "profits," a measure of recovery
not in issue in the Insuranshares case.
In the determination of the Gerdes defendants' liability for "loot-
ing" losses, the part played by the excessive price -they received is un-
clear. Some of the court's language indicates that the -excessive price
should have put the sellers on notice that loss was likely to result from
the sale of shares. However, in the referee's report on the extent of
the sellers' liability for looting losses; the -point -was made that the
sellers' liability was based on ". . . more than simple negligence." 174
The court apparently acquiesced in that point, for in its opinion con-
firming the referee's report, the court held -that it was not necessary to
decide whether loss to the corporation had been foreseeable by the de-
fendants, since liability was based on the "added" -element of an illegal
sale of corporate office.1r . That language- indicates that liability for
looting losses (and not .merely for profits) arose from-the application
of a rule of law relating to the obligations of corporate managers rather
than from a factual finding of negligence. Despite that language, the
possibility remains open that even the court which decided the Gerdes
case could have held the controlling shareholders liable for looting losses
even though the price received for their shares was merely their "actual"
value and not something in excess of that value. That court did not
reject a rule of liability based on a negligent failure to investigate the
purchaser; if the sellers had been put on notice that they were selling
their shares to persons who might reasonably be expected to loot the
corporation's treasury, it seems plausible to suppose that they would
have been held liable for those losses: For instance, in Insuranshares,
the excessiveness of the price was only one of a number of facts serving
to put the defendants on notice, and although proof of such notice might
be more difficult if that particular fact were not present, at least in
theory it has not been made a sine qua non on the issue of notice.
their control value as a block; this witness admitted the possibility that the shares
might have a value as high as 50 cents a share. The court concluded that ". . . 75
cents per share is as liberal a finding as the evidence warrants." See 28 N.Y.S.2d
at 654-58.
171. Id. at 658.
172. Ibid.
173. Id. at 661.
174. 30 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
175. Id. at 779.
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Aside from the question of the proper basis for imposing liability
on a controlling shareholder for losses which a sale of control may
cause, the investment company cases invite speculation about the re-
sponsibility of a transferor of control for his "profits" in a case in
which there is no depletion of corporate assets after the transfer or,
if there is such depletion, there are no clear factual reasons for the
transferor of control to have suspected that looting might occur. The
doctrinal and factual complexities of the investment company cases
make difficult an intelligent prediction of the results of such a transfer.
There is a question which the Gerdes case suggests and which may
arise in any case in which a director or officer has sold controlling
shares and at the buyer's request has resigned his office and procured
resignation of other directors and officers. If such a sale is made at a
price which a court might find to be in excess of the "value" of the
shares sold, considered as individual units, will the seller be required
to account to the corporation for that excess even though the buyer
does not appropriate assets when he acquires control? The opinion
in the Gerdes case gives rise to an inference that in any sale of con-
trolling shares, a selling director or officer will be held to account to
the corporation for such excess if an integral part of the sale is the
substitution of the buyer's nominees as managers of the corporation.
However, this narrow issue was not presented to the court; its treat-
ment of the excess in price received by the sellers cannot be divorced
from the complex factual context in which the receipt of that excess
occurred. The sale in that case was in fact followed by waste of cor-
porate assets and was accompanied by facts putting the seller on notice
that the possibility of waste was present. In the companion case of
Ballantine v. Ferretti,7" in which the question was presented in a
somewhat different factual and legal setting,177 the same court stated
176. 28 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
177. Two corporations were involved in the Ballantine case. Corporation A sup-
plied "management" to Corporation B, an investment company owning a security
portfolio. Two of the defendants owned all of the shares of A and had practical
control of B through the management contract and by reason of the fact that one
of the defendants was the president and a director of B. Upon sale of all of the
shares of A, the majority of the officers and directors of both corporations resigned
and the buyers' nominees were substituted. B's portfolio of securities was not stolen,
and no complaint was made by that corporation. However, suit was brought against
the sellers of A's stock by the trustee of an insolvent third corporation, Corpora-
tion C. The purchasers of A's shares had obtained the funds with which they made
the purchase by looting the treasury of C. C's trustee traced those funds into the
hands of the sellers of A's shares and claimed recovery on the ground that the funds
had not yet passed to a "bona fide purchaser." Recovery was allowed, on the ground
that the sellers had in fact sold control of B and had therefore engaged in an
"illegal" transaction. Defendants were required to pay to the trustee of C that
portion of the purchase price they had received for A's shares which the court found
to be in excess of the "fair value" of those shares.
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that such a sale was "illegal" even though it was not followed by loot-
ing. However, even in the Ballantine case, the facts indicated to the
sellers as plainly as in the Gerdes and Insuranshares cases that looting
might reasonably have been anticipated. 8 Earlier New York cases
upon which the court relied in the Gerdes and Ballantine cases do not
supply satisfactory answers to the question whether, in a case in which
looting of a corporate treasury does not figure as a strong possibility,
a manager will be required to account for his "profit" when he sells
controlling shares at an excessive price. One such case involved pri-
marily a question of pleading, 79 while another involved a scheme
whereby the president and director of an insurance company, for a
price, delivered control of the company by procuring the resignations
of the old board and appointing the nominees of the buyer. 80 In the
latter case, no sale of stock was involved, and the court was not faced
with the necessity of balancing those seemingly conflicting policies
which arise from the division of the corporate institution into respon-
sible managers and non-responsible shareholders; 181 furthermore, as
178. 28 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
179. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901). The Bosworth
case arose on demurrers specifying misjoinder of causes of action; the court held
that there was no misjoinder of causes of action to recover the profits made by
sellers of control and the damages sustained by the corporation as a result of the
control sale. Plaintiff receiver had alleged that defendant managers and shareholders
had conspired with purchasers of control ". . . whom they knew to be irresponsible
and untrustworthy. . . ." The opinion does not indicate what proof would sub-
stantiate the charge of conspiracy or of defendants' knowledge of the character of
the buyers. By dictum, however, controlling persons who "sell out" by resigning
are liable to account for their gain as well as for damages "naturally resulting" from
their acts. 168 N.Y. at 166, 61 N.E. at 165.
180. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899); cf. Field v. Western
Life Ins. Co., 166 Fed. 607 (N.D. Ill. 1908).
181. There has been a substantial body of litigation involving agreements to
appoint officers and directors, the effect of which would commit directors to courses
of conduct not necessarily in the best interests of the corporation. The courts have
been presented primarily with problems relating to the enforceability of such agree-
ments (either by way of actions for damages or suits for specific performance). The
concept of the "illegality" of the "sale of a corporate office" is grounded in large
measure upon policies developed in those cases, although the problem of accountability
for gain was not in issue. Agreements by directors, not entered into as a part
of an agreement for the sale of shares between the parties, to elect or procure the
election of other persons as officers or to pay specified salaries to officers, have been
held unenforceable by either party. West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1890) ; Watkins
v. Passannante, 114 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Lockley v. Robie, 276 App. Div.
291, 94 N.Y.S.2d 335 (4th Dep't 1950); Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E2d
439 (1946) ; Dubbs v. Kramer, 302 Pa. 455, 153 AtI. 733 (1931) ; cf. Kratzer v. Day,
12 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Clark v. First Nat'l Bank, 219 Iowa 637, 259 N.W. 211
(1935) ; Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918) ; Jackson v. Hooper, 76
N.J. Eq. 592, 75 AtI. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910) ; see Annot., 12 A.L.R. 1070 (1921).
It all of the outstanding shareholders agree, the result may be otherwise. Clark v.
Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936); Cohen v. Wacht, 124 N.Y.S.2d 207
(Sup. Ct. 1953). See also Miller v. Vanderlip, 285 N.Y. 116, 33 N.E.2d 51 (1941)
(no allegation that those who agreed to urge board to elect plaintiff as president and
general manager were directors). The courts are not uniform in their treatment of
agreements by whith the corporation is committed to employment of an officer.
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in the Gerdes case, the sale of control was followed by insolvency at-
tributable to the fact of the sale.'
Compare Thielsen v. Blake, Moffit & Towne, 142 Ore. 59, 17 P.2d 560 (1932), With
United Producers & Consumers Co-op. v. Heald, 225 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1955), and
Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1930).
If directors agree that they will resign their positions and procure the substi-
tution of other persons as directors, not as a part of a contract for the sale of shares
by the resigning directors, such an agreement has been held to be unenforceable.
Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98 (1880) (mining corporation); Reed v. Catlett,
228 Mo. App. 109, 68 S.W.2d 734 (1934) (mutual insurance company without capital
stock); Sauerhering v. Rueping, 137 Wis. 407, 119 N.W. 184 (1909) (same); cf.
Griffin v. Patterson, 183 Okla. 108, 80 P.2d 246 (1938). Even though the agreement
to elect or procure the election of someone as an officer is part of an agreement to
sell shares, if the shares sold are less than controlling shares the agreement is almost
uniformly held unenforceable. Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876) ; McQuade
v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Fabre v. Donahue, 185 App. Div.
779 (2d Dep't 1918); Fennessy v. Ross, 90 Hun 298 (N.Y.,- 1st Dep't 1895), 5 App.
Div. 342 (1st Dep't 1896); cf. Noel v. Drake, 28 Kan. 265 (1882); Fremont v.
Stone, 42 Barb. 169 (N.Y. 1864). Again, the result may be otherwise if all of the
outstanding shareholders have consented t6 the agreement. Hayden v. Beane, 293
Mass. 347, 199 N.E. 755 (.1936).
,~ When the agreement contemplates a sale of controlling shares, resignation of
the sellers from directorships and offices and substitution of the buyer's nomiriees, some
courts have held such an agreement enforceable between the parties. Henry L.
Doherty & Co. v. Rice, 186 Fed. 204 (M.D. Ala. 1910); Barnes v. Brown, 80 N.Y.
527 (1880); cf. Renner v. Progressive Life Ins. Co., 193 Ark. 504, 101 S.W.2d 426
(1937) (vendors held all outstanding shares) ; Northern Cehtral Ry. v. Walworth, 193
-Pa. 207, 44. AtI. 253 (1899) (no mention of use of resignation process). A contrary
result was reached in Horbach v. Coyle, 2 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1924) (contract
included provision for secret bonus to resigning officers and directors who agreed to
procure sale by other shareholders); cf. Carlisle v. Smith, 234 Fed. 759 (N.D. Ga.
1916); Brewer v. Stoddard, 309, Mich. 119, 14 N.W.2d 804 (1944). One argument
interposed in favor of the enforceability of agreements for sale of controlling shares
involving.a substitution of directors and officers has been that the purchasers are
merely assuming the .full control which would be theirs -at the next annual meeting.
The writer believes that the enforceability, by the parties, of agreements -for the
sale of controlling shares (both those involving the resignation of officers and
directors and those not involving the resignation process) may properly be con-
sidered against the background of the policies articulated in the text with .respect to
the accountability of controlling shareholders, in the looting cases and otherwise. If
it is found to be desirable to restrain the making of personal profit from a control
sale, accburitability for gains is one sanction which may be imposed by the courts;
refusal to enforce an executory agreement for such a sale may be another appro-
priate sanction.
182. Further difficult problems arise out of both the Insuranshares and Gerdes
cases with. respect to the extent of the liability of the sellers of control for the losses
of the corporation caused by the activities of the buyers. Whether viewed in terms
of a duty to investigate the buyers, or as an absolute duty to account for conse-
quences resulting from a sale of corporate offices, the question is presented whether
these cases have any significance outside their own peculiar facts. If the buyers of
corporate shares engage in less flamboyant tactics than the buyers in the investment
company cases, will the sellers of control be liable for ensuing losses to the cor-
poration? The varieties of corporate wastage are voluminous. Besides direct theft
of the physical assets of the corporation, the incoming control group may, among
other things, pay themselves excessive salaries, bind the corporation to burdensome
management contracts, divert business from the corporation to themselves or to cor-
porations in which they are interested, or pay excessive dividends. The new managers
may simply be so incompetent that the corporation becomes insolvent. Logically,
liability for such losses could be imposed upon control sellers under the negligence
rule of the Insuranshares case and even more clearly under the Gerdes rule that a
sale of a corporate office creates liability to account for those losses proximately
caused by the sale. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157. 61 N.E. 163 (1901), by its
dicta, indicated that sellers of control would be held liable for a variety of acts of
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Whatever doubts may remain, from a reading. of the Gerdes
case, .about the accountability of resigning directors who sell controlling
shares at a profit ina non-looting situation, recent litigation in the New
York courts indicates that sale of control to known irresponsible per-
sons will ground an action for recovery of profits. In Benson v.
Braun,1m a shareholder brought a combined individual and derivative
action to compel accounting by sellers of controlling shares who re-
signed their offices and directorships in favor of buyers' nominees.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendants' shares. had been sold for a price
far in excess of their value and requested accounting for that excess.
It was also alleged that the principal buyers, who had been directors of
the corporation, had previously looted the corporation and were in-
volved in litigation with respect to their derelictions as directors, all
of which defendants knew at the time -of sale. The lower court's denial
of a motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency was affirmed by
the appellate division. As in the investment company cases, the theo-
retical basis for requiring accounting for profits is left unclear. Al-
though the lower court relied heavily on defendants' alleged knowledge
of the buyers' irresponsibility, the appellate division recited only the
plaintiff's theory that the excess price was paid for the resignations, for
the election of the purchasers' nominees as directors and for the im-
mediate control of the corporation. Again, as was suggested in the
discussion of the Gerdes case, the significance of the case must be ap-
prised in the light of th6 factual context in which the sale of control was
alleged to have occurred. To state that the defendants were held ac-
countable because they sold control with knowledge that further looting
was a possibility may be to define their liability in too limited terms:
no further looting had been alleged and the lower court found plain-
tiff's allegation of knowledge of past looting sufficient. The known
potentiality of loss to the corporation, even though through unknown
mismanagement by buyers, including the payment of excessive salaries, unnecessary
expenditures, wasteful contracts and corporate expenses incurred in cancelling such
wasteful contracts. However, even the two investment company cases did not im-
pose liability on the sellers as though they themselves were the converters of cor-
porate property, and each one called an end to accountability at some point short of
full accountability for every act of omission and commission performed by the buyers.
42 F. Supp. at 129; 30 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
In addition, if an act of wastage or mismanagement is sought to be attributed to
the sellers, some limitation is probably inevitable if the court adopts a theory of
negligence as the liability determinant. The ample evidence upon which the court in
the Insuranshares case based its finding that loss of some kind was foreseeable makes
that case less significant as a guide to future conduct where suspicions are less open
on the record or mismanagement is more subtle. Compare Dale v. Thomas H. Temple
Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948) (allegation of conspiracy; director selling
control required to account to receiver of corporation for some losses caused by buyers
but not for excessive salaries paid by buyers to themselves).
183. 141 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 286 App. Div. 1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d 711
(2d Dep't 1955).
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devices,' by persons who had demonstrated a lack of regard for the
welfare of the enterprise as a whole may be the measure of liability
for profits which the court was applying in the Benson case.
Far from establishing that the bare fact of a sale of controlling
shares at a price in excess of their value will at least subject the control-
ling shareholder to liability for profits, the investment company cases
have not wholly succeeded in making the selling controlling share-
holders responsible even when losses actually occur. Levy v. American
Beverage Corp." underscored the thought expressed in those cases
that an important factor in the imposition of liability on the sellers of
control was the ease with which the assets could be transferred or con-
verted into cash. A derivative suit was prosecuted against one who had
been president and director of a corporation engaged in the liquor busi-
ness and had sold the 53 per cent share interest he had controlled. Re-
versing the trial court, the appellate division held that the defendant
was not required to account to the corporation either for a part of the
price received for his shares or for losses resulting from the buyer's
mismanagement and looting of the corporation. The lower court had
required the defendant to account for both. Relying in part on the
Insuranshares case, the trial court had characterized the transaction
184. As suggested, the corporation might suffer loss through further looting,
Loss might result in other ways. Thus the new controlling group may mismanage
the corporation in ways which do not reach the level of outright looting but which favor
the new controlling group at the expense of other shareholders. Or, in a case such
as Benson in which the buyers are former directors under fire for past wrongs to
the corporation, they may now be in a position to control any non-derivative litigation
which has previously been instituted by the corporation; if the statute of limitations
has run against a corporate suit since the date of its institution, or if remaining
shareholders would be barred from instituting a derivative suit by some rule of law,
the new controlling group may successfully evade all liability to the corporation.
As suggested in the text, it is unclear from the opinion of the appellate division how
far the possibility of such losses underlay its decision; it cited McClure v. Law, 161
N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899) (a case in which insolvency resulted from the sale),
Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914) (a selling shareholders' suit) and
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), discussed at length in the text
at p. 809 infra. The failure of either the lower court or the appellate division to
discuss specific foreseeable losses to the corporation may mean only that such mat-
ters are to be developed at trial. That the potentiality of loss resulting from sale
to irresponsible persons may be less significant than was intimated in plaintiff's
allegation is to some slight extent suggested by the failure of the courts to discuss
those losses and by the citation to the Perlman case, in which the court took a much
more sophisticated view of corporate loss than the looting cases had demonstrated
theretofore.
185. 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1st Dep't 1942), reversing Levy v.
Feinberg, 29 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1941). As in the Insuranshares and Gerdes
cases, and unlike the Benson case, the corporation had suffered loss before suit was
brought. Principal losses had been caused by the buyer's use of the assets of the
corporation to pay for the shares purchased and by the merger of the corporation
with an insolvent corporation owned by the buyer. In the Benson case the lower
court distinguished the Levy case on several grounds, one of which was the alleged
actual knowledge in the Benson case that the buyers of control were irresponsible.
141 N.Y.S.2d at 288-89.
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as a sale of control rather than merely of shares because of the fol-
lowing facts: the defendant had received more than three times the
market value of the shares; he had disregarded the character of the
buyer and his means of paying for the shares; he had timed the sale
to coincide with the annual meeting so that the old board could
be replaced without the necessity of resignation; and he had kept the
sale secret until it had been accomplished. The trial court concluded
that, as a seller of control, the defendant should be held accountable
because the circumstances had been sufficient to require an investigation
to determine whether the transaction was in the best interests of the
corporation.
The appellate division questioned the trial court's characterization
of the defendant's status as that of a "fiduciary"; it also concluded that
it could not accept the finding that the defendant had been on notice of
possible looting and mismanagement. The Insuranshares case was
distinguished. That case had involved an investment trust with assets
consisting of readily saleable securities; the present case involved a
mercantile corporation. In the Insuranshares case, the assets had been
converted into cash before the sale of the shares, and the directors and
officers had resigned; those facts were not present in the Levy case."'
The fact alone that the seller of control had failed to discover that the
buyer would loot the corporation was an insufficient basis for liability.
If the court was saying that the seller of control is not a guarantor of the
buyer's honesty in all cases, it is difficult to disagree with that position.
Even under the Insuranshares rule, no need for investigation of the
buyer's integrity is necessary unless the seller has reasonable cause to
suspect that the buyer will misappropriate the corporation's assets.
And although the court in the Gerdes case doctrinally rested liability
for losses on the fact that the defendants had sold corporate offices and
not on the fact that they could foresee loss to the corporation, the courts
have not imposed an absolute liability for losses caused by buyers of
control in cases where the facts have not indicated that losses are about
to occur.
186. With respect to the latter distinguishing point, the fact that the sale was
timed to coincide with the annual meeting of shareholders may have relieved the
defendant from the necessity of resigning, but it did not prevent the buyer from
acquiring control of the corporation. The buyer's ownership of a majority of the
shares permitted him to elect his nominees as directors and officers almost immediately
upon acquiring the defendant's shares. The minority knew at least that a new man-
agement had taken over, which had not been true in the Inmiranshares case, and
theoretically could have kept their eyes open for chicanery. However, as a practical
matter, the minority is probably no better informed about the activities inside the
corporation when the new management is elected in this fashion than when it is
elected by the directors through the device of serial resignations.
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The court's observations in the Levy case, that no -fiduciary duty
rests upon one who sells a majority of the corporation's shares,'17 may
have constituted a rejection of the basis on-which the theory of negli-
gence in the Insuranshares case was constructed. Therefore, its dis-
tinguishing the Insuranshares case on the facts may not -be too sig-
nificant. However, in the process of distinguishing the two cases with
respect to the price received by the controlling shareholders, the New
York court revealed a basic conception of the "value" of controlling
shares which requires examination. The fact that the defendant in
the Levy case had received more than three times. the market value of
his shares did not serve as a liability determinant either in itself or as
a warning of the buyer's intentions. In this case the "liquidation" or
book value of the,-shares was $4.31 a share; exchange prices had gone
as low as one -and one-eighth a share; the defendant had received $3.50
a share. The-court's major basis for rejecting the receipt of an excess
over market as a liability determinant does not seem satisfactory. In
sum, the court's position was that "control might have lawful advan-
tages." 188
There may be a popular belief that controlling shares do as a fact
command a higher price per share than individual shares."8 9 That
belief may detract from the significance of the receipt of an excessive
price as an evidentiary item on the issue of the control seller's notice
of prospective looting. But several questions arise from the New York
court's view of -the value of controlling shares, even if it be conceded
that, in particular cases, there may be "lawful advantages" attaching
187. The court suggested, as its test of liability, that the seller of controlling
shares could not be required to account to the corporation if he has acted in "common
honesty." This test may be too lenient in a situation involving a virtual transfer
of the corporate enterprise. This test is a familiar one in the law dealing with
transfers of commercial paper. The question whether the status of a "holder in due
course" should be accorded to one who has purchased a negotiable instrument honestly,
although he has made the purchase in the face of suspicious circumstances, has at
.least doctrinally been answered in favor of the honest purchaser. Investigation of
suspicious circumstances is no longer required. See BRIrON, BILLS AND NOTES
407-15 (1943). A test of common honesty as the highest measure of obligation in
such a commercial situation is no doubt dictated by the supposed necessities of keeping
a body of commercial paper in a state of fluidity. It may be undesirable to dis-
courage rapidity in the transfer of checks and drafts by erecting an obligation of
inquiry by prospective purchasers. It is difficult to see the necessity for encouraging
even a closely corresponding rapidity in -a transaction involving a transfer of control
of a corporation where there are minority shareholders and creditors whose interests
require some real attention from those who control the enterprise.
188. 265 App. Div. at 218, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
189. For judicial reflection of that belief, see Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 95 F.2d 806, 812 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Royal Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 247 Fed. 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1917); Kier v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 633, 634
(1933); Joseph Soss, P-H 1940 T.C. Mem. Dec. 140531, at p. 40-867; Stanton v.
Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 633, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221, 233 (Sup. Ct. 1931); cf. State v.
Wagner, 233 Minn. 241, 46 N.W.2d 676 (1951); see also Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1
Cum. BULL. 187, 192; BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 244; DODD & BAxER,
CORPORATIONS 570 (1951).
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to a controlling block of shares. (1) Is it not relevant to question
what those advantages may be, particularly in a case where the result
of the purchase of control leaves an inference that the particular ad-
vantage paid for was a power to loot the corporation? "0 (2) Is it not
relevant to determine whether the seller of control reasonably believed
that the excess in price paid by the buyer was paid for specific lawful
advantages? (3) As a minimum protection- to non-controlling share-
holders, should not the receipt of a price for controlling shares in ex-
cess of such lawful advantages at least call forth a duty of investigation
of the buyer's financial responsibility and, possibly, his business reputa-
tion? (4) Who should bear the burden of proof with respect to the
value of such lawful advantages? (5) Can those advantages be valued
realistically, and by what standards? (6) If such advantages cannot
be valued realistically; does not the proposition that controlling shares
may lawfully be sold at a premium result in the abandonment of all
inquiry into the -relevance of the. fact that a price has been paid -for
controlling shares far in excess of the price such shares could have com-
manded if sold in smaller blocks? The courts have found, on- an ad hoc
basis as related to specific cases, that the receipt of an extraordinarily
high price for controlling shares may serve as an indication that the
sale is fraught with risk to the corporation. In view of the fact that
freedom to ask for and retain a high price for controlling shares may
encourage controlling shareholders to abandon the corporation in a
helpless condition and take the risk of subsequent looting, the court's
generalized disposition of the price issue in the Levy case hardly seems
to be a satisfactory solution to a difficult problem.
The court drew another distinction between the Insuranshares
case and. the Levy case which should not be a controlling factor in all
cases. That is the distinction based on the character of the assets of the
two corporations. One court, at least, has not chosen to limit re-
covery merely to those companies whose assets consist of negotiable
securities. In Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co.,191 the Tennessee court
required the sellers of control of a corporation engaged in the business
of distribution and sale of oil and gasoline to account to the corpora-
tion's receiver for the buyer's appropriation of assets. The seller had
transferred majority, shares for slightly in excess of $2.81 a share,
although some of the shares had recently been acquired for $1 a share.
The price for the majority shares was to be paid by deferred instal-
190. The court was not illuminating on this point. "For instance, if corporate con-
trol for the purpose of a merger, or some similar object, was desired by the pur-
chasers for legitimate purposes, undoubtedly they would pay more for a controlling
interest." 265 App. Div. at 218, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
191. 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948).
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ments, the buyer thereby obtaining control before the full price was to
be paid. The excessiveness of the price and the manner of its payment
were facts which led the court to find that the seller expected the buyer
to misappropriate corporate assets, despite the fact that the corpora-
tion was not a financial institution with substantial liquid assets.
Although isolated controlling factors are not readily distilled from
the looting cases, the following observations appear to be warranted:
(1) On the facts of the cases, if not always on their theory, a
major consideration has been whether the seller of controlling shares
had reason to suspect that the corporate assets would be used by the
buyer either to pay for the purchased shares or for other personal pur-
poses of the buyer.
(2) Whether the seller of controlling shares had reason to suspect
that the corporate assets would be so used by the buyer is basically a
factual question. No single factor can be found to have been control-
ling in answering that question. Some relevant considerations may be:
(a) Whether the corporation's assets are liquid in character.
Although great weight has been placed on the existence of this factor,
it does not appear inevitable that liability should be limited to those cases
in which practically all of the assets are in the form of negotiable se-
curities. Concededly buyers of control may more easily accomplish
their objective secretly and quickly if the assets are in that form. How-
ever, if the corporation in fact has sufficient liquid assets to tempt a
buyer, whether or not the corporation has fixed assets as well, that
fact in combination with others may well serve to put the seller on.
notice of possible wrongdoing. And if other facts sufficiently indicate
that the buyer intends to dispose of assets for his own purposes (e.g.,
to pay for the purchased shares), the non-liquidity of the assets should
be a matter of indifference.
(b) Whether the shares were sold at a price in excess of market
value. Some courts have concluded that receipt of an amount in excess
of the market value of individual shares does not serve to put sellers
on notice of wrongdoing, on the theory that such excess may be prop-
erly attributable to legitimate control features. However, the courts
have only casually considered what these legitimate features may be,
and have not developed any precise standards by which their value
may be determined. This may be the result of an unarticulated as-
sumption by the courts that the plaintiff should prove the non-existence
of such permissible elements or their lack of value. This assumption
appears to be unwarranted. History has demonstrated that the payment
TRANSACTIONS IN CORPORATE CONTROL
of an excessive price for shares may be motivated by the buyer's desire
to acquire something other than the power to control the normal busi-
ness operations of the corporation. Since the seller of control is in
the best position to prevent the buyer's acquisition for such harmful
purposes, he should at least bear the burden of showing that it rea-
sonably appeared to him that the buyer was paying for "lawful ad-
vantages" necessitating the payment of such a price.
(c) Whether the buyer was permitted to obtain immediate access
to the corporation's assets upon purchase of the shares. This factor
should be considered in combination with the buyer's desire to sub-
stitute a new board of directors for the old board through resignation
of the latter. The existence of this combination of facts should not be
controlling on the question of the seller's liability. Despite the language
in the cases with respect to the "sale of corporate offices," the possi-
bility that a buyer might desire to obtain immediate control of a cor-
poration in order to integrate its business operations immediately with
another business renders his desire to obtain such immediate control
subject to conflicting inferences. In combination with other facts
(such as the existence of liquid assets and the receipt of an excessive
price), the buyer's desire to obtain immediate control may leave the
seller with the quite reasonable suspicion that the entire transaction
will result in injury to the corporation. Without such other facts, the
seller is left with a less clear inference of wrongdoing.
(d) Whether the seller and buyer insist upon secrecy in the con-
summation of the transaction. If the factors considered in (c) are
found to be directed primarily toward preventing disclosure to the
minority shareholders, the inference is strong that wrongdoing may
result from the transaction.
(3) Courts have not always required the seller to account to
the corporation for his profit. However, in those cases in which the
seller has been required to account for looting losses, no court has
refused to require an additional accounting for the "excessive" part
of the purchase price when an issue has been made of it.'"2 The remedy
of accounting for profits is a familiar device in the law, serving to pre-
vent personal interest from interfering with the fulfillment of an obliga-
tion to look after the interests of others." 3 But even though the threat
192. Compare Benson v. Braun, 286 App. Div. 1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d Dep't
1955), in which the court sustained a complaint requesting solely an accounting for
profits.
193. Byrne v. Barrett, 268 N.Y. 199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935); Commonwealth
Trust Co. Case, 331 Pa. 569, 1 A.2d 662 (1938) ; Caveney v. Caveney, 234 Wis. 637,
291 N.W. 818 (1940); RESTATEmENT, TauSTS § 203 (1935); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 403 (1933).
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of a loss of profits may not have succeeded in a particular case in pre-
venting a faithless agent from engaging in personally profitable ac-
tivity which causes loss to his principal, the wrongdoer is nevertheless
required to disgorge those profits as well as respond in damages for
the losses he has caused.' 94 Such a two-fold recovery from the seller
of control appears to be similarly appropriate.
(4) The effort to find legal tools which will permit examination
of a sale of controlling shares has required doctrinal manipulation,
largely because of the traditional attitude toward the immunity of
those engaging in share trading. Thus, if a seller of shares has been
an officer or director, it has been held that he has violated a duty owed
to the corporation in his managerial capacity. It has also been flatly
stated that a transferor of control owes a fiduciary duty to the corpo-
ration; however, the cases in which that has been stated have involved
shareholders who were either (a) directors or officers 195 or (b) cor-
porations whose appointees were directors or officers.' The inference
might therefore be drawn from the cases that only those who can be
found to have violated or to have assisted in the violation of some rec-
ognized inanagerial duty may be held liable for loss to the corporation.
The inference does not seem to be warranted or desirable. Straining
to achieve such symmetry in corporate concepts ignores the basic issue
in these cases. That issue is whether those who do in fact control the
disposition of corporate assets have transferred that control under
circumstances which should have put them on notice that loss would
result to the corporation. Control, as a fact, can be found to reside
in an individual shareholder or a group of shareholders even though
they do not themselves technically occupy managerial positions. If, as
a fact, the technical management of a corporation has declared its in-
dependence from the majority shareholders, perhaps liability may not
be imposed upon the selling shareholder. Such freedom from liability
would result from the fact that the majority shareholder does not
control the corporation; it would not result from the fact that he does
not technically occupy an office or a directorship. At least some of
the looting cases have demonstrated that the courts are beginning to
appreciate the fact that "control," as a factual matter, is superseding
the traditional technical cleavage between managerial and shareholder
functions.
194. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 407 (1933).
195. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Dale v. Thomas H.
Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948).
196. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940).
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2. Against Controlling Shareholders When Sale Is Not Followed by
Looting or Looting Is Not Anticipated
a. Liability Based on Diversion of Specific Opportunities
In the cases discussed in the previous section, controlling shares
were sold under either of the following circumstances: (1) the sale
was followed by looting and (2) even though no looting occurred,
corporate loss was an anticipated risk. A sale may be accomplished
which does not result in looting; if looting does take place, it may not
have been reasonably anticipated by any of the pragmatic tests applied
by the courts in the cases already examined. If a corporation is unable
to attack a control sale on any of the bases suggested in those cases,
is there nevertheless a reasonable basis for recognition of a cause of
action in the corporation to recover some part of the seller's premium
on his shares? One possible approach to this problem is through an
examination of negotiations leading up to a sale of controlling shares
when there has been no disclosure of those negotiations to other share-
holders. Since a variety of negotiations may precede such a sale, the
following cases are suggested for consideration:
Case E. Offer of Merger or Purchase of Assets. Buyer
may approach D, who is either (1) an officer or director (who
may or may not then own a controlling block of shares) or (2)
an owner of a controlling block of shares (not an officer or di-
rector). Buyer may submit an offer to merge the corporation
with another corporation or to purchase all of its assets. D may
suggest that Buyer purchase a controlling block of shares. He
may point out that this will involve a smaller expenditure by Buyer
than a merger or sale of assets would entail. He may further
suggest a price for the controlling shares which includes a pre-
mium over the price which Buyer would pay if he were to buy
individual shares or small blocks of shares on the market.
Case F. Offer To Purchase All Outstanding Shares. Buyer
may approach D, the person referred to in Case E, with an offer
to purchase all of the outstanding shares of the corporation. D
may suggest that Buyer purchase a controlling block of shares,
for a lesser expenditure than a purchase of all of the shares would
entail. He may also suggest a price which includes a premium
over the market price of individual shares or small blocks of
shares.
Case G. Offer To Purchase a Controlling Block of Shares.
Buyer may approach D, the person referred to in Case E, with
an offer to purchase only a controlling block of shares. Buyer
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may know or believe that D owns such a controlling block, or
he may propose that such A block be accumulated for sale to him.
D may suggest a price which includes a premium over the market
price of individual shares or small blocks of shares.
In each of the three cases posited, D may sell a controlling block
of shares which he then owns, or he may accumulate a controlling
block in order to deliver such a block on the agreed terms.
The three cases may be examined initially on the hypothesis that
D is not solely a shareholder but is also an officer or director. The
liability of one who is not simultaneously a controlling shareholder
and a manager will be considered hereafter. 19 7  The Seltzer case,198
discussed in the introductory section to Part Two, throws light upon
Case E. If a sale of controlling shares is followed by an immediate
sale of all of the 'orporation's assets to Buyer, and a proportionate dis-
tribution of the proceeds of such a sale is made to the remaining share-
holders, the Seltzer case would be a direct precedent for requiring an
accounting by the sellers of control.9 9 In such a case, since the re-
maining shareholders no longer have any interest in the assets, the
opportunity which might have been theirs (to sell the assets at a
favorable price) has been irrevocably lost, and the controlling share-
holders have appropriated a part of that favorable price. On the other
hand, if the sale of controlling shares is not followed by a sale of the
corporation's assets to Buyer, the Seltzer case is not so directly in
point. The remaining shareholders have not irrevocably lost an interest
in the assets. However, they have lost an opportunity for the corpora-
tion to sell the assets at that time at a favorable price. A similar op-
portunity may not arise again. To hold at least the directors and
officers liable for having appropriated the benefit of an opportunity
which was available to the corporation would be consonant with well-
established managerial responsibilities.200
Case F involves an offer to purchase all of the outstanding shares,
which has been converted into a sale of controlling shares.201 If the
197. See pp. 805-06 infra.
198. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77
(1910) ; see text at p. 777 supra.
199. The observations made in the text with respect to a sale of control which is
preceded by rejection of an offer to purchase all of the assets are equally applicable
to a sale of control preceded by rejection of an offer of a merger. For this purpose,
the analogy between a sale of assets and a merger is particularly close; each involves
a change in the economics of the enterprise which may well increase the value of
the shareholder's interest.
200. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutseh, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294
U.S. 708 (1935) ; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
201. In Keely v. Black, 91 N.J. Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920),
it was agreed that the president should acquire all of the outstanding shares or, if he
was unable to accomplish that, then as many of the shares as he could acquire in
excess of 51%.
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director or officer making such a sale has not disclosed to the remaining
shareholders that Buyer initially proposed to purchase their shares as
well as his own, he has effectively foreclosed them either from an op-
portunity to sell their shares or from bargaining with Buyer.
A preliminary question arises whether a manager to whom a third
party has presented an offer to purchase all of the corporation's out-
standing shares will be subjected to a sanction by the courts solely
for failing to communicate such an offer to the shareholders even
though he does not make a favorable sale of his own shares. One court,
at an earlier day, considered the problem only in passing upon another
question and referred to a president's ". . moral, if not his legal,
duty to advise those interested of the terms of such proposition, so
that they might accept or reject as they saw fit. Such a course was
far more in consonance with a just conception of *hat he owed to
the stockholders than a hiding of the proposition until he could secure
terms for his own further retention in office, or an equivalent pecuniary
consideration." 2 More modern conceptions of managerial respon-
sibilities, which have been observed to be widening even in connection
with share trading, may have moved to the point where the communica-
tion of such an offer falls within the enforceable duties of a corporate
manager, although the fact that the manager has not received a dis-
cernible benefit from failing to communicate such an offer and the
difficulty of finding a measure for his pecuniary liability may make a
court hesitate to recognize the existence of such a duty.2"
However, not all of the problems posed in the preceding para-
graph need be answered in order to consider Case F. In that case
the manager has by hypothesis sold his own controlling shares. He
is therefore foreclosed from arguing that he thought it would not be
in the best interests of the corporation to transfer control to a group
of irresponsible people, since he has in fact transferred control. His
receipt of a premium for his shares is indicative of his use of the
information for purely personal reasons and suggests an available
measure of liability if a basis for imposition of liability may be found.
Three bases, either independently relevant or to be considered in com-
bination, may be suggested:
(1) The manager has appropriated an opportunity available to
the shareholders at large. It has been suggested earlier in this article
202. Ingraham v. National Salt Co., 36 Misc. 646, 647-48, 74 N.Y. Supp. 388,
389 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
203. Assuming that the offered price was in excess of the market price of the
shares on the day the offer was made, the manager who failed to communicate the
offer might be held liable to shareholders for the difference between those two prices.
Questions which might arise are: (1) Should the manager's liability be greater if the
1956]
800 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
that an appropriate basis for recovery by one who sells his shares to
a manager who in turn resells at a profit is the fact that the selling
shareholder has been deprived of an opportunity to sell his shares, or
to bargain for sale, at a favorable price. In Case F to permit the cor-
poration, acting on behalf of the remaining shareholders, to recover
some portion of the selling manager's profit would merely complete
that picture. It may be argued that there are compelling differences
between the case of the corporation suing on behalf of remaining share-
holders and the case of selling shareholders suing because their shares
were resold at a profit. A principal difference, however, is one relating
to problems of proof rather than to substantive liability. Where a
manager has purchased all of the outstanding shares in order to ac-
cumulate them for resale to a third party as in Case A, it is easier for
the shareholderssto prove that Buyer did in fact want to buy all of the
shares. Where a manager has converted an offer for all of the out-
standing shares into a sale only of controlling shares, as in Case F, it
is more difficult to prove that Buyer did in fact initially propose a pur-
chase of all the shares. That it may be difficult for the remaining
shareholders (or the corporation on their behalf) to prove that the
manager converted such an offer into a transaction profitable only to
himself may suggest the advisability of shifting the burden of proof
on that issue from the complainant to the manager. It should not
suggest releasing the manager from liability. An additional difference
between the two cases is the fact that the shareholder whose shares
are resold by a manager loses irrevocably an opportunity to sell shares
at a favorable price; the remaining shareholders have lost a specific
opportunity but have not lost the possibility of similar opportunities in
the future. A short answer to this may be that the manager should
not be permitted to profit from a gamble that other opportunities will
become available to the remaining shareholders at a later date.
(2) The manager has used "inside" information for his own
benefit.2 4  However, the information is "inside" because it has come
shares have fallen in price since the day the offer was made? Or should it be less
if the shares have risen in price? (2) Should the market price of the shares on the
day the offer was made be used as a factor in measuring the manager's liability, or
should the "asset value" of the shares (if greater than market price) be used as the
criterion? (3) What reasons might the manager offer in court for failing to com-
municate the offer to the shareholders, so as to exonerate himself from liability?
One possible reason might be that he had reasonable cause to believe that the prospective
purchasers intended to loot the corporation, to the consequent injury of its creditors.
A- rule of law which would reject that reason, requiring disclosure of the offer in
all cases, might be unduly harsh: if the manager discloses the offer without dis-
closing his suspicions with respect to the buyer's integrity, he may be subjected to
liability for that nondisclosure; if he discloses both the offer and his suspicions, he
may be subjected to an action for libel.
204. Compare Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch.
1949).
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to one who is a manager. Perhaps the seller of control may contend
that Buyer came to him not in his managerial capacity as such, but
because Buyer knew or believed that he owned a large block of shares.
Under such a state of facts, is the information that Buyer was willing
to purchase all of the shares "inside" or "outside" information? At-
tempted solution of that problem, as suggested earlier in this article
in another context,2°5 may move into the realm of the metaphysical.
In addition, the argument that the defendant's liability depends on the
capacity in which he received the information assumes that a control-
ling shareholder is not in a position to receive "inside" information.
The facts of corporate life indicate that it is the pragmatic relationship
which the defendant bears to the corporation which is important, and
that no meaningful division can be made between managerial capacities
and controlling shareholder capacities on that issue.
(3) The manager would probably have acted in the best interests
of all of the shareholders by communicating Buyer's proposal to pur-
chase their shares, but failed to do so because of his own personal
interest.2°6 A prophylactic removal of a part of the profit from a sale
of controlling shares would remove the temptation to ignore the best
interests of the shareholders at large. The measurement of the extent
of the manager's liability is a collateral problem not necessarily related
to the question of substantive liability; the problem of measuring such
liability will be considered hereafter °0
Case G, involving negotiations only for sale of controlling shares,
is suggestive of the New York case of Stanton v. Schenck,"°' decided
a decade before the investment company cases. In the Schenck case, a
block of shares allegedly constituting practical control 209 of Loew's,
Inc., was sold to Fox Theatres Corporation. At a time when the widow
and other members of the family of the former president of the corpora-
205. See pp. 754-55 .supra.
206. A sale of controlling shares by a manager may interfere with an un-
prejudiced exercise of his judgment with respect to a corporate matter of which such
sale is an integral part. Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954);
cf. In re Petrol Terminal Corp., 120 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 1954).
207. See pp. 817-20 infra.
208. 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1931); see also Stanton v.
Schenck, 252 N.Y. Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
209. On August 31, 1928, 1,334,453 common shares were outstanding. MooDy,
INDUSTRIALS 2464 (1929). Four hundred thousand shares were transferred in Feb-
ruary, 1929. On August 31, 1929, 1,363,993 Ys shares were outstanding. MOODY,
INDUSTRIALS 1425 (1930). 1,341,946 7/ shares were outstanding as of October 25,
1929, in addition to 150,000 voting preferred shares. 140 Misc. at 623, 251 N.Y. Supp.
at 223. The court did not make a finding, one way or the other, on the question
whether the block of 400,000 shares constituted practical control as alleged. It does
not appear unreasonable to assume that it did constitute such control. Cf. MooDY,
INDUSTRIALS 2461 (1929).
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tion owned a large block of shares, a broker approached the incumbent
president with the request that the president suggest to the widow
that she part with her shares. The widow agreed that she would make
the sale if the buyer would take a block of 400,000 shares which would
include those of herself and her family and those owned by certain
officers, directors and other persons who had assisted her husband in
building up the corporation. The agreed price per share was $125,
of which $102.50 was to go to the sellers of shares. The balance was
to be paid to three directors of the corporation (the president and two
vice-presidents) as a bonus for work they had done with the widow's
late husband. The broker then interested Fox Theatres in the pur-
chase of this block of shares. Some shares were purchased in the
market by the three directors to complete the formation of the block
of 400,000 shares, and the sale was accomplished; the three directors
made an alleged profit of approximately $9,200,000 from the trans-
action. A derivative suit was brought against the three directors to
require them to account to the corporation for their profit.210 After
trial, the complaint was dismissed.
It should be noted that the suit was brought to call the corpora-
tion's officers and directors to account; the widow, who was not an
officer or director of the corporation although she had been the holder
of a substantial block of the corporation's shares, was not made a party.
The plaintiffs relied in large measure on a theory of managerial
accountability for waste,21" ' although the relief requested posed more
clearly the question of the liability of managers to account for profit
arising from a transfer of their shares as a part of the sale of a con-
trolling block. The court was unable to find the customary liability
determinants. (1) The corporation had lost nothing; there had been
210. The corporation's common shares, listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
had reached a high of $77 during 1928 and $84.50 during 1929. Prices ranged between
$50 and $60 "for a considerable period" during 1929. The questioned sale took place
in 1929. (In 1930, the shares were quoted at $96.75 a share.) Defendants had
received not only $102.50 per share (a price considerably above the market price in
1929) for the shares which they had personally owned but also, as a bonus, the
difference ($22.50) between $102.50 and $125 for every share included in the block
of 400,000 shares sold to Fox. The court referred to the "profit" made by the defend-
ants as being approximately $9,200,000. This amount appears to represent principally
the bonus of $22.50 per share on 400,000 shares. It does not appear whether the
plaintiffs were asking for an accounting of any other "profit," such as the difference
between the current market price of the corporation's shares and $102.50 allocated
to each of the shares owned personally by the defendants and sold by them as a part
of the block of 400,000 shares. 140 Misc. at 624-25, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 224-25.
211. Plaintiffs alleged that there had been a conspiracy between the defendant
managers and Fox to acquire a controlling interest in the corporation for Fox, to
wreck the corporation, to turn over the good will and assets of the corporation to
Fox and to reduce the directors and officers to the status of dummies for Fox.
These allegations were in addition to the allegation that defendants had conspired
to secure a secret profit at the expense of the corporation and its shareholders. Id.
at 627, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 227.
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no waste; the net earnings of the corporation had increased subsequent
to the sale; and there had been no change in the corporation's policy.
(2) It had not been shown that a sale of outstanding shares to the
buyer had deprived the corporation of a needed opportunity to raise
new capital through the disposition of unissued shares. (3) The trans-
action had not involved corporate property; therefore the directors had
not received a secret gift in connection with a "corporate transaction."
It should also be noted that the defendants had not resigned from their
positions with the corporation, so that it was not possible for the
plaintiffs to base liability on a sale of corporate office.
The court considered the ultimate issue in the Schenck case to be
whether or not a person who, because of his position as an
officer and director of a corporation, is enabled to sell his shares of
stock at a much larger price than the stock would bring in the open
market, is bound to turn that profit back into the treasury of the cor-
poration .... 212 The court analyzed the transaction as one in
which the information about the possibility of a sale of the shares had
come to the president because he was acquainted with the principal
shareholder rather than because he occupied the office of president.
This finding of fact could have disposed of the question as stated by
the court. However, apparently without emphasis on the "capacity"
in which the directors had received information about the possibility
of a sale of shares, the court further considered whether directors should
be required to account to the corporation for profit made from a sale
of their shares above the current market price. The court stated that,
absent "unfair dealings and conspiracy," accounting should not be re-
quired. It buttressed its statement with a strong dictum clearly ex-
onerating not only directors but, by necessary implication, all sellers
of "exceptionally large" blocks of shares without regard to whether
they were also directors and officers.2 1
It is clear that the court did not relieve the managers from liability
merely because their own shares, being only a part of the block of
shares sold, had not carried "practical control" of the corporation.1 4
212. Id. at 629, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 229.
213. "No one will argue that the holder of a large block of the stock of a cor-
poration would be under a duty to account for his profit to the corporation. As such
holder he might be in a position to command a considerable premium above current
prices in a favorable market The advantage would be entirely his, for which he
would in no way be compelled to respond to the corporation. If it is granted that a
director may freely sell his own stock, it must follow that he may benefit from the
advantage due to his holding of an exceptionally large block of stock. Possibly,
evidence of unfair dealings and conspiracy, such as are charged in the complaint,
might make a difference; but, in view of the failure of proof in that direction, we
are relegated to the abstract principle as to the right of a director to sell his stock
freely to the best advantage. This he may do." Id. at 633, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 233.
214. Only a portion of the 400,000 shares sold had been owned by the three
directors prior to the consummation of the transaction. However, the court's reference
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The plaintiffs had fairly posed the proposition that the 400,000 shares
.sold, of which the defendants shares had been a part, did constitute
controlling shares, and the court did not find against the plaintiffs on
that point. In addition, much of the "profit" from the sale of this
controlling block had been diverted into the defendants' hands. Had
the plaintiffs sued all of the prior owners of the shares making up the
block, seeking an accounting for profits and tracing those profits into
the hands of the three directors, it is unlikely that the court could have
rested exoneration merely on the ground that no single shareholder
had sold sufficient shares to transfer control. If all of the prior owners
had knowingly pooled their shares to make up a controlling block,
it is doubtful that their cooperation could have been ignored. Even
on that assumed state of facts, however, it is reasonable to suppose from
the court's language that it would not have required an accounting of
profits by shareholders cooperating to sell control. As to each such
shareholder, in the court's words, "the advantage would be entirely
his. . ,, 210
The reasonableness of the position of the court in the Schenck case
and its application to Case G may be examined in the context of the
foregoing discussion of Cases E and F. It cannot be said that the
manager selling control has precluded other shareholders from benefit-
ing from a proposed sale of the corporation's assets or of their own
shares, in view of the fact that Buyer has made it clear from the outset
that he was interested only in acquiring control and negotiated directly
with the one who owned controlling shares or who acquired them from
shareholders not complaining at this time. However, the facts con-
cerning Buyer's negotiations are generally unknown to the remaining
shareholders even after the transaction has been completed and after
they have been informed that the sale has taken place. Presumably
the seller of control will reveal only that Buyer wanted a specific
block of shares and that he bought that block. The truth of the matter
may be that Buyer offered initially to buy assets, or to merge, or to
buy all of the outstanding shares.21 Inaccessibility of those facts to
the remaining shareholders may make it almost impossible for them
to substantiate a claim that the seller of control diverted to himself a
to the right of a director to "... benefit from the advantage due to his holding
of an exceptionally large block of stock . . ." (see note 213 supra) suggests that
the court was assuming that the defendants' responsibilities, if any, should be exam-
ined from the standpoint of their having had beneficial ownership of the entire block
of shares.
215. See note 213 supra.
216. The facts are, of course; known to the buyer. Recognition of a "corporate"
cause of action (which might benefit not only the remaining shareholders but also
the buyer) causes problems. See pp. 821-30 infra.
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transaction potentially profitable to all of the shareholders. Assuming
that requiring the seller to account for receipt of a premium for his
shares may be grounded on his diversion of such transactions, 217 the
minimum protection which can be afforded to remaining shareholders
is to require the seller to account in all cases unless he can sustain the
burden of proving that prior negotiations dealt only with controlling
shares. The prospect of having to meet this burden may tend to prevent
the diversion of offers potentially profitable to all of the shareholders
and may further tend to encourage disclosure of the character of prior
negotiations and thus prevent the diversion from taking place. Al-
though the defendants in the Schenck case might have been able to
sustain such a burden, it is clear that the court was not thinking in
those terms, since the defendant did not offer any rebuttal to the
plaintiffs' case. Since the prior negotiations, so far as they could be
elicited by the plaintiffs, related only to controlling shares, the Schenck
case should not be taken to represent even that court's reaction to a sit-
uation where such negotiations related to matters potentially profitable
to all of the shareholders.
The foregoing discussion has been directed toward the problem
of the accountability of a manager who is simultaneously a holder of
controlling shares or who acquires power over controlling shares prior
to their sale to a third party. If in any one of the three hypothetical
cases, D is solely a holder of controlling shares and does not simul-
taneously occupy an office or directorship, the problem of the court's
insistence upon the existence of a "fiduciary duty" becomes more
acute. In such a case, it cannot conveniently be argued that the selling
shareholder has violated any duty falling upon him because of his
exercise of a managerial function.21 In examining the looting cases,
it was noted that the Insuranshares case held that liability for looting
losses resulted because some of the shareholders occupied a control
position even though they did not technically hold office. The fact
that the majority or substantial shareholder holds an important cor-
porate office will make it easier to prove that he occupies a control
position than if he exercises his control through the appointment and
supervision of those who do hold office. If a seller of shares resigns
from office and the buyer's nominees are substituted as officers and
directors, that is strongly evidentiary of the fact that the seller oc-
cupied a control position. As observed in the Insuranshares case, the
fact that a shareholder does not technically occupy a managerial posi-
217. Another basis for liability is suggested at p. 814 infra.
218. Compare Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410,
76 AtI. 77 (1910).
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tion does not necessarily exonerate him from liabilities resulting from
his abuse of that which is factually a position from which he can con-
trol corporate destinies.2 19 There may be serious problems of proof
facing those who would assert that a transaction concerned control
and not merely shares, arising from the fact that the seller was for-
mally only a shareholder. Those problems of proof should not preclude
recognition of the existence of responsibilities flowing from an as-
sumption of power.
It is obvious that the courts will be more willing to impose re-
sponsibilities on shareholders who have sold control to persons who loot
the corporation than on those who unfairly appropriate opportunities
available to other shareholders. The question whether those respon-
sibilities should be imposed should not depend upon the application of
a negative, all-inclusive and uncritical doctrine of "no fiduciary duty."
It is not true that shareholders have been permitted unlimited latitude
in the exercise of control. The Insuranshares case is demonstrative of
that fact.220 In addition, the cases reveal that the courts have not in-
variably applied that negative doctrine in their development of the
responsibilities of controlling shareholders in other contexts; there are
increasing numbers of instances in which majority or other controlling
shareholders have been subject to injunction, accounting, damages or
other sanctions for the exercise of that control."'
219. In Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), involving the lia-
bility of one who was president, director and controlling shareholder, the court
stated: "In this case the violation of duty seems to be all the clearer because of this
triple role in which Feldmann appears, though we are unwilling to say, and are not to
be understood as saying, that we should accept a lesser obligation for any one of
his roles alone." Id. at 178.
220. In Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Committee v. Mayflower Corp.,
173 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1949), majority shares in the hotel company were sold to
Hilton Hotels Corporation for $13 a share. The majority shares had been controlled
by Donner Estates, Incorporated, who elected members of the board of directors of
the hotel company. A derivative suit was brought against the former controlling
shareholder, officers and directors of the hotel company and the buyer. The court
held that a cause of action had been stated not only against the buyer and the officers
and directors but also against the controlling shareholder. The complaint alleged,
inter alia, that the controlling shareholder had (1) refused to pay dividends, so as
to reduce the market value of the shares, and purchased shares at reduced prices,
(2) conspired with the buyer to secure the hotel company for the buyer and to assist
the latter to acquire hotel company shares at a manipulated price through false repre-
sentations, and (3) wilfully and in pursuance of a conspiracy withheld from the
board and the shareholders an offer for the hotel company at a realizable value of
$18 per share and an offer for the controlling shares at $17.50 per share. The claims
were found not substantiated at trial. Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective
Committee v. Mayflower Corp., 193 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
221. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d
369 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942), modified, 136 F.2d 876 (7th Cir.
1943); Turner v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 187 Mich. 238, 153 N.W. 718
(1915); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & North. Ry., 150 N.Y. 410,
44 N.E. 1043 (1896); Weinberger v. Semenenko, 36 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
Compare May v. Midwest Refining Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1941). That it is
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One further point must be noted with respect to the foregoing
hypothetical cases. The focus of the discussion has been on loss and
injury to remaining shareholders resulting from a sale of controlling
shares and suggested bases of liability have been couched in those
terms. From time to time, the courts have suggested that a "sale of
a corporate office" will subject a seller of controlling shares to liability.
It is true that the decided cases have demonstrated that if the buyer
insists, as he usually will, the seller of shares may have the buyer's
nominees substituted as directors and officers, by resigning such posi-
tions and appointing substitutes or by procuring resignations and sub-
stitutions by those who do hold such positions. However, whether
the selling shareholders shall be required to account to the corporation
for the premium received for controlling shares should not depend upon
whether the sale has been accompanied by resignation of the old di-
rectors and officers and substitution of the buyer's nominees. Although
resignations and substitutions commonly accompany sales of control-
ling shares," 2 the fact that they do take place should not be considered
the sole determinant of the seller's liability, nor should the fact in itself
that the seller has not resigned or procured resignations relieve him
from liability. Such resignations may have some significance in the
looting cases as an indication that the controlling shareholder knew or
the fact of control which is important has been demonstrated graphically by two cases
in which shareholders with only a small minority of shares have assumed control
over a particular facet of corporate activity and have been held accountable for
personal profits gained from their use of that control. Clarke v. Greenberg, 296
N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947), involved the following situation. A shareholder
had instituted a derivative suit against corporate managers. Before trial, his shares
(having a market value of $51.88) were purchased by the managers for $9,000. The
shareholder gave releases, and the action was discontinued and settled. Thereafter,
in the case cited, a trustee for the corporation instituted suit to require the share-
holder to account for his personal gain arising from the sale of his shares. The
court of appeals reversed dismissal of the trustee's complaint. In Young v. Higbee
Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945), holders of shares of preferred stock having a market value
of $17,000 appealed from a district court's confirmation of a plan of reorganization
under the Bankruptcy Act. For $115,000 they sold their shares and the appeal to
certain claimants in reorganization who would benefit from dismissal of the appeal;
the appeal was dismissed. Another holder of preferred shares filed a petition in the
district court, directed toward compelling an accounting, by the shareholders who
had sold their shares, of the difference between the price they had received and the
fair value of their shares. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's dis-
missal of the petition.
That controlling persons held their position through share ownership as well as
through the technical occupation of offices and directorships was significant in
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) ; Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226
N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); Welt v. The Beachcomber, Inc., 166 Misc. 29, 1
N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Weisbecker v. Hosiery Patents, Inc., 356 Pa. 244,
51 A.2d 811 (1947). Some courts have found, however, either that a majority
shareholder fulfilled his obligations or that he did not control the independent exercise
of judgment by directors in connection with the particular transactions under ques-
tion. Crawford v. Mexican Petroleum Co., 130 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Blaustein
v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934
(1st Dep't 1941).
222. Cf. Oil Shares, Inc. v. Kahn, 94 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1938).
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suspected that wastage was in the offing, and even in those cases the
particular degree of significance should depend upon the existence
of other facts as well.-2  It has appeared that the courts have resorted
to the "sale of a corporate office" concept mainly to establish a juridical
basis (i.e., "fiduciary duty") for an examination of the transaction, a
basis thought to be necessary because of the' doctrinal difficulties caused
by traditional rules that a shareholder may sell his shares, and a di-
rector may resign, whenever he pleases. m4
By hypothesis, Cases E, F and G do not not involve looting by
the buyers or suspicion that it might occur. In cases not involving
looting, the fact that directors and officers have resigned their posi-
tions is factually significant for two main reasons:
(a) Such resignations are probative of the fact that the shares
which have been sold do constitute the medium of control of the cor-
poration. To the extent that liability may be imposed on a seller of
control because of unfair use of information acquired in connection
with a control transaction, at least part of the complainant's cause of
action is made out when it is shown that the resignation process has
been followed.
(b) Such resignations are merely a part of the factual operational
pattern of a sale of control; the use of this pattern will aid in the
preservation of secrecy. If Buyer wants the corporate machinery to
be immediately responsive to him and wishes the transfer to remain
secret, it will be convenient for a substitution of directors and officers
to be made through resort to the process of resignation and appoint-
ment of successors. Buyer's alternative is to call a special meeting of
shareholders or to time the sale to coincide with the annual meeting,2 5
at which time he may or may not be able to elect a board, depending
upon whether he has acquired a majority of shares or can effectively
control the proxy machinery. Calling such a meeting may apprise
the shareholders of the control transfer. If Buyer wishes to install
a new board immediately upon procuring the shares, without resorting
to the resignation process, notice of a meeting must necessarily be
given before the transfer is effected; if the meeting is to be a special
one, it is unlikely that the shareholders can be kept in the dark about
the transfer. The process of resignation is therefore a device to avoid
publicity of the transfer. Since nondisclosure of the transfer may be a
223. Cf. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
224. See note 181 supra.
225. See Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517
(1st Dep't 1942).
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significant element in the question of the liability of the seller of con-
trol, as developed in connection with Cases E, F and G, the fact that
the resignation process has been followed is merely probative of
secrecy.
Lest too much significance be accorded the use of the resigna-
tion process, it should be noted that it is neither a factual sine qua non
of secrecy nor conclusive proof that a transfer was secretly accom-
plished. On the one hand, it is possible for a secret transfer to be
made without resort to the resignation process, by timing the sale to
coincide with an annual meeting. On the other hand, shareholders
might be fully informed that a transfer of control is to take place and
that the old board will resign in favor of Buyer's nominees. There-
fore, the fact that the resignation process has taken place should not
of itself be a liability determinant.
However, it would be desirable to forestall use of such a process,
since it may be abused so easily. This could be accomplished by re-
peal of those provisions of the general incorporation statutes which
indiscriminately permit directors to fill vacancies and by substitution
of provisions substantially comparable to those adopted in the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940.'
b. The Development of New Bases of Liability
In the previous discussion it was concluded that a controlling
shareholder's failure to disclose to remaining shareholders the character
of prior negotiations and his diversion of offers potentially profitable
to the corporation may serve as plausible bases for accountability to
the corporation. In the discussion of Case G, it was developed that
so long as accountability is based on such nondisclosure and diversion
of offers, a sale of controlling shares would not necessarily result in
accountability, at least if the seller could sustain a burden of proof that
prior negotiations had been confined to a sale only of controlling
shares. The recent case of Perlman v. Feldmann,17 although factually
involving a secret sale of control preceded by a rejection of an offer
of merger, was decided on a basis which did not emphasize either of
those elements. The rationale of the court's opinion invites specula-
tion about future judicial reaction to sales of controlling interests.
226. See note 163 supra.
227. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), 40 CORNELL L.Q.
786, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1274, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 399 (1956), 22 U. CmHI. L. Rav. 895. See
Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1956), which appeared
after the writer's manuscript had been delivered to the printer.
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Feldmann was the chairman of the board of directors and presi-
dent of Newport Steel Corporation, a manufacturer of sheet steel.
Through members of his family and personal corporations, he owned
or controlled one-third of the outstanding shares of the corporation;
through such shareholding he exercised practical working control of
the corporation. In August, 1950, the corporation's shares had a book
value of $17.03 a share; individual shares had been traded on the
over-the-counter market at prices not in excess of $12 a share. Wilport
Corporation was formed by users of steel for the specific purpose of
acquiring the controlling shares in Newport. After negotiations with
Feldmann, Wilport agreed to buy his shares for $20 a share. Feld-
mann's shares, plus shares of friends and associates, were sold" to
Wilport at the agreed price, Wilport acquiring 37 per cent of New-
port's shares in the transaction. To complete the transfer of the
shares and the attendant control of the corporation, Feldmann resigned
from the board of directors and procured the resignations of the re-
maining members; Wilport's nominees were elected to fill their'posi-
tions. A derivative action, in which Feldmann was the principal de-
fendant, was brought at the instance of certain of the remaining share-
holders to require accounting for gains resulting from the transaction.
Although Feldmann had previously rejected an offer of a merger
of the corporation,22 and although the plaintiffs asserted that the trans-
fer of control had been effected with secrecy, plaintiffs' main contention
was that Feldmann, as an officer, director and controlling shareholder
of Newport, owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation which he had
violated by selling a "corporate asset" for his personal profit. The
existence of the "corporate asset" was shown to have arisen from a
peculiar market demand for Newport's product. During the Korean
War steel was in short supply. Like other steel companies, Newport
was unable to fill all demands for steel and was therefore able to
allocate its steel production in a manner favorable to itself. Instead
of raising steel prices, Newport used its market position to obtain in-
terest-free advances from prospective customers in exchange for firm
commitments by Newport with respect to future production. The
advances were used for capital developments which Newport needed.
Plaintiffs claimed that Feldmann had sold a power to allocate steel in
a tight market, that such a power was exercisable through the cor-
poration's board of directors and that it was therefore a "corporate
asset" for the sale of which Feldmann and his associates should account
228. Compare Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), and
the discussion of Case E in the text at p. 798 supra.
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to the corporation. Plaintiffs were unable to show that the sale had
resulted in the corporation's being operated less profitably after the sale.
The district court concluded that all that Feldmann had sold were
powers inseparably attaching to ownership of a controlling block of
shares and that they constituted factors of value attaching to the con-
trol block which might be realized by him on its sale.229 It also found
that $20 per share was the fair value of the control block of shares
sold by Feldmann."0
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the district court's judgment
for defendants was reversed in an opinion by Judge Clark, and the
case was remanded."z  According to the court of appeals, Feldmann
had violated a fiduciary duty which he owed as officer, director and
controlling shareholder; "2 he should account for that part of the price
he had received for his shares which was attributable to his sale of
the power to control allocation of the corporate product. The court
further directed that the accounting be made directly to the minority
shareholders. The district court was required to make a determina-
tion of ". . . the value of defendants' stock without the appurtenant
control over the corporation's output of steel," the burden of proof
on this issue to rest with the defendants.
The court did not describe Feldmann's control of the corporation
as a "corporate asset" in itself. It referred to the "corporate oppor-
tunities" available to Newport through its exercise of the power to
allocate its product: the opportunity to secure interest-free advances and
the opportunity to build up patronage in anticipation of the day when
steel would be more abundant in supply. Those opportunities had been
misappropriated or siphoned off by the defendants. To some extent the
result may have been foreshadowed by the Seltzer casef 3 in which the
defendants therein had masked a sale of all of the assets with a sale
229. Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952).
230. The district court stated, in connection with that finding of fact: "What
value the block would have had if shorn of its appurtenant power to control dis-,
tribution of the corporate product, the evidence does not show." Id. at 179.
231. Judge Swan dissented from this opinion. 219 F.2d at 178.
232. See note 219 supra. The court relied primarily upon Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 (1939), and Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919), as
establishing Feldmann's fiduciary relationship to the corporation as director and
dominant shareholder. Although the court found no cases directly on point in Indiana,
the state of Newport's incorporation, reference was made to one Indiana case for a
statement of the ". . . close scrutiny to which Indiana subjects the conduct of
fiduciaries where personal benefit may stand in the way of fulfillment of trust obliga-
tions. . . ." Schemmel v. Hill, 91 Ind. App. 373, 169 N.E. 678 (1930) (rescission of
sale of real estate, for more than it was worth, to insolvent bank by one who was a
director and vice president).
233. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77
(1910), discussed in text at pp. 777-79 smpra. For reference to control as a "cor-
porate asset" see BERxE & MEANS, oP. cit. mpra note 1, at 244.
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of shares in order to obtain personal benefit. But the Perlman case
did not involve an offer by a third party to buy assets or a diversion of
such an offer into a sale of shares. The power to allocate the product
of Newport's facilities could indeed have been transferred by a sale
of all of those facilities, by a merger or consolidation or by a sale of
all of the shares. The consideration received in such a transaction
would have belonged proportionately to all of the shareholders. But
in the Perlman case, it was held that the benefit of a transfer of that
power could not be appropriated exclusively by a controlling shareholder
through the device of a sale of his own shares, even though he had not
diverted the buyer from a different type of transaction which would
automatically have benefited all the shareholders. The considerations
underlying the court's decision appear to be different from those requir-
ing accounting in the hypothetical Cases E and F, in which diversion
of potentially profitable asset or share transactions was involved.
In one sense, the result of the Perlman case grows out of the
philosophy underlying the looting cases. The remedy of a recovery
of profits is not inappropriate even though the corporation has not
suffered loss as a result of a control sale. If the seller of control should
reasonably have anticipated that the buyer would use control in such
a way as to make the corporation's operations unprofitable and if the
purchasers did cause such loss, the seller could be required to respond
not only in damages but also to account for his gains. 4 There is
no reason why the corporation, or shareholders suing in its behalf,
should be obliged to sue both for damages and profits: a waiver of
damages should not preclude an action to require an accounting. Fur-
thermore, if the holder of control sells to persons who reasonably may
be expected to cause harm to the corporation, it is doubtful that the
seller should be relieved from liability to account solely on the ground
that the anticipated loss did not occur; " accountability for profits
is required as a prophylaxis to prevent temptation. In the Perlman
case, however, there was neither loss in the sense that the corporation
was operated less profitably after the sale than before nor anticipation
of such loss. Instead, the court demonstrated a much more sophisti-
cated approach than the looting cases demanded: the "loss" which the
corporation suffered was a failure to realize gains which might pos-
sibly arise from its exercise of certain opportunities. Not only did
that "loss" result, but it was easily anticipated, since the defendants
must have known that the purchasers, being themselves users of steel
234. Cf. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
235. Cf. Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 NY.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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in a tight supply market, would probably not allocate the corporation's
product as it had been allocated before the purchasers acquired control.
This view of the Perlman case may be read as suggesting that a
controlling shareholder, even one holding a majority of the shares,
may not with impunity make basic changes in corporate policy. It
may be asked whether Feldmann would have been subjected to liability
if he had not sold his shares and had simply procured the corpora-
tion's abandonment of its policy of allocating steel to obtain interest-
free advances. That result is not a necessary corollary of the Perlman
case or the fundamental basis on which it rests. At most, the law
would require only that those in control of the corporation exercise an
informed and honest business judgment in making such a basic policy
change. Failing that exercise of due care, the law would impose
liability for resulting losses as those losses are traditionally defined.
Presumably, in the event the purchaser of controlling shares were to
make such basic changes in policy, the corporation's redress would again
be by way of a cause of action for damages if they could be shown.' 6
The looting cases established that the controlling shareholder was re-
sponsible for policy judgments of a flagrantly outrageous sort even
though they were formally made by the new controlling shareholder;
in one sense, a decision to transfer control to a group which might
loot the corporation is itself a policy judgment by the controlling share-
holder for which he 'is responsible if losses occur. By permitting a
recovery of profits in the looting cases, the courts introduced the idea
that the incentive to making that kind of policy judgment should be
removed, for prophylactic purposes and whether or not loss has re-
sulted. Perlman underscores the idea that the remaining shareholders
are inadequately protected if their only remedy is a suit for losses re-
sulting from the policy change. Shareholders are subject to enough
risks from the normal operation of the corporation's business by per-
sons other than themselves. A policy change, even though honestly
and hopefully made, may result in loss simply because it is not wise
or the winds of a competitive economy shift and blow cold; that loss
is not necessarily actionable. Even if a policy change results in ac-
tionable loss, the remaining shareholders may find that the expense
of litigation and the financial inadequacy of the defendants make the
loss permanent. Perlman holds that-there will not be added, to those
inevitable risks, the risk that policy changes will be dictated not so
236. Thus it is recognized that the courts do afford some measure of protection
to non-controlling shareholders, by way of corporate actions against management
for flagrantly unwise or dishonest policy decisions and that some remedies are
available to remaining shareholders against the new management which steps in
after a transfer of control.
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much by the controlling shareholder's honest business judgment that
the corporation's earnings and assets will grow but by his decision to
take a personal benefit at the same time that he removes himself from
an interested position in the corporation.
The Perlman case did not proceed on the basis that every seller
of controlling shares shall be required to account for some portion of
his purchase price. The theory of liability was more narrowly oriented.
The court spoke in terms indicating an intention to protect specific op-
portunities or advantages and it used language to limit the implications
to be drawn from its opinion." 7 But the technique of isolating specific
opportunities suggests the direction of the growth of the law when
only controlling shares are bargained for and sold. Springing from
the Pernman case, the argument may now run that every corporation
possesses opportunities beyond its book assets,23s opportunities at-
tributable to its competitive position, contracts for supplying raw ma-
terials, commitments for distribution of its product, customer lists,
latent productive capacity, an imaginative management or a host of
other matters which might be exploited for the benefit of its present
shareholders by its present management. The argument would then
proceed that a sale of control which carries with it normal corporate
powers also carries with it the risk that those powers may not be used
to exploit those opportunities and advantages and that, therefore, the
seller of control should account to the corporation for transferring
powers in the face of the risk that the corporation's possible gains
may not be realized. The court in the Perlnmn case emphasized that
it is the possibility of gain which is important, not its inevitability. 9
The way, therefore, appears to be open in future control sales for the
remaining shareholders to identify particular opportunities which the
sale might jeopardize and to seek accounting from the controlling
shareholder who created that jeopardy. The result may eventually be
a frank recognition that, since each control sale involves one or more
of such opportunities, the basic liability determinant is the sale of con-
trol itself and not some collateral opportunity.
Three restraining factors on the eventual express recognition of
such a broad rule of accountability may be suggested. First, the courts
237. "We do not mean to suggest that a majority stockholder cannot dispose of his
controlling block of stock to outsiders without having to account to his corporation
for profits or even never do this with impunity when the buyer is an interested cus-
tomer, actual or potential, for the corporation's product." 219 F.2d at 178.
238. ". . . [Tihe responsibility of the fiduciary is not limited to a proper regard
for the tangible balance sheet assets of the corporation, but includes the dedication
of his uncorrupted business judgment for the sole benefit of the corporation, in any
dealings which may adversely affect it." Id. at 176.
239. "Only if defendants had been able to negate completely any possibility of
gain by Newport could they have prevailed." Id. at 177.
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may hesitate to require an accounting unless the risk that the oppor-
tunity would be passed over by the buyer of control was a practical
certainty, as it was in the Perlman case, rather than just a possibility.240
Second, if the liability determinant is no longer the jeopardizing of
any specific opportunity, there may be a doubt as to the appropriate
liability determinant. If it is merely the fact that control was sold,
for what shall the seller account? The Perlman court did not suggest
that a sale at the fair value of the defendants' shares considered as indi-
vidual units rather than as a control block would require an account-
ing; by its requirement that the defendants show the value of their
shares shorn of the power to allocate steel, the court made it quite clear
that the presence of the misappropriated opportunity was the essential
element in determining their liability. It may be argued that the liability
determinant should be the receipt of a "premium" for controlling
shares. In such an event, it may be difficult to determine whether
shares have been sold at a price in excess of their "intrinsic" or "fair"
value if there is no active market. To make the amount of a premium
the measure of the controlling shareholder's liability does not seem
inappropriate if that liability is once established through independent
facts; to make it also the determining factor on the existence of lia-
bility may be difficult except in those cases where the price paid is
clearly unrelated to the fair value of the shares. In legal theory, there-
fore, the cases will probably proceed in terms of the misappropriation
of specific opportunities. In practice, knowledge on the part of con-
trolling shareholders that it will be relatively simple for a complainant
to identify such opportunities may serve as a pragmatic restraint on
their sale of controlling shares at very much above a reasonable ap-
proximation of their current market price.
Third, the rule of the Perlman case should be extended to other
control sales, irrespective of a showing that specific opportunities have
been misappropriated, only if there are alternatives available to the
controlling shareholder other than the making of the sale at the offered
price. Those alternatives were not discussed by the court in the Perl-
nan case, and its impact on practice in control sales is to that extent un-
clear. If faced with an offer for controlling shares at a price in excess
of the current market, the control seller may do one or the other of
the following:
(1) He may refuse to sell controlling shares as a block under any
circumstances.
240. The power to allocate production had been used in the past to acquire
interest-free advances from those who bought the corporation's product. Since the
purchasers of control could now allocate steel to themselves without making such
advances, the prior source of capital was cut off by the sale of control.
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(2) He may refuse to sell controlling shares at the offered price,
but sell at the current market price.
(3) He may refuse to sell at the offered price unless the buyer
makes an offer to the other shareholders to purchase their shares at
the same price.
241
To force the controlling shareholder into any one of those posi-
tions by a rule of accountability is admittedly to restrain his free
alienation of his shares. If forced into the first alternative, the con-
trolling shareholder may be unable to dispose of all of his shares even
though he may want to sell them at the time in question just to get
out of the corporate picture; if there is no market except for control
he may be obliged to hold on to his shares until he can dispose of them
in smaller blocks from time to time as a market develops. Of course,
the absence of a market is a risk which all the other shareholders are
241. If the buyer refuses to make the offer suggested in the third alternative, the
controlling shareholder may, of course, be forced back to one or the other of the
first two alternatives.
Two further alternatives may be suggested. (a) The holder of control may
refuse to sell his controlling shares as a block but sell a proportionate part of them.
Thus if control is exercised through a 40% ownership of shares, the holder of
control may decline the buyer's offer to purchase all of those shares, but may agree to
sell 40% of the shares he owns on the condition that the buyer offer to buy, at the
same price, 40% of the shares owned by each of the other holders of outstanding
shares. This alternative is probably unworkable. In the first place, the buyer
may refuse to proceed on this basis, because of the possibility that other shareholders
may be unwilling to sell the necessary percentage of shares; the buyer would there-
fore not be assured of acquiring the desired control. In the second place, the buyer
may be less inclined to purchase control if there is the likelihood of the former
controlling shareholder's remaining in possession of a substantial block of minority
shares. However, if the buyer does accept this alternative, and succeeds in acquiring
control through the purchase of the desired percentage of shares, there is the further
question whether the former controlling shareholder, 'even then, should be relieved
from liability to account for the premium he has received on his shares. It is doubtful
that the courts would require such accountability. The former controlling shareholder
has not in fact transferred control or acted in concert with other shareholders to
produce an aggregation of controlling shares in the buyer's hands. The independent
judgment of other shareholders was necessary to that end, and although shares owned
by the former controlling shareholder contributed more than those of any other
shareholder to accomplishing the buyer's purposes, it could be argued that the share-
holders whose sales were latest in time were the ones who factually placed control
in the buyer's hands. Shareholders have traditionally assumed the risk that an
outsider will accumulate control from scattered shareholders; in substance that is
what is being done in the alternative suggested here. The rule of accountability
seen developing from the Perlman case is designed only to protect shareholders from
the more serious risk of having that control shifted immediately and as a block from
one person or concerted group which has previously assumed to chart the corpora-
tion's course and now decides to abandon it in favor of a personal profit. (b) The
holder of control may refuse to sell his controlling shares to a particular purchaser
but nevertheless sell to another purchaser. If the rule of accountability developed in
the Perlman case is designed to cover only that case in which it is known that spe-
cific corporate opportunities will be abandoned, resort to this alternative may relieve
the control seller from liability. If, as the writer believes, the rule is reasonably
capable of extension to almost all cases 'of control sales because of the risk that
any number of such opportunities will be abandoned, the alternative may be more
theoretical than practical.
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taking, and there does not appear to be any special reason why a con-
trolling shareholder should be protected from that risk. If faced with
the second alternative, the controlling shareholder will at least not be
transferring his control under the persuasive influence of a premium
price and to that extent the remaining shareholders have some protec-
tion. But, along with the first alternative, that course of action makes
a dontrolling shareholder forego a favorable opportunity to benefit from
a prospective buyer's desire to pay a high price for his shares. No
particular reason appears for giving a buyer the benefit of control at
a bargain purchase. The third alternative would meet the objections
which have been made to the first two: the controlling shareholder is
not prohibited from disposing of his shares as a block, he is enabled
to benefit from the buyer's desire to acquire control of the corporation,
and the buyer is not put in a position to acquire shares by a bargain
purchase. The benefit of this alternative is to give the remaining
shareholders an opportunity to decide for themselves whether they will
take the risks of new management or get a favorable price for their
shares. Controlling shareholders who have resorted to this alternative
have found sympathetic reception in the courts; they have been freed
from an obligation to account for a premium received for their shares
when they have insisted on an even-handed offer to all shareholders.
242
The rule of accountability laid down in the Perlman case thus encour-
ages communication with fellow-shareholders on the question of the ad-
visability of making fundamental shifts in the operation of the cor-
poration's business.
c. Measure of Liability
A major problem in the administration of a broad rule of ac-
countability to which the Perlman case may lead was posed even in
242. Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Committee v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 193 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (see note 220 supra). Determination of the
time when such an offer should be made raises a separate problem. In the Mayflower
case, the purchaser of control made an offer to all of the shareholders to purchase
their shares at the same price paid for controlling shares; the offer was made after
control had been transferred. The court held that plaintiffs had no claim based
on the fact that notice of the transfer had not been given before the transfer had
been accomplished. "Nevertheless the sale must be shown to have been fair, free
of secret or undisclosed arrangements as to price or other considerations different
from the terms subsequently made known to all stockholders, and entirely in good
faith." Id. at 670. The offer should be made reasonably contemporaneously if the
seller of control is to be relieved from liability to account for his gain. As the
writer has indicated in the text, a seller of control should be relieved from that lia-
bility if he has given remaining shareholders an opportunity to choose whether or not
they will take the risk of new management. They are not given a meaningful choice
unless the offer is made to all shareholders either before control is transferred or
practically simultaneously with the transfer. If the offer is not made until some time
after control has been transferred, then whether or not the control transfer has worked
advantageously to the corporation, the remaining shareholders have been subjected
in the interim to a risk from which the rule of accountability for gain is designed to
protect them.
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the limited situation presented there. That problem involves the de-
termination of the amount of the gain for which the seller of control
must account and is focused primarily on the price for which control-
ling shares are sold. Many sellers of such shares have proceeded on
the assumption that controlling shares properly command a price in
excess of the aggregate value of the individual shares sold; thus the
seller of control may argue that even if his liability to account depends
upon valuation of his shares shorn of the power to control allocation
of the corporation's product or shorn of some other corporate power,
his shares nevertheless had a value in excess of the aggregate value
of the individual shares making up the block. The assumption that
shares have a legitimate "control" value has been accepted by some
courts without examination into whether the excess which may have
been received is commensurate with value reasonably to be attributed
to the shares by. reason of the fact that they carry control.23  At least
one court has attributed specific value to the control element adhering
to majority shares, although that value was found to be far less than
the premium received by the seller of control over the value of his
shares considered as individual units.244 Whether a seller of control-
ling shares shall account for all of the premium in price over the market
value or other fair value of shares considered as individual units or only
for some part of that excess is the question to be considered. It is
clear from the Perlman case that he will not, in certain circumstances,
be relieved from accounting for at least some part of that premium.
So long as the courts accept the limited proposition that account-
ability depends upon the sale of a "corporate power" and that only
certain "corporate powers" fall within the ambit of the Perlman case,
a seller of controlling shares may argue that all or a part of the price
he has received for his shares may appropriately be allocated to legiti-
mate control advantages. The utility of this argument will depend
upon the circumstances under which it is presented. Two situations
may be considered.
(a) A seller of controlling shares who receives a price which in-
cludes a premium over the market value of the shares as individual
units may reasonably anticipate that some minority shareholder may
move the corporation to call him to account for some part of his pre-
mium. The subsequent disclosure of such a premium may encourage
243. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517
(1st Dep't 1942) ; Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct.
1931). Note the problem of the valuation of blocks of shares for federal tax pur-
poses. Freeman & Vinciguerra, Blockage Valuatioa in Federal Tax Law, 94 U. PA.
L. REv. 365 (1946).
244. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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a search for a "corporate power" by a minority shareholder who may
plausibly argue that no excess over market price will ever be paid
unless the buyer wants to acquire some peculiar power not obtainable
by the purchase of shares unless they carry control. The consequent
pressure on the courts to segregate control advantages which may
lawfully be sold from those which may not may result either in the
confinement of the Perlman case to its peculiar facts or, as suggested
above, in the adoption of a broader rule of accountability.
(b) If a court determines that accountability is required because
a peculiar "corporate power" has been improperly sold, the defendant
may seek to reduce the amount for which he shall be required to account
by arguing that his sale of control involved not only sale of that "cor-
porate power" but the sale of some of the "lawful advantages" of control
as well.2" That argument should not be recognized. Adequate stand-
ards of valuation do not exist for segregating the price paid for con-
trolling shares into (i) the part which is paid for that aspect of all
shares which may variously be called their "actual," "intrinsic," "invest-
ment" or "market" value,2"' (ii) that part which is paid for "lawful
245. See Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 218, 38 N.Y.S.2d
517, 526 (1st Dep't 1942), and pp. x x x supra.
246. The determination of the amount which the seller of control should be
permitted to retain requires some verbal description of that amount and the estab-
lishment of standards by which that verbal description is to be fulfilled. The "fair
value" of defendant's shares may be suggested as a standard. (Cf. Young v. Higbee
Co., 324 U.S. 204, 208 (1945).) It is an adequate statement of the problem although,
as such, somewhat tautological. In a normal transaction of purchase and sale, the con-
currence of buyer and seller would be a sufficient standard of valuation. But in the
control sale cases, when the holder of controlling shares has not procured the invi-
tation of all other shareholders to participate in the "value" established by the pur-
chaser, the "value" so established is inappropriate by hypothesis. Therefore it is
necessary to resort to some artificial measure to determine a figure which will
"fairly" compensate the seller of control for having transferred his shares in the
corporation. To characterize that figure as the "value" of his shares does not aid
in solution. It may be suggested that "value" is a word of many meanings precisely
because in many contexts it serves only as a description of a price or figure which is
"fair" to the parties under the circumstances; "fair value," therefore, merely describes
the result to be reached. A similar problem is encountered in the determination of
the "value" of a dissenter's shares in connection with a merger or sale of assets.
In such cases also, there has been difficulty in arriving at an appropriate term de-
scribing the amount which will fairly compensate the dissenter. See, e.g., N.Y. STocx
CORP. LAW § 21(3) ("value"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-908(B) (Purdon
Supp. 1954) ("fair value") ; VA. CODE ANN. § 13-47 (Supp. 1954) ; id. § 13-85 (1950)
("fair cash value"); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 271.415(4), 271.490 (1953) ("fair market
value") ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-11-5 (1953) ("full market value") ; ALA. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 100 (1940) ("market value").
Assuming that the problem may be described as the search for a "fair" amount
or for "fair value," the standards to be applied in determining that "value" may be
examined. One standard is rejected in the text, i.e., the valuation of "lawful" con-
trol features. In the writer's opinion, the "fair value" of the controlling shareholder's
shares, for purposes of requiring an accounting in control sales cases, should be
that figure which most closely approximates what a willing buyer would have paid
a willing seller for individual or non-controlling, small blocks of shares in that cor-
poration at the time of the sale, assuming that no more than normal changes in
management policy were anticipated. Thus if the shares are actively traded on an
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advantages" and (iii) that part which is paid for "unlawful advan-
tages." 24' Conceivably a control seller might search until he has found
and valued a sufficient number of "lawful advantages" to consume the
entire premium paid for his shares. By hypothesis, however, the court
has found that the reason the buyer paid that premium was to induce
a sale of controlling shares in order to acquire advantages which be-
longed to the corporation and were therefore not a proper subject of
private sale. Requiring the seller of control to account is a remedy
which does not appear to be designed to compensate the corporation for
the loss of the power sold; its purpose is basically prophylactic. The
fund from which the seller of control should give his accounting is that
amount which he has received by reason of the fact that he has sold not
merely shares but control. If the prophylactic nature of the remedy is to
be preserved, he should not be permitted to reduce that fund by showing
the value of hypothetical legitimate advantages which might have in-
duced the buyer to pay a premium for control but which did not in
fact materially affect the bargaining between the parties. 4
exchange or there is otherwise an active market among buyers and sellers informed
of the corporation's conditions and prospects (although not informed of the con-
templated control sale) prices current. in that market should serve as the standard
of "fair value." Market prices may more appropriately be used as a standard in
control sale cases than in a dissenter's proceeding on a merger or sale of assets,
since in the latter case market prices may be affected by the proposed merger or
sale. It may appear that market prices have been manipulated by the controlling
shareholder (as by an unwarranted declaration of dividends) who has sought to
raise them in anticipation of a control sale, or that there is no active market. In
either event standards of valuation should be based on capitalization of past earnings
and earnings which could reasonably have been expected had the control sale not
taken place. If any process of valuing "assets," as distinguished from valuing the
going concern, should reveal a higher "value" than is obtainable by earnings capi-
talization, that "value" should be rejected; if the present management has been in-
capable of employing the corporation's assets to the full extent of their earning
capacity, it should be inappropriate to permit that management to benefit from its
inefficiency at the same time that it subjects the shareholders to increased risks by a
sale of control. The importance of arriving at a "value" based on current market
prices or a reasonable approximation thereof rests in the fact that accounting is being
required because "control," rather than individual shares, was sold. An artificial
process of valuation is therefore necessary to recreate a hypothetical sale of indi-
vidual shares (subject to the possible exception mentioned in note 248 infra).
See Matter of Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931) (proceedings under New
York appraisal statute); Application of Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
aff'd, 271 App. Div. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1st Dep't 1947) (same).
247. Compare the treatment of a similar problem in Sautter v. Fulmer, 258
N.Y. 107, 179 N.E. 310 (1932), and note 37 supra. Judge Swan stated in his
dissenting opinion in the Pernman case: "The controlling block could not by any
possibility be shorn of its appurtenant power to elect directors and through them to
control distribution of the corporate product. It is this 'appurtenant power' which
gives a controlling block its value as such block. What evidence could be adduced
to show the value of the block 'if shorn' of such appurtenant power, I cannot con-
ceive, for it cannot be shorn of it." 219 F.2d at 180. It may be suggested that
evidence could be introduced to show the value of the shares considered as an
aggregate of individual units rather than as a control block.
248. One possible exception to an accounting based on the total premium received
for controlling shares over their value considered as individual units might be to
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B. Actions by Individual Shareholders
1. Choice of Form of Suit
After controlling shares have been sold, remaining shareholders
who wish to complain of the transaction face the necessity of choosing
between a derivative suit asserting rights of the corporation and a per-
sonal suit on their own behalf. The necessity for making such a choice
is not confined to control transactions. Since the theoretical differences
between corporate rights and shareholder rights are not always simple
to define, the choice of a remedy poses problems in a wide variety of
situations giving rise to shareholder complaints.249 However, the
choice creates special problems in the control sale cases.
Cases examined in Part One of this article involved complaints
by former shareholders whose shares had been sold either directly
to a third party or resold by a manager or controlling shareholder after
purchase from the complaining shareholder. In such cases, although
there were questions as to substantive liability, no suggestion was
made that the one complaining should have brought an action assert-
ing rights of the corporation or otherwise than on his own behalf.
On the other hand, the bulk of the litigation involving sales of control
in which such selling shareholders were not complaining has been in-
stituted formally on behalf of the corporation or has involved the as-
sertion of "corporate" causes of action. Direct, personal actions by
remaining shareholders asserting rights growing out of sales of control
have been attempted infrequently and have not been successful when
tried. In one case, in which managers were alleged to have frustrated
shareholders' acceptance of a third party's offer for all the shares,
relief would probably not have been granted even if a corporate cause
of action had been asserted, because of the court's reliance on the "no
fiduciary duty" doctrine.25° In another case the court plainly denied
permit the seller of control to have a credit, nominal at best, attributable to the fact
that the buyer saved time and expense by being able to purchase a block of shares
in one transaction instead of through numerous negotiations.
249. See, e.g., Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E.2d 331 (1954) (share-
holder suing to compel declaration of dividends required to furnish security for costs
under New York statute; cause of action held to be one "in the right of the cor-
poration"); Note, 38 CORN=LL L.Q. 244 (1953) (comment on opinion of the appel-
late division, 280 App. Div. 655, 116 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st Dep't 1952)). Compare
Knapp v. Bankers Securities Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956).
250. Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass. 378, 30 N.E.2d 242 (1940). Compare Benson
v. Braun, 286 App. Div. 1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d Dep't 1955), in which the court
stated that it was upholding a complaint alleging a combined personal and derivative
suit for accounting for profits from a control sale "... even if only one of the
causes of action is sufficient." Ibid.
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relief because the shareholder had failed to prosecute his action in
derivative form on behalf of the corporation.25'
Whether a shareholder shall proceed individually or derivatively
does not depend upon whether or not he has been injured. A misap-
propriation or diversion of physical assets identifiable as "corporate"
property injures the individual shareholder by reducing the value of
his shares; nevertheless a derivative action has been required for the
redress of such an injury.252 Although the decision that a shareholder
should proceed by one form of suit rather than another is customarily
couched in terms of "personal cause of action" or "corporate cause of
action," the selection of the appropriate remedy, and the supervision
of that selection by the courts, is basically one of administration. Fun-
damentally the question is: how may shareholder complaints best be
worked out?
Although numerous detailed questions arise in the solution of
that problem, 2  a major administrative problem is the form of the
relief to be granted. If a remaining shareholder successfully prosecutes
an action in which he has complained of a sale of control and has ob-
tained recognition of his claim that the controlling shareholder should
account for a premium received on the sale, to whom should the pay-
ment of that premium be made? Although not exhaustive of the pos-
sible forms of relief, two may be suggested: payment of the entire
premium into the corporation's treasury, or payment to the complaining
shareholder or shareholders of a proportionate share of the entire
premium. The choice between those two possibilities poses two com-
peting considerations:
251. Beeber v. Wilson, 285 Pa. 312, 131 Atl. 854 (1926). A creditor does not
have the right to sue the wrongdoer directly in a case involving sale of control.
Heineman v. Marshall, 117 Mo. App. 546, 92 S.W. 1131 (1905). Relief was denied
to a creditor alleging a sale of stock in fraud of creditors in Donaldson v. Andresen,
300 Pa. 312, 150 At]. 616 (1930).
252. Niles v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 176 N.Y. 119, 68 N.E. 142 (1903).
See Annot., 167 A.L.R. 279 (1947) for a comparison of cases illustrative of this
general approach to shareholder complaints and cases in which direct action has
been permitted on a showing of some special injury to individual shareholders.
253. Questions relevant to the administration of relief to complaining share-
holders are: (1) How far should the shareholder proceed within the internal cor-
porate organization in his search for relief? (2) Is the shareholder's complaint
peculiar to himself, shared by some but not by all of the shareholders or shared in
common by all shareholders? (3) Do creditors have any interest in the matter of
which the shareholder complains? (4) Should the complaining shareholder be com-
pensated by the corporation for his counsel fees and other expenses? (5) Do court
rules or statutes imposing restrictions (by way of requiring security for costs or
ownership of shares at the time of the wrong) properly apply to the particular type
of shareholder complaint being prosecuted? (6) Should any restrictions on the
capacity or ability to bring suit be imposed on shareholders, whatever the nature
of the complaint? (7) Who should have control over the prosecution of a shareholder
suit, over its discontinuance or settlement and over the execution of a judgment?
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(1) Requiring a seller of control to account for personal gain is
not primarily compensatory in purpose; its function is largely pro-
phylactic. It is more desirable to prevent an unfair sale of control
from being made than to force the remaining shareholders into litiga-
tion after the event. The virtue of requiring the defendant to disgorge
his entire gain is that it increases the effectiveness of the prophylaxis;
to require him to disgorge less than that amount is less beneficial. To
direct the defendant to pay only a pro rata portion directly to remaining
shareholders would mean that a seller of control would be most tempted
to override the interests of minority shareholders in those cases where
the minority is smallest and least able to protect itself by any form of
combined action, since the extent of his liability in such cases might be
minimal as compared to that part of his gain which he would be per-
mitted to retain. Therefore, to obtain the maximum protection for
minority shareholders, the defendant should be required to give up
his entire premium.
(2) The conclusion that payment of the entire premium by the
seller of control would increase his sense of responsibility raises an-
other problem. It is doubtful that a court would order the payment
of the entire premium directly to remaining shareholders. Even in
those cases in which selling shareholders have sought redress by per-
sonal action, the courts have not awarded to them the entire premium
received by the seller of control; selling shareholders have generally
recovered only a proportionate share of that premium. 5 The major
alternative to ordering payment of the entire premium to the remaining
shareholders is to direct it to be paid to the corporation. However,
in such a case, the purchaser of control (who now owns shares in the
corporation), or his transferee, would benefit. In effect he would re-
cover a part of the price he had paid for his shares. This fact has
troubled several courts which have considered whether a seller of
control should be liable to the corporation. Their concern has been
so great that it may have influenced their decision not to require any
accounting.2 In the words of one court, such a result would be
"unjust and inequitable." "I Other courts have solved this difficulty
by requiring an accounting directly to the remaining shareholders on
a proportionate basis, even though the suit was technically derivative.
57
254. See pp. 738, 747 and 755 supra.
255. Keely v. Black, 91 N.J. Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920);
Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
256. See Keely v. Black, supra note 255; see also note 139 supra.
257. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); Commonwealth Title
Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910). As to one possible
explanation for the form of relief in the Seltzer case, see note 146 supra.
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It must be admitted that awarding recovery to the corporation
may benefit the buyer who has cooperated in the transfer of control.
However, it clearly will remove the incentive from a seller of control.
The prophylactic benefit gained by the threat of removal of that incen-
tive does not appear to be outweighed by any possible increase in
buyers' incentive to acquire control. 8 The dilemma might be avoided
by recognizing a remedy other than one directed toward a money judg-
ment. Such a remedy would be an injunction. Injunctions against
control sales have been denied heretofore in part on the ground that
complaining shareholders have failed to show that loss will result
from the transaction; at times the plaintiffs have been expressly re-
mitted to their remedies, if any, available upon a showing of loss after
the control sale has been accomplished." 9 In the light of the more
sophisticated view of corporate injury which appears to be developing
in the Perlman case, re-examination of the older injunction cases would
presumably be required. At least with respect to particular purchasers,
such as those in the Pernman case, it can be shown with a fair degree
of certainty that the purpose of the purchase is inconsistent with use of
certain of the corporation's opportunities in the future; injury to the
corporation, in that sense, is therefore practically inevitable. Injunc-
tion might not be granted, however, if there is not a practical certainty
but merely a risk that certain corporate opportunities will not be pur-
sued by the purchasers. In such a case, a court could consistently
deny injunctive relief and thereafter require accounting from the seller
of control for taking personal profit in the face of that risk.26 A
major objection to the remedy of injunction, from the standpoint of
the corporation and remaining shareholders, is the fact that in many
of the situations giving rise to complaint the control sale has been con-
ducted in an atmosphere of secrecy. In such a case, injunction is not
an available remedy, since the sale will have been accomplished before
the complainants have become aware of that fact. Therefore despite
258. Compare Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 188
Mass. 315, 74 N.E. 653 (1905) (action by corporation for recovery of promoters'
profits). "A corporation is not precluded from recovering for a fraud on it (the
corporation) because the party committing the fraud is a stockholder." Id. at 327,
74 N.E. at 658.
259. Ingraham v. National Salt Co., 36 Misc. 646, 74 N.Y. Supp. 388 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 72 App. Div. 582, 76 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (2d Dep't 1902), aff'd,
179 N.Y. 556, 71 N.E. 1131 (1904); Phelan v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 24
Misc. 109, 53 N.Y. Supp. 305 (Sup. Ct. 1898); see also Delevan v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 154 App. Div. 8, 139 N.Y. Supp. 17 (1st Dep't 1912).
260. In a case involving the dissolution of a corporation by its controlling share-
holder for the latter's benefit, the court demonstrated a similar hesitancy to deny
injunctive relief and a willingness to grant monetary relief after the event. Lebold v.
Inland S.S. Co., 82 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1936) (injunction denied), 125 F.2d 369 (7th
Cir. 1941) (liability for damages established), 136 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1943)
(measure of damages).
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the fact that the suggested dilemma may be avoided by resort to in-
junction, that remedy should not be exclusive of an accounting for
gain.
If it be determined that a money judgment is an appropriate form
of relief and that corporate policy would best be served by requiring
payment of the entire premium to the corporation, in the present frame-
work of the corporate institution, the derivative suit is the appropriate
remedy. Although, as noted, some courts have felt free to mold relief
in sale of control cases in such a way as to grant only a proportionate
recovery even in a derivative suit,261 it is not probable that a share-
holder's suit technically on his own behalf would be productive of a
corporate recovery of the type described.
The conclusion that a derivative suit is the appropriate remedy
implies that consequences other than the form of relief will flow from
such a choice. The selection of the derivative suit from the present rigid
dichotomy between derivative and personal suits almost automatically
and uncritically settles other questions, such as the right of the plain-
tiff to the payment of counsel fees 262 and the applicability of restric-
tions on the bringing.of the suit.2" A reappraisal of the structure of
shareholders' remedies might well dictate that some of those conse-
quences should not flow from any kind of shareholder suit,2 whether
personal or derivative, or whether to compel accounting for sales of
control or for other wrongs. Such a reappraisal might indicate that
the congeries of consequences which normally flow from choice of a
particular type of suit are not unitary, but severable, and that the inci-
dence of each consequence ought to be determined on its merits with
relationship to the particular wrong complained of rather than auto-
matically by the designation of the suit as derivative or personal. Until
such reappraisal causes substantial changes in the structure of share-
261. The courts have not been in agreement with respect to the propriety of
awarding relief in derivative suits directly to complaining shareholders. STEVENS,
CoRPoRATioNs 794-97 (2d ed. 1949). Compare Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch.
234, 2 A.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1938), with Brown v. DeYoung, 167 Ill. 549, 47 N.E. 863
(1897) ; see also May v. Midwest Refining Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1941) ; Harris
v. Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366, 190 N.Y. Supp. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1921). Although the interests
of creditors in the restoration of property appropriated by tortfeasors might dictate a
corporate recovery, the fact that the corporation has reached such a point in the dis-
solution process as to make the interests of creditors irrelevant has led some courts
to award relief directly to complaining shareholders. Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 165,
6 A.2d 519 (1939) ; Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 Atl. 320 (1937).
262. See, generally, Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 39 CoLtJm. L. REv. 784 (1939).
263. Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E.2d 331 (1954).
264. See, generally, Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How
Far Is California's New "Security for Expenses Act" Sound Regulation. 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 399 (1949); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits,
47 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1947).
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holder remedies, those courts which deny the right of an individual
remaining shareholder to prosecute a suit purely on his own behalf
appear to be taking a correct approach.
Some difficulty may be anticipated on the theoretical level.
Whether it is possible for a remaining shareholder, complaining of a
sale of control, to state a "corporate cause of action" raises a question.
The shareholder who sues both for damages caused by looting and for
the seller's gain has no doubt stated such a cause of action. The action
for damages is corporate largely because the replacement of identifiable
physical assets benefits the whole body of those interested in that cor-
porate property; creditors have a particular interest in such a corporate
recovery. Although creditors do not have a similar interest in the
recovery of gains from such a sale, the joinder of a corporate claim
for gains in the same suit does not seem to be inappropriate. Where
no looting losses are sought to be reclaimed, a suit for the control
seller's gains may be cast in the form of a corporate suit when the
theoretical basis for suit is the sale of a "corporate power." Only if
the shareholder is complaining that he has been deprived of an oppor-
tunity to sell his shares (as in hypothetical Case F) may a share-
holder's claim plausibly be considered exclusively personal and not cor-
porate. Even in such a case, the prophylactic, rather than compen-
satory, nature of the relief and the consequent benefit to the whole body
of shareholders in the increase of managerial and controlling share-
holder responsibility may sufficiently support a theory of a corporate
cause of action.
2. Integration of Remedies With Those of Selling Shareholders
The suggestion that a proportionate recovery by individual re-
maining shareholders does not adequately serve preventive purposes
may create a problem in the integration of remedies. Part One of this
article dealt with the rights of the selling shareholder, i.e., one whose
shares formed a part of the controlling shares taken by a buyer, with-
out his knowledge that a sale of control was being effected or that he
was being deprived of an opportunity to participate in the profit from
such a sale. It was observed there that the selling shareholder may
have a remedy against the person who appropriates profit attributable
to a sale of control. The remedy, when recognized by the courts, has
almost uniformly consisted of the selling shareholder's recovery of a
proportionate part of the differential between the amount per share
received by the complainant for his shares and the amount per share
received by the manager or controlling shareholder profiting from the
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sale.2"5 The effect of this remedy is to permit the defendant to retain
a part of the premium which a buyer was willing to pay for a sale of
control, so long as the defendant's own shares formed a part of the
block sold. On the other hand, if the manager or controlling share-
holder has sold controlling shares which he owns, at a premium over
their value considered as individual shares, the proposed prophylactic
recovery by the corporation in a derivative suit brought at the instiga-
tion of remaining shareholders would compel the defendant to disgorge
all of the premium.
The administration of those two remedies would create problems
in a case in which a control block consisting of less than all of the cor-
poration's outstanding shares are sold to a buyer of control and some
of the shares making up that control block have been furnished by
selling shareholders who thereby acquire personal rights of redress.
In such a case, not only selling shareholders but also remaining share-
holders may have rights against the one who has profited from the
sale of control.2"' The problem may be examined in the light of the
following assumed state of facts.
Case H. Control Block Includes Shares Purchased from
Selling Shareholders. Corporation C has 100 common shares
outstanding. D, the president and a director, owns 30 shares.
L, M and N (selling shareholders) own an aggregate of 30 shares.
X, Y and Z (remaining shareholders) own an aggregate of 40
shares. The market price of individual shares is $100 per share
and remains constantly at that figure throughout all relevant times.
D purchases the 30 shares owned by L, M and N and pays them
$100 per share. D then sells 60 shares to Buyer at $150, thereby
receiving a premium of $3,000 over the market price of the 60
shares sold. If it be assumed that all other circumstances of the
sale are sufficient to create causes of action in favor of the selling
shareholders (L, M and N) as well as Corporation C, the selling
shareholders' right to recover $1,500 (that portion of the pre-
mium allocable to their shares) apparently overlaps the right
which it has been proposed that Corporation C should have to
recover the entire premium of $3,000.287 The seller of control
under such circumstances therefore runs the risk of being sub-
jected to what may be referred to as a "multiple liability."
265. See pp. 738, 747 and 755 supra.
266. See note 14 mipra.
267. The "overlap" would be less apparent if D had purchased the shares of
L, M and N at some price above or below the $100 figure hypothesized as the market
price. The integration of remedies discussed in the text would become more complex
in that case as well as in a case in which the market price fluctuated between the
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The inadequate theoretical development by the courts of the sub-
stantive liability of those who profit from a sale of control makes it
difficult to determine whether, if D were required to pay $4,500, he
would be paying more than oncefor the same wrong or would simply
be paying heavily for having committed two distinct wrongs.26 One
argument for the proposition that the control seller has committed only
one wrong might be that he has sold controlling shares without
inviting participation in his profit by all interested parties (i.e., selling
shareholders and remaining shareholders) and that recovery of all of
that profit, whether by selling shareholders, the corporation or remain-
ing shareholders, would satisfy all liability arising from the sale. How-
ever, the courts have considered that the rights of selling shareholders
and those of other parties in the corporate institution are more distinct
than such an argument assumes. Some courts have viewed the rights
of selling shareholders as grounded in "fraud" and their recovery as
an award of damages; others have viewed their rights as grounded
in a breach of duty which gives rise to a prophylactic recovery of
profits.26 9 It was suggested in the discussion of the rights of selling
shareholders that they may in fact be injured by a sale of control under
certain circumstances. A proportionate part of the premium received
on a sale of control may serye as a rough measure of that injury. Se-
lection of that particular measure is indicative of the fact that prophy-
laxis plays a significant role in the selling shareholders' cause of action,
but it does not exclude compensation as an important basis for the
selling shareholders' recovery. The corporate cause of ,action is less
compensatory in purpose. Unlike selling shareholders, the remaining
shareholders will continue to be shareholders and through subsequent
sales may be able to recoup losses which have flowed from having been
deprived of opportunities to merge, sell assets or sell shares. There-
fore the corporate recovery is mainly prophylactic. It is more clearly
time of D's purchase from L, M and N and his sale of their shares and his own
shares to Buyer. In such circumstances, the "premium" for which the selling share-
holders have a proportionate claim might be a figure different from the "premium"
for which D may be held liable to the corporation. The basic problem of multiple
liability discussed in the text would remain the same, however. (In the discussion
of Case H in the text, it is hypothesized that the market price mentioned can rea-
sonably be found by the court to represent the fair value of shares considered as
individual units.)
268. A similar problem arises under § 10(b) (and rule X-10B-5) and § 16(b)
of the Exchange Act. See Loss, SECURTMES REGULATION 844 (1951). -One can
agree with Loss' analysis of the independence of the liabilities created by those two
sections without being required to hold that the extent of recovery in a corporate
suit for profits on a sale of control must be considered independently of the extent
of the recovery by selling shareholders; the language and purposes of the Exchange
Act sections raise considerations different from those which face a common-law
court.
269. See Part One supra for an analysis of the variety of theoretical bases for
selling shareholders' suits.
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so when the theory of recovery is the sale of a "corporate power" or
"opportunity" and would be most clearly so if the courts were to adopt
the broad policy that no seller of controlling shares may benefit from
a gamble that the corporation will continue to operate profitably.
The conclusion that the selling shareholders' recovery is basically
compensatory leads to the suggestion that no attempt should be made
to integrate the selling shareholders' and the corporation's remedies in
any way which would preclude recovery by the former. Although
the chronology of suits may result in the recovery of judgment first
by the selling shareholders and later by the corporation, the chronology
may have a reverse result. If the selling shareholders recover their
proportion of the defendant's premium, a subsequent recovery by the
corporation of the entire premium would not appear to be required by
the prophylactic purposes sought to be served by a corporate recovery.
The goal should be only that the defendant disgorge his profits; allow-
ing the defendant a credit for the amount he has paid to selling share-
holders would be consonant with that goal 7  The allowance of such
a credit should be well policed, however. Conceivably, the defendant
might have cooperated with the selling shareholders in a sale of con-
trol, using the device of a selling shareholders' suit to share at least
some part of his profit with them. More probable than such a conlu-
sive suit would be a sham private restitution or settlement without
trial. Payments by the defendant to selling shareholders should be
subjected to close scrutiny before the court allows the defendant a
credit on the basis of his argument that his clear profit from the sale
has been decreased.
If the corporation sues first, allowance of a credit merely for po-
tential liability to selling shareholders would not be consonant with
the purpose of requiring the defendant to disgorge his profits. How-
ever, a court may be concerned at this point with the possibility of mul-
tiple recovery. It may be aware of the fact that the compensatory
character of the selling shareholders' claims demand recognition even
if the claims are asserted after the corporation has had full recovery.
270. It may be argued that permitting a direct recovery by selling shareholders
for their part of the premium and corporate recovery of the remainder of the premium
will give selling shareholders a larger share than remaining shareholders will receive
(since the latter must share with the buyer of control the amount recovered by the
corporation). Equivalence between the selling shareholders' recovery and that of
'the remaining shareholders could be accomplished only by awarding to each of them
a share in the control seller's premium measured by the ratio between their shares
and the total outstanding shares. However, this would permit the control seller
to retain a portion of his premium and would gain equivalence at a sacrifice in
prophylaxis. Although the remedy suggested in the text gives a greater proportionate
recovery to selling shareholders, it appears to be justified on the ground that they
have suffered an irrevocable loss; they have sold their shares, remaining share-
holders have not.
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Such concern should not cause confusion between the corporation's sub-
stantive right and the problem of damages.2 I The corporation should
not be denied recovery of the full premium unless the defendant estab-
lishes more than merely potential liability to selling shareholders. As
mentioned above, the defendant may be able to establish that a proper
private settlement has taken place. If suits by the selling shareholders
and the corporation are proceeding simultaneously, a stay in the cor-
porate suit would give time for determination of the amount for which
the defendant will be held liable to selling shareholders. If selling
shareholders have not brought suit and the defendant is unwilling to
make any payment to them without judicial determination of his li-
ability, then, aside from exploring the possibilities of interpleader under
the modern statutes and rules which have removed many of the tradi-
tional restrictions on the use of that procedure, 72 he may find that at
least some risk of multiple damages is part of the price he must pay for
so manipulating a transaction in corporate control as to injure so many
interests in the enterprise.
73
271. Compare the handling of a related problem in General Rubber Co. v.
Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 96 (1915). As to the court's treatment of the argu-
ment of double liability, see id. at 24-26, 109 N.E. at 98-99; see also McCandless v.
Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140, 167 (1935).
272. Defendant would find his use of interpleader blocked by traditional re-
quirements. Inter alia, there must be privity between the claimants, the defendant
must not have incurred independent liability to either claimant, the defendant must
have or claim no interest in the subject matter, and the same debt or duty must be
claimed by all claimants. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1322 (5th ed. 1941) ;
Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L.J. 814, 822 (1921). However, tradi-
tional restrictions have been relaxed by the federal interpleader statute, 62 STAT.
931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1952), and by some state procedures, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P.
2301-25. Under PA. R. Civ. P. 2306, the defendant may still encounter difficulty,
since the court is given discretion to deny a petition for interpleader if the defend-
ant ". . . has admitted the claim of, or subjected himself to independent liability to,
the plaintiff or any claimant, with knowledge that an inconsistent claim would be
later asserted against him by any known or unknown person." If the manager or
controlling shareholder incurs liability to the corporation in a control sale, he may
be said to have done so with knowledge that selling shareholders from whom he
purchased shares may subsequently assert a claim against him.
273. In the examination of the rights of selling shareholders, it was stated that
Case D poses problems substantially different from those suggested by Cases A,
B and C. Discussion of Case D under state law (see p. 758 supra) and under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (see p. 773 supra) was deferred until the total
problem of the liability of the manager and controlling shareholder had been exam-
ined and the policies behind recovering profits from a control sale fully explored.
As noted in the previous discussion of Case D, Buyer has purchased D's shares at a
premium and also has purchased other outstanding shares at a lower price without
D's assistance or knowledge. In such a case, it is difficult to support a claim under
either state law or the Exchange Act that D has deprived other shareholders of
any opportunity which Buyer had originally proposed to make available to them. Of
course, a rule requiring D to share his gains with other shareholders should be
applied only if it is thought desirable to compel particular action by D. If D's
shares are not purchased by Buyer until after Buyer has purchased other shares, it is
too late for D to protect other shareholders. If other shares are not purchased until
after the control sale, then other remedies are available. As suggested in the text,
the practical effect of the Perlman case may be to require D to bargain for an
even-handed offer to all other shareholders or to refuse to sell his shares at a
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IV. ACTIONS INDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES STATUTES BY OR ON
BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION OR REMAINING SHAREHOLDERS
The federal securities statutes do not provide the corporation with
a cause of action with respect 'to a control sale as such. As noted
previously, 74 section 16(b) has a limited impact on those cases in
which corporate insiders purchase shares for resale. It does not reach
those cases, such as Cases E, F and G, in which the insider has not
supplemented his own shares by making purchases from other share-
holders.
It is subject to question whether section 10(b) and rule X-10B-5
furnish relief to a corporation asserting that it or its remaining share-
holders have been adversely affected by sales of control such as those
which took place in the looting cases or in Cases E, F and G. The
fact that no civil cause of action is given by the terms of the rule to
the corporation or to shareholders suing on its behalf should not alone
serve as a barrier to judicial recognition of the corporation's claim.
The consistent ruling that a civil remedy is available to an aggrieved
selling shareholder in the event of violation of the rule 275 is persuasive
that a civil remedy may be similarly available to the corporation, but
only if a transaction involving a sale of control falls within the ac-
tivities proscribed by the section and rule as a substantive matter.
Words such as "public interest" and "protection of investors" in
the section, "any person" in subsection (c) of the rule, and the rule's
broad definition of "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance"
are literally capable of comprehending those sales of control which
result in looting losses to the corporation as well as those in which the
interests of remaining shareholders are ignored for the private benefit
of the sellers of control, although the extent to which that language
permits the courts to proceed beyond common-law doctrines with re-
premium. The threat of a prophylactic recovery of D's premium may therefore
induce D to take action on behalf of all remaining shareholders and the situation
posed by Case D will be avoided; Buyer will have acquired all of his shares at the
same price. Although in the text the point was made that the fundamental purpose
of the rule of accountability in the Perlnan situation is the protection of remaining
shareholders against the risk of new control being imposed on them without consul-
tation, it has the collateral effect of producing even-handed treatment of all share-
holders including those who might otherwise have sold to Buyer at lower prices.
The corporate recovery of D's profit therefore seems a sufficient safeguard against
the type of transaction which Case D poses. Assuming that D has ignored the threat
of a loss of profits and has proceeded to carry out a transaction warranting a cor-
porate recovery, selling shareholders in Case D would not share in that recovery.
But since they cannot point to the diversion of known profitable opportunities, a
personal compensatory recovery by them does not appear to be required under
either state law or rule X-10B-5.
274. See text at pp. 759-62 supra.
275. See cases cited in note 94 mipra.
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spect to the duties of managers and controlling shareholders is subject
to some speculation.2
The primary difficulty in determining whether such cases fall
substantively within the section and rule arises from the necessity of
interpreting the words "in connection with" the purchase or sale of
any security. That language is found in both the section and the rule.
The question is presented whether those words limit the operation of
the section and rule to those "devices and contrivances" (as defined in
the rule) which operate upon purchasers or sellers of securities, or
whether the section and rule proscribe practices which are injurious
to other persons, not purchasers or sellers, so long as a purchase or sale
of a security is one of the steps in the effectuation of those practices.
In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,27 the only case in which a
court has written an opinion on this matter, it was stated that ".
Rule X-10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser
or seller." In that case, shareholders of Newport Steel Corporation
brought a combined personal and derivative suit alleging that section
10(b) and rule X-10B-5 had been violated in connection with Feld-
mann's sale of Newport's control."' The complaint emphasized mis-
representations and nondisclosures in Feldmann's reporting on the
rejection of a proposed profitable merger of Newport and another steel
company and in the reporting, by the new president of Newport, on the
sale of Feldmann's shares. The district court dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action 279 and the dismissal was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court looked to
the SEC's apparent purpose in promulgating rule X-10B-5 to deter-
276. McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., Civil No. 8015, E.D. Pa., July 30,
1948, in which the court denied motions to dismiss the complaint, without opinion, is
significant not only because it involved a suit by non-sellers, but also because of the
substantive cause of action alleged under rule X-10B-5. In a mixed personal and
derivative suit, plaintiff minority shareholders alleged that three officers and directors,
owners of over four-fifths of the voting shares of a paper company, sold their shares
and control of the company to a newspaper corporation at $60 a share at a time
when the paper company's shares were selling on the over-the-counter market at
$6 to $8 a share. Plaintiffs alleged that the paper company had a large surplus at
the time of the sale and that the buyers intended to use a part of this surplus to
convert its operations to the manufacture of newsprint, changing the company's
course of business and operating policies to its detriment and for the buyer's benefit.
Inter alla, plaintiffs alleged that the sellers of control had breached fiduciary obliga-
tions by making such a sale to outsiders under the above circumstances, by depriving
minority shareholders of opportunities to participate in disposition of the assets and
in the sale of shares above the market price and by failing to make full disclosures
of all material facts.- The buyer, included as a defendant, was alleged to have
conspired with the control sellers in violating rule X-10B-5.
277. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1251.
278. The Perlman case, discussed at pp. 809-17 supra, and the Birnbaum case
arose out of the same transaction. Jurisdiction in the Perlman case was based on
diversity of citizenship.
279. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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mine the meaning and scope of its "loosely drawn" language. The
SEC's purpose was found to be the creation of prohibitions against
fraud by purchasers comparable to those already contained in the Se-
curities Act with respect to fraud by sellers,28 ° and the court went no
further than it considered necessary to carry out that purpose.
There is no affirmative evidence to indicate that a result contrary
to that reached in the Birnbaum case was clearly compelled."8' It has
been reported that the Commission has not taken a position which
would shed light on the question. 82 Nevertheless, even in the absence
of a clear cut statement by the Commission or of a rule deliberately
drawn to cover the precise situation posed in the Birnbaum case, there
are grounds for suggesting that relief could reasonably have been
granted, and that the court may have been unduly concerned with the
implications of granting that relief. In the first place, as recognized
by the court, the rule is literally broad enough to encompass the factual
situation before it. Indeed, one district court had previously denied
motions to dismiss a complaint alleging violations of rule X-10B-5
in connection with a sale of control under circumstances similar to
those in the Birnbaum case.
2
8
In the second place, there is evidence that the Commission's desire
to prohibit frauds by purchasers may have served only as the occasion
for its use of a rule making power, in a broad fashion, which it had not
fully exercised up to that point. As noted, that purpose was found to
be the prohibition of fraud by purchasers, a prohibition designed to
fill a loophole in the securities statutes, section 17(a) being limited to
280. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942, stated in
introduction to the text of rule X-10B-5: "The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission today announced the adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in
connection with the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules against
fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule
closes a loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by
prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud
in their purchase."
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, in language almost identical with that used
by the Commission in rule X-10B-5, applied only to the offer or sale of securities.
The "previously existing rules" referred to by the Commission were the rules relating
to over-the-counter markets adopted pursuant to § 15(c) of the Exchange Act.
281. In S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934), the only reference to
section 10(b) is as follows: "Subsection (b) authorizes the Commission by rules
and regulations to prohibit or regulate the use of any other manipulative or deceptive
practices which it finds detrimental to the interests of the investor." Sales of cor-
porate control were not mentioned in the reports accompanying the Exchange Act.
S. REP. No. 792, mipra; S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
282. "The Commission has taken no position on the question of the applicability
of the rule where the person allegedly defrauded was neither a seller nor a buyer."
Loss, SUPPLEMENT TO SECUIdTIEs REGULATION 841 (1955).
283. McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., Civil No. 8015, E.D. Pa., July 30,
1948 (dismissed with prejudice upon stipulation). As stated in note 276 wspra no
opinion was filed in support of the court's denial of motions to dismiss.
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fraud bysellers. But despite that stated purpose, the language of the
rule covers frauds by "any person" (not merely by purchasers) "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Even in the
Birnbaum case the court demonstrated its recognition of the rule's
reach to frauds by sellers as well as by purchasers; the court cited its
own prior opinion in which a fraud by sellers was held to fall within
the rule. 84 If the rule has a broader scope than may be attributed to
it by reference to the Commission's stated purpose in its adoption, the
question remains whether the court was obliged to draw the limit of
its scope at the precise point chosen.
The court may have been motivated by a consideration not wholly
relevant to the specific situation before it. The only issue presented
was whether section 10(b) and rule X-10B-5, in combination, afforded
grounds for corporate and shareholder objection to activities in connec-
tion with a sale of control. After disposing of rule X-10B-5 because
of the purpose of its adoption, the court observed that section 10(b)
was not directed toward "fraudulent mismanagement of corporate
affairs." "25 The plaintiffs' allegation that "fiduciary obligations" had
been violated by the defendants may have drawn the court into over-
estimating the consequences of granting relief in the case before it.
It may be true, as a general proposition, that section 10(b) is not
broadly oriented toward problems of "fraudulent mismanagement."
Concededly, a court should hesitate to impute to Congress the inten-
tion to draw into the federal courts innumerable facets of the internal
management of corporations for attack by shareholders purely on the
basis of the rule making power in section 10(b). If such an intention
were to be imputed to Congress, it might thus be possible to engraft
a completely new body of federal "common law" of corporations on
the slim structure of section 10(b), permitting examination of such
matters as dividend policy and business practice. The creation of such
a body of law could conceivably be justified on the ground that "fraudu-
lent mismanagement" always constitutes a practice "in connection with"
the purchase or sale of a security because it necessarily affects the
rights of someone who purchased some of the corporation's shares at
some time in the past. A reading of section 10(b) which would per-
mit that examination of corporate affairs could be made only if the
phrase "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security were
to be given only minor substantive significance. Thus the phrase
284. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). There
are doubts whether the protection afforded by the rule is comparable to that available
to sellers. See Loss, SEcutrrlEs RFuL.ATioN 1054-65 (1951).
285. Cf. Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954).
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would operate as a type of jurisdictional ground, much as the language
of the section and rule referring to the "means or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce or of the mails" now operates.
28 6
It was not necessary to read section 10(b) so broadly to decide
the Birnbaum case favorably to the plaintiffs. On the facts, the ques-
tion raised was whether the grant of rule making power in a statutory
section, itself "loosely drawn," fairly gives rise to an inference that
Congress gave flexibility to the Commission to identify and proscribe
practices detrimental to investors and necessarily involving the pur-
chase and sale of securities, even though such practices were not prev-
alent at the time the statute was passed. Corporate managers who find
more traditional share trading devices closed to them by specific pro-
visions of the statutes, such as section 16(b) of the Exchange Act,
may seek new methods of using the avenue of share trading to gain
advantages to the detriment of investors. Section 10 (b), more broadly
interpreted than it was by the court in the Birnbaum case, would give
the Commission flexibility to meet new situations as they arise. Under
circumstances discussed previously in this article, a sale of control
may be injurious to investors and their collective representative, the
corporation. In a sense, such a sale may be said to be corporate
mismanagement. But at the heart of the transaction is an abuse of
the securities trading process; the terms of section 10(b) direct the
Commission toward proscribing such abuses.
It must be admitted that there is room for debate even over the
extent to which section 10(b) gives the SEC supervisory power over
the securities trading process as distinguished from fraudulent mis-
management of corporate affairs. However, the scope of the section
with respect to such supervisory power was not squarely posed in the
Birnbaum case; 287 the reach of rule X-10B-5 was the more immediate
issue. Concern that the rule might burgeon into an expanded common
law of corporations may have influenced the court as fully as its
analysis of the Commission's purpose in promulgating the rule. Ju-
dicial insistence that only those transactions should be considered to
fall under the proscriptions of that rule in which a purchase or sale of
securities plays the major role would alleviate much of the difficulty
which may have been anticipated by the court.
286. See text at p. 763 supra.
287. That the court was focusing on § 10(b) as a basis for examination of
fraudulent mismanagement and breaches of "fiduciary duty" may be observed from
its observation that Congress did not intend that § 10(b) should be the vehicle for
protecting shareholders against breaches of "fiduciary duty" by insiders, since Con-
gress left no doubt as to its meaning when it did intend to grant such protection by
enacting § 16(b). 193 F.2d at 464.
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CONCLUSION
It is evident that the basic assumption that corporate managers
shall not absolutely be foreclosed from owning and trading in shares
of their corporations has not prevented examination of transactions
which constitute trading in corporate control. That assumption has,
however, delayed recognition of the fact that control trading is a pe-
culiar problem in its own right and requires analysis as a unitary
question.
Litigation involving control transfers has fallen into two major
categories: (1) cases in which selling shareholders have shown that
they have contributed shares forming a part of a controlling block
but have been deprived of benefits attaching to a control sale; (2)
cases in which remaining shareholders, the corporation or trustees
in bankruptcy have objected to control sales because of discernible
injury or loss of opportunities. In the first class of cases, the common
law has proceeded in its usual fragmentary fashion to work out mech-
anisms by which protection can be afforded to the selling shareholder,
although consistency of result and doctrine has not been marked. The
variety of factual patterns through which managers and controlling
shareholders have obtained personal benefit from sales of controlling
shares to the exclusion of other selling shareholders has resulted in the
application of a variety of doctrines ranging around indefinite concepts
of fraud and deceit. Rarely have the courts articulately analyzed the
basic question of corporate policy which the cases present: should
managers or controlling shareholders be permitted to benefit from trans-
fers of corporate control to the observable exclusion of shareholders
whose shares have entered into the control block? In result, however,
the courts are beginning to answer the question in favor of the whole
body of shareholders.
The federal securities statutes have not been addressed to the
specific problem of control transfers as they affect selling shareholders.
Rule X-10B-5 has been designed to correct specific deficiencies in
common-law doctrine in a more generalized area of problems. It
has been applied from time to time in control sale cases, but not all
of the transactions which have been considered at common law have
come up for examination under the rule. On the whole it offers an
opportunity for a wiser approach to the basic corporate problem than
many of the common-law courts have demonstrated. Section 16(b) of
the Exchange Act has afforded a prophylactic remedy in a limited num-
ber of cases but is not completely applicable to control sales because
of its limitation to issuers with listed securities and because of its fail-
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ure to reach cases in which selling shareholders have been induced to
transfer shares directly to third parties.
In the second major class of cases, those not involving selling
shareholders, the law has moved more slowly to impose sanctions
on those who sell control. Where the sale has resulted in definite and
discernible depletion of corporate properties, the likelihood that 'the
transaction will result in the imposition of liability on the sellers of
control is fairly great. In cases where the remaining members of the
corporate institution are unable to point to specific depletion of assets,
courts have been less willing to require any accounting from sellers of
control. Some strides have been made in the direction of protecting
remaining shareholders where specific profitable opportunities to sell
their shares or the corporation's assets have been diverted into a sale
of control. At the frontier of the cases lies the problem of the owner
of controlling shares who sells control at a premium under circum-
stances which do not entail diversion of such profitable transactions or
which do not result in loss of specific corporate property. Thus far,
the courts have been unwilling to require every seller of control to ac-
count for his profit; control as such has not yet attained the status of
a "corporate asset." There is observable a slight tendency toward a
judicial willingness to break away from the concept of control as a
"natural" incident of the ownership of large blocks of shares. The con-
geries of rights and powers which follow controlling shares are being
segregated for separate examination. As the cases appear before the
courts, and as more and more shareholders point out that specific in-
tangible but describable incidents of controlling shares are improperly
the subject of private bargaining, the courts will be faced with a choice.
Shall they revert to confining accountability only to those cases where
identifiable book assets have been lost as a result of the sale, or shall
they move in the direction of a broad rule of accountability in all control
sale cases? The latter alternative has merit.
The risk of losing the peculiar gains which flow from a control sale
may discourage the purchase and resale of outstanding shares by a
manager or controlling shareholder. Even though a selling share-
holder may not benefit by a corporate recovery of the profit from the
resale of his shares, the corporate remedy may tend to prevent the occa-
sion for a shareholder's complaint from arising. In addition the risks
to remaining shareholders attendant upon basic changes in corporate
policy are already substantial; there should not be added the risk that
such changes will be made because a controlling shareholder is making
a personal profit. It is true that in specific cases integration of the
corporation into an enterprise owned by the purchasers of control may
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result profitably to the corporation, even though such integration re-
quires the abandonment of other potentially profitable opportunities.
This possibility should not obscure the fact that the seller of control
at a premium price is making a unilateral determination that his cor-
poration should gamble on its future prosperity, without consulting
other shareholders to determine whether they are willing to make that
same gamble. The law normally places in the hands of the one who
owns majority shards or can garner majority votes the power of making
decisions with respect to the corporation's future. But the pragmatic
necessity of conducting corporate affairs through rule by the majority
does not justify exercise of majority power when the benefits of that
exercise are all on one side and the risks are all on the other.
If it is objected that a rule requiring accounting for gain when
only control is bargained for and sold will deprive the controlling share-
holder of benefits normally his, it can be said that the conclusion as-
sumes the answer to the question. That the economics of control sales
has traditionally resulted in a private benefit accruing to holders of con-
trol does not prove that the result should be encouraged. A balance of
the interests of all shareholders is involved; only when that balance
has been established may it be stated what the controlling shareholder's
property rights are and what they are not. It may be further objected
that a requirement of accounting for premium prices received from a
sale of control may serve to stagnate corporate ownership, that there
are greater risks from restraining sales of controlling shares than from
permitting new blood to enter the,-cotporation by purchase of control.
Insistence on an even-handed offer to all shareholders may block some
control transfers; it will not block all of them. Further, it is still to be
shown that there is inherent virtue in protecting a system whereby one
block of shareholders largely unresponsive to their fellows is supplanted
by another.288
288. Other methods of changing corporate control, bringing infusions of new
blood, do not possess the inherent disadvantages of the block transfer of control
described in this article. In striking contrast to such block transfers, accomplished
with no publicity and no opportunity for shareholders to exercise informed choices,
is the change or potential change in management which accompanies a proxy con-
test. In corporations under management or minority control, proxy solicitation by
non-managers opens corporate affairs to public debate and creates opportunities for
shareholders to choose between the present management and a proposed new one.
The pressure of outside forces on the internal operations of the corporation may
not result in the substitution of new managers; nevertheless that pressure may have
the beneficial effect of increasing management concern for shareholder interests.
However the fact that minority shareholders of a majority controlled corporation
do not have the same residual voting powers as are held by shareholders of a man-
agement or minority controlled corporation should not dictate results different from
those suggested in this article with respect to block transfers of majority control.
The fact that the voting system cannot be used by such minority holders for their
own protection does not require that other methods of protecting non-controlling
minority interests should be ignored.
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Regard for the interests of scattered and unorganized shareholders
may lead corporate managers and controlling shareholders to refuse
to sell controlling shares unless an eve--h1mned-offer is made by the
prospective buyer to all shareholders. Many managers and controlling
shareholders will adopt this practice without being goaded by the law.
Experience has demonstrated, however, that the standards of business
ethics alone do not carry all before them. It may eventually appear
that fairness to non-controlling shareholders may dictate the adoption
of legislation permitting sales of controlling shares at premium prices
only upon provision being made for the purchase of non-controlling
shares, in a manner now provided in the merger statutes. Until such
time, the federal securities statutes may supply the framework for ju-
dicial appreciation of the fundamental corporate problem involved in
control sales, although the limitations inherent in section 16(b) of
the Exchange Act in its present form and the growing judicial gloss
on rule X-10B-5 may interfere with their utility. The task of develop-
ing the law applicable to control sales may rest heavily on common-law
courts. They have available to them at the present time all of the doc-
trines necessary for handling the control sale cases in a manner con-
sistent with the protection of investor interests. The fragmentary
fashion in which the diverse issues presented by control sales are pre-
sented to those courts should not obscure the necessity for working out
a corporate policy which imposes responsibility where power resides.
In a minority or management-controlled corporation, there is always the possi-
bility that an outsider will prepare for-a proxy fight by garnering a core of shares
from scattered minority holders in order to be able to appeal successfully for addi-
tional votes. The purchase of such a core of shares is almost a necessary incident
of such a process of corporate change, and no criticism is intended of non-controlling
shareholders who sell their shares to an outsider preparing for the proxy contest.
Nor is any criticism directed toward non-controlling shareholders who respond to
a prospective buyer's public call for tenders even though the buyer announces his
intention to acquire a majority of shares; a shareholder selling under such circum-
stances shares with others an opportunity to decide whether to remain with the cor-
poration under new management or to sell out.
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